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Inequality in Latin America became an eminently important topic for me, ever since I participated 
on a university exchange programme in Aracaju (Brazil), which was in the last semester of my 
bachelor’s degree in 2011. During this period it became obvious to me that there were and are high 
levels of inequality in different terms: income, gender, racial, geographical among others. This 
experience inspired me to research deeper into this matter. At the same time, I was overwhelmed 
by the richness of culture and its people. Hereby I officially also have to commit that I am a big fan 
of the Latin American mentality and astonished how the process of intercultural communication 
worked out well throughout the whole time in Brazil. 
During the thesis of my Master´s degree I have revised the literature since decolonisation after the 
second world war written by Latin American authors, to get into the causes and consequences of 
inequality in the Latin American region. One of the main motivations of this work was to understand 
the development theories coming not from foreign authors (usually Western), but from the same 
countries that suffer inequality issues. During the pursuit of solutions to the systemic problem of 
inequality in the region, I have come to experience the richness and quality of research on the topic, 
far from western recipes which, in most cases, overlooks Latin American contexts. 
Of special importance for me was to give this thesis a different angle than the studies within similar 
regions by comparing the evolution of social contracts and their relation to income inequality in two 
very different countries. This risky comparison, even provocative for some, has supposed a 
challenge during the whole thesis. Yet, I feel personally satisfied by humbly contributing to the state 
of the art regarding welfare states in emerging countries, especially given the traditional western 
hegemony around this topic. For supporting my idea I would like to thank my tutor Dr. Marisol García 
who was not only of great help in the process of collecting and finding ideas before actually writing 
the thesis, but especially also throughout the whole time. She always gave me concrete, critical and 
helpful advices and responded not only quickly but also very accurately. Even when she did not 
directly have an answer, she found resources as well as other experts on the topic. Also, I would like 
to thank professor Dr. Juan Tugores, the director of the Master´s degree in Internationalisation and 
my mentor in international sciences, for his invaluable help. He recommended Dr. Marisol Garcia as 
director of the thesis and helped us both with key elements of the thesis, such as the methodology 
or with the access to current debates in economy about inequality.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recently, inequality has been recognised as a more pressing issue than ever before, especially since 
they have been named the most likely global risk by the World Economic Forum and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), as pronounced by its chairwoman Christine Lagarde (2014). 
Income inequality rates have steadily been increasing for the past three decades (Milanovic, 2011).  
However, it was not until 2008, the moment the global financial crisis showed the perverse 
consequences of the dualization of the national societies, when most influential institutions put 
inequality at the centre of global debate. On January 17, 2014, inequality reached the first position 
in a ranking carried out by the World Economic Forum on global risks for the second year in a row 
(2014).  
Reputable international organisations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
have revealed in their respective works “Structural Change for Equality: An Integrated Approach to 
Development” and “Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising,” that although the tools 
actually do exist to tackle inequality, policy-makers have not been able to implement effective 
policies to face this phenomenon (ECLAC, 2012) (OECD, 2011). The global financial crisis has put 
socioeconomic inequality in the centre of the debate. According to reputable economists such as 
Joseph Stiglitz, the stagnation of workers' wages on the one hand and the incidence of patrimony 
among the wealthiest on the other, constitute two of the main causes of the growth in inequality, 
which was further fuelled by indebtedness and speculation before the financial bubble burst. People 
with medium-low income paid for this more than any other group, especially in those countries in 
which a policy of austerity has been undertaken (Crouch 2011) (Atkinson, 2015). High 
unemployment rates, the decrease of real wages, and a long recession were the consequences of 
this policy. After the reopening of the casino, so to speak, and next boom in stock markets with the 
help of central banks, inequality still increases in practically every country.  
Even IMF economists, traditionally known as one the most orthodox economic institutions, have 
written about inequality in these terms: “Because crises are costly, redistribution policies that 
prevent excessive household indebtedness and reduce crisis-risk ex-ante can be more desirable 
from a macroeconomic stabilization point of view than ex-post policies such as bailouts or debt 
restructurings” (Kumhof et. al, 2010: 3). Conversely, other IMF texts demonstrate the relation 
between low inequality levels and the robustness of economic growth (Berg et. al, 2011).  
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The recent crisis has changed the way we look at inequality. Decades ago inequality was 
characterised as an incentive to increase economic performance; it was not seen as a problem but 
as a requirement to obtain economic growth. Currently, inequality is not seen as a solely social 
phenomenon, but is also perceived as an economic issue which negatively influences economic 
performance1. In EUA since 2009, 95% of all the increases of incomes are gained by the richest 1% 
of the population (Stiglitz, 2013). This fully coincides with other similar trends: between 1976 and 
2007 the same highest proportion had secured 58% of the increases of incomes (Atkinson et al., 
2011). However if one looks at patrimony distributions, inequality figures are far greater than 
income distribution. Almost half of the worldwide patrimony belongs to the richest 1% of the world 
(Credit Suisse (2018). Despite these pieces of evidence, economic growth and material well-being 
of most of the population are two concepts which are clearly: which are often treated separately in 
contemporary discourse. 
The main aim of this study is no more than to shed light on the role of social contract in inequality 
rates. This is undertaken through a comparative study between two paradigmatic examples, namely 
Germany and Brazil, whose income inequality levels are dramatically different: On the one hand, (a) 
in Germany, the richest 5% earn 4.5 times the income of the poorest 20%, performing far better 
than the rest of the world on average. (Dauderstädt/ Keltek, 2011). (b) On the other hand, in Brazil 
the numbers look radically differ from the German ones. Branko Milanovic (2011) analyses the 
position every ventile of the Brazilian population compared with the world income distribution. The 
results demonstrate that Brazil contains almost the full spectrum of income populations from the 
poorest to the richest worldwide, however, the proportion of poor Brazilians is much larger than 
the middle and upper ones. For example, Milanovic (2011) states that just 50% of the Brazilian 
population is richer than the poorest 5% in the US. 
Despite these differences in terms of income inequality, if one looks at the figures in relative terms 
the picture changes. Brazil has been able to reduce income inequality since 1990 while Germany has 
experienced the opposite trend. Figure 10 shows that the difference of the Gini coefficient has 
steadily been reduced by almost 0.1 points from 1990 to 2014 in Brazil. The surprising and even 
provocative statement that Brazil has performed better than Germany, the former being one of the 
paradigms of the welfare state and the latter one of the most unequal countries in the world, 
represents one of the main reasons to study the causes of this phenomenon. 
                                                          





1. CAUSES OF INCOME INEQUALITY 
How can income inequality be reduced? There is a vast literature regarding this topic. One of the 
most recent studies: Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization, undertaken by 
the influential Branko Milanovic (2016), former Chief Economic Director of the World Bank, brings 
out an updated and thorough view of the current situation of income inequality worldwide, as well 
as its main drivers. However, this same author stated in a recent interview: “The new solutions 
against income inequality are not invented yet.”2 According to this view the traditional approaches 
combating inequality are not effective anymore in developed countries, however they could work 
in developing countries. While it is true that global inequality between countries has been 
extraordinarily reduced, inequality within countries is steadily increasing. The richest are richer 
whereas the poorest are poorer. Furthermore, Milanovic (2016) argues that education is perhaps 
the only serious determinant of inequality that remains important to improve income distribution. 
He stresses the fact that this is not a matter of quantity but quality, above all in developed countries 
where universal education is already massively extended and young people must stand out among 
their peers to overcome the barrier of poverty. By contrast, redistribution of income through 
taxation does not have much margin of manoeuvre, since the middle-class is already straining under 
the limits of this pressure. Furthermore, the misuse of public funds may increase the unrest of 
taxpayers. 
Other authors, such as the sociologist Wolfgang Streeck (2016) goes even further in respect to the 
causes of increasing inequality within countries, especially in the developed countries during the 
last two decades. He shows intrinsic reasons to justify the systemic high inequality rates, directly 
correlated with the characteristic institutions of capitalism which serve and are made around the 
market. In his last book, How Will Capitalism End? he anticipates the end of capitalism. According 
to him, the protagonistic role of capital after the victory of capitalism at the end of the Cold War is 
undermining the relation between democracy and capitalism which has been seen as the 
predominant socioeconomic paradigm or model since then. He states that “before capitalism goes 
to hell, it will remain in limbo in the near future, dead or close to it due to an overdose of itself but 
still kicking, because no one will have the power to remove the decomposing corpse” Wolfgang 
Streeck (2016). According to him, the systemic inequality is so high that the implicit agreement, in 
                                                          




terms of social contract, between the middle class and the richest is about to break down. The 
proportion of wealth of the latter is increasing to a greater extent than most of the society from 
which they obtain their wealth. The main problem is that this marriage of democracy and capitalism 
is coming to an end because the power of redistributing the resources is not in the hands of national 
governments. Instead, it rests on international institutions and central banks, all of which exist 
within an opaque sphere in comparison to the public sector which is subjected to public scrutiny 
(Streeck, 2016). 
 
2. WHY SOCIAL CONTRACT? 
The concept of social contract comprises two counterparts: the state on the one hand and the citizen 
on the other. This simple but powerful fact is one of the key arguments of the thesis’ reasoning. If 
the social contract may affect the income inequality of individuals and citizens who participate in 
the social contract, in a democratic country its citizens may have certain margins within which they 
can affect income inequality. In other words, Brazilians and Germans are affected by the income 
inequality of one another’s country, however, they theoretically have the power to change it3. 
Hence, the results of this logic are remarkably interesting due to its link with politics. It is 
paradigmatic of how every country reacts politically in different ways in regard to inequality rates 
and their different consequences. For instance, while in one country with low rates of inequality, 
politicians might be punished, in another with a higher degree of inequality politicians might be 
approved or legitimised by its citizens. The conception of social justice is intrinsically linked with 
these phenomena. The origin of social contract departs from the Rousseau´s concept of natural law 
related to this concept of social justice. In Germany, for example one headline of a reputable 
newspaper states: “The battle over perceptions of inequality and justice could be at the heart of 
September’s national election”4. This in a country whose income inequality rates have been 
historically low, especially compared to developing countries such as China, India, or Brazil (UN, 
2013: 36). Still, the Germans’ feeling that theirs is a society of social justice is declining dramatically. 
This dilemma about income inequality and its perception by the citizens brings up the question: 
Why is the social contract not broken yet in a country with high level income 
inequality rates, such as Brazil, yet in Germany, with much lower degree of 
                                                          
3 Considering a perfect democracy, complying with freedom and transparency standards.  
4 Retrieved from Aljazeera: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/germany-booming-
left-170409073343721.html. Date of consultation??? 
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inequality, the social contract is experiencing an increasing stress with political and 
social tension and unrest? 
Many authors have tackled economic inequality and have tried to understand the causes of income 
inequality rates (Atkinson, 2015; Piketty, 2014; Niehues, 2010; Anderson, D'Orey, Duvendack, & 
Esposito, 2017; Rudra, 2004). The socioeconomic institutions that define a specific welfare state of 
a country according to Esping-Andersen are family, market, and state. This set of institutions that 
define the welfare state of a country evolve together with the concepts of social conflict and 
citizenship. Therefore, the evolution of the configuration of social contracts is explained with the 
dynamics of social conflict and citizenship up to the present, taking welfare state policies as the 
outcome of the social contract. In line with research on welfare states, this thesis follows a new 
current of studies regarding the welfare states in emerging countries.  
This study focuses on both: (a) the formal character of the social contract, in other words, how the 
division between population under formal versus the ones in informal conditions affects income 
inequality; and (b) the configuration of social contract through welfare state policies as a key 
determinant of income levels in a country. Within the welfare state, I analyse the institutions that 
shape the social contract and their function as a welfare provider to understand their redistributive 
character, as measured by a quantitative study and a descriptive analysis. Social security systems, 
generally, are based on contributory benefits whose entitlement is related to the contribution to 
the social security budget. On the contrary, social assistance policies are based on citizenship and/or 
need and put the focus on the poorest strata. Thus, to measure the degree of formality of the social 
contract I chose two variables: public social expenditure and social security contributors; both 
variables are used as the explanatory variables for income inequality, the dependent variables.  
Later, I undertake a descriptive study using the welfare state classification of Esping-Andersen 
(1990) to explain the results of the quantitative study. I define the different welfare state institutions 
of both countries through their financing (who pays it) and entitlement (who benefits from it). The 
main goal of this analysis is to understand the effect of the variations in the welfare policies in 
different contexts of development (very different cases). But it is also to understand the dynamics 
of welfare states within each country from 1990 to 2016. 
● Similar approaches from social contract  
My proposition regarding the determinants of income inequality differs from other studies that 
describe the relation between social contract and inequality. Here I show other studies that have 
contributed to this topic: 
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Firstly, while on the one hand, generally workers who have access to collective bargaining 
experience an increment in their salaries, those who are underemployed or working in precarious 
labour markets suffer consistent decrements in their real income (Stockhammer, 2013). On the 
other hand, the rents from capitals have been steadily growing since 1980 to a higher degree than 
the real economy, resulting in greater patrimonial concentration and reduction of middle class 
(Piketty, 2014) 
Secondly, other authors such as Stiglitz (2013) mention that welfare levels and economic growth 
may not necessarily be correlated. For instance, taking the United States as the paradigm of 
developed countries, since 2009 95% of the increments in income are concentrated in the richest 
proportion of the population. But this trend is not only present in the United States; a study 
undertaken by Credit Suisse (2018) demonstrates that the richest percentile of ODCE countries 
overall have had their income increase unequally.  
Finally, fiscal and redistribution policies have not been able to soften the above mentioned 
divergences to the same proportion.  It is a fact: tax rates coming from capital income are far lower 
than the ones coming from work. In Germany, for example, the rate for the former is 25% whereas 
the maximum rate for the latter is around 45%. The difference is even higher when accounting for 
patrimony and work taxes, the wide range of possibilities regarding tax evasion, and fraud. Some 
studies mention that the richest 85 people worldwide possess more patrimony than half of the 
global population (Oxfam, 2013) and the income from the richest 1% of the population is equal to 
the poorest 50% (Credit Suisse, 2018). 
 
3. COMPARATIVE GERMANY VS. BRAZIL 
The question, inequality of what? is particularly relevant when introducing a comparison between 
Brazil and Germany, given the notable contrast between them regarding Sen´s idea of functionings 
and capabilities5. One person, in order to achieve a certain level of wellbeing does not enjoy the 
same number of functionings in Germany as they might in Brazil. For example, the macroeconomic 
performance of one or another country has influence over the wellbeing of their citizens. Interest 
rates and inflation during the last two and a half decades (considering the time frame of the present 
                                                          
5 Functionings are defined by Sen as the set of beings and doings that constitute the well-being of a person. 
On the other hand, capability represents the aggregate of functionings that the person can, in fact, reach. 
This set of vectors of functionings indicate one´s freedom to have one kind of life or another. Nevertheless, 
the capability to achieve functionings will show a person´s freedom to reach his or her feeling of wellbeing 
(Sen, 1992: 5). 
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thesis) varied widely between Brazil and Germany. While for the latter the inflation has evolved with 
relative stability, for the former it has been the central issue because of its unprecedented growth 
during the early 1990s, regardless of the attempts of the government to control it by increasing 
interest rates that affect private consumption rates, which in turn affect the wellbeing of Brazilians. 
Sen (1992) highlights this trade-off between freedom and wellbeing, and he puts the focus on 
countries instead of individuals as a subject of study for inequality, raising political implications 
regarding this issue. These political aspects6 refer to the capability (also called entitlement) of a 
citizen to enjoy certain arrays of goods or benefits (functionings) solely because of their nationality. 
Even though the absolute wealth of a country may, to some extent, influence the amount of 
functionings or benefits their citizens may enjoy, the principle of equality of opportunities rests 
mainly on political decisions, in relative terms.   
Much has been written about welfare states in developed countries by authors such as Titmuss 
(1947); Esping-Andersen (1990) (1999); Pierson (1998); Gough et. Al. (1997); Mishra (1999); Korpi & 
Palme (1998); Ferrera, Hemerijck & Rhodes (2001); Pierson & Castles (2000). However, the welfare 
classifications created by Titmuss (1947) and later, Esping-Andersen (1990) only fit developed 
countries. Latin American countries do not necessarily fall into these welfare classifications since 
they have developed more heterodox ways of facing the socioeconomic inequalities in which they 
have fallen since the early 1980s, also called the lost decade. Brazil is an example that shows one of 
the sharpest declines in income inequality terms from 1990 to the present, despite the remaining 
huge gaps between the different spheres of their society. Brazil has achieved this through a hybrid 
model named liberal neo-developmentalism (Cornel, 2013) which does not purely fit into any 
category of the western classification of welfare states provided by Titmuss (1947) or Esping-
Andersen (1990). On the other hand, Germany, as one of the pioneers of the welfare state along 
with Bismarck, still represents the paradigm of the corporatist welfare model, according to Esping-
Andersen (1990). However, when external and internal shocks, such as unification and globalisation, 
hit the German socioeconomic structures, income inequality steadily increased from 1990 until 2004 
(OECD, 2016) (Eurostat, 2017). These opposite trends in income inequality terms, Germany being a 
paradigm of the welfare state unlike Brazil, one of the world’s most unequal countries, raises one's 
interest in determining the reasons for this unexpected phenomenon.  
The selection of Germany and Brazil was in response to some similarities that render them 
comparable: (a) during the time-frame chosen for this study, from 1990 to 2016, both have faced 
                                                          
6 Developed in Chapter 2, section 3.2. Debates in Economics around Inequality. 
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internal shocks. In 1989 Brazil enjoyed its first year of democracy after 29 years of dictatorship, and 
the first elected government, with Fernando Collor´s administration, faced a difficult economic 
situation characterized by hyperinflation and stagnation inherited from the lost decade. In Germany, 
the reunification of the country took place in 1990 and it has posed a tremendous challenge to the 
country that even today, in 2018, still needs to be overcome as demonstrated by the fact that the 
general tax Solidaritätszuschlag7 remains in place. (b) Both are the most populated countries in their 
respective regions, Europe and Latin America. Therefore both are representative of their regions in 
quantitative terms if one extrapolates the results to their respective regions. In Chapter 2 historical 
backgrounds of Brazil and Germany are described with the touchpoints that sustain the argument 
for the comparison of these two countries is relevant given recent history.  
While it is true that the comparison of these two very distinct countries present a challenge and 
some limitations are going to be difficult to overcome, all the data needed for the study is treated 
by the author to make the information comparable and thus does not compromise the reliability of 
the analysis. 
 
4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Two different socioeconomic models of social contract are being compared in this thesis. While 
social security policies have traditionally been more important for Germany in improving inequality 
levels after the reunification process, social assistance policies seem to have been more important 
for Brazil in tackling the systemically high levels of income inequality. The first research question is 
focused on the effect of the independent variables, namely social security contributors and social 
expenditure, on the explained variable, income inequality. For this purpose, the statistical model is 
applied to Brazil, Germany, and both together as a case study. The answer to the following research 
question will shed light on the formality of social contracts: 
Which variable, social security contributors or social expenditure, is shown to have 
more of an impact on the reduction of income inequality in the analysis of two 
distinct countries, Germany and Brazil? 
However, by answering this first question, the effects of social contracts in income inequality, when 
analysing different institutional contexts, remain unclear. Correspondingly in the second research 
question, Germany and Brazil are analysed separately to analyse the influence of these variables in 
                                                          
7 Solidarity surcharge: Introduced in 1991 to fund the rebuilding of East Germany after reunification, it 
was supposed to be temporary but there is no agreement on when to end it yet. 
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their national institutional configuration. The second research question is not only variable, but also 
case oriented. This shall clarify, which of the two welfare approaches is more effective in terms of 
redistribution: 
To what extent may the lessons from a developed country such as Germany, which 
is a paradigm of the corporatist welfare state, be applied to Brazil to reduce its high 
income inequality levels? 
In order to answer this question, two very different approaches of welfare state policies from Brazil 
and Germany are taken to study their impact on income inequality from 1990 to 2016.  On the one 
hand the (a) Corporatist-welfare model, represented by Germany (Esping-Andersen, 1990), and on 
the other hand; the (b) hybrid between a Residual and Universal model (Cornel, 2013). Both have 
been proven to possess advantages and drawbacks regarding their impact on income inequality: 
(a) The social contract in Germany rests on the Corporatist-Statist welfare approach (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). This welfare model derives from the Coordinated Market Economy which 
has characterised Germany since WWII, which is based on a strong job market characterised 
by high added value industry, as well as a high wages model (Streeck, 1995). During the 
following two and a half decades, most of the employment offered by the system was under 
these conditions and people not covered or included by this model were assumed as 
collateral damage and covered by the welfare state benefits, including health and education 
(Streeck, 1995). The generous welfare state model of Germany was financed mainly by 
employers and workers and was only affordable so long as the country kept its high level of 
employment and decent growth rates. After the shock of the re-unification in the 1990s, 
rising competition due to globalisation, and later the financial crisis in 2007, growth rates 
substantially decreased, especially in comparison to the former thirty glorious years 
denominated by the Wirtschaftswunder (Economic Miracle). This phenomenon together 
with the growing proportion of the elderly in the population provoke strain on the welfare 
system, with a lot of people finding themselves outside of the high-skills high-wages model, 
either unemployed or working in lower conditions (Leisering, 2000) (Allen, 2010). The 
unemployed do benefit from the welfare system. However, the system can not provide the 
same social services as it had in past years because the number of contributors, and 
therefore the re-distribution budget, is lower. To sum up, even though the welfare system 
still works in Germany the duality of social contracts within the country has increased 
income inequality and thus social unrest and political tensions have arisen. 
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(b) The other model identified to articulate the social contract is a mix between the citizenship 
basic goods approach used in Brazil and a strong contributory social security system, which 
benefited the Brazilians working in the formal labour market. The formal social contract in 
Brazil has traditionally represented a substantial portion of the social budget, although only 
a small proportion of the total society benefited from it (IPEA, 2016a) (MTPS, 2014). Apart 
from those just mentioned, the high level of informal economy has left the majority of 
people out of the social security system. This results in dependence on non-contributory 
subsidies and public services such as health or education, which perpetuate the situation of 
the worst-off of the population (Fleury, 2017). In 1990, the strategy of the newly elected 
government paid more attention to poverty alleviation policies than its predecessors. In 
order to improve inequality rates, and despite the remaining differences between social 
security and social assistance expenditure, there was an increase in social policies based on 
means testing, bringing 25.4 million Brazilians out of extreme poverty8 between 1990 to 
2015 (World Bank, 2018a).  
Three hypotheses of this thesis are related to the set of social policies used in each country, namely 
the corporatist and the basic goods approach in income inequality terms. Germany represents the 
characteristics of a developed country and Brazil represents the Latin American socioeconomic 
structures:  
H1: Generally, an increase in the social budget9 is important in reducing income 
inequality. However, the direction of the social expenditure determines the effect 
of this measure. The social policies based on the formal social contract, which are 
focused on the middle-working class working under the formality conditions, are 
predictably more effective in income inequality reduction than the residual ones. 
However, non-contributory social policies with low levels of social security 
contributors may improve inequality in high poverty contexts with a significant 
number of citizens living under informality conditions.  
H2: Using the Esping-Andersen´s welfare classifications (1990), the corporatist 
welfare model is effective in reducing income inequality as long as the formal labour 
market remains strong in the country. The combination of both elements has 
proven very effective for Germany, as it has enjoyed one of the lowest income 
                                                          
8 Number of poor at 1.9$ a day. 
9 According to the OECD (2018) definition of social expenditure. 
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inequality levels by following this Bismarckian approach after WWII until the late 
1980s when the reunification happened. While the hybrid welfare model of Brazil, 
which pays more attention to the poor, has been characteristic of capitalist 
societies. And traditionally the most capitalist societies, such as the US, represented 
arguably the most unequal ones among the developed countries. While, at the same 
time, Brazil maintains a public social security system whose beneficiaries do not 
represent the whole working class of the country due to the high levels of 
informality. 
H3: The socioeconomic structures, in terms of development, suppose a determinant 
for income inequality when the same welfare model is followed by different 
countries. In a context of high levels of informality, such as Brazil, residual policies 
may reduce income inequality levels until a certain level of formality is reached, then 
a corporatist welfare model might be more effective in reducing income inequality 
levels.  
 
5. DESIGN OF THE THESIS AND OUTLINE 
This study belongs to the body of literature that tries to identify the determinants of income 
inequality through a cross-national comparative institutional perspective. These kinds of 
comparisons are less studied, probably because of endogeneity problems (Niehues, 2010). 
Comparative analysis has always been a universal method in the social sciences, and in a broad 
sense, all social-empiric analysis is comparative in some way. In particular, the term comparative 
analysis has been used for large macrosocial units, in the case of this study the macrosocial units 
are the nations Brazil and Germany. The more specific discipline within the social science sphere, 
comparative social science, encompasses the cross-societal differences and similarities (Ragin, 
1987). 
For the quantitative study, Germany and Brazil represent the cases of this longitudinal comparative 
study, which are analysed from 1990 to 2016, or the latest data available depending on the source 
of the database. The concepts of the study, which have already been introduced, have to be 
converted into variables to undertake the quantitative analysis and this operationalisation process 
is done as follows10: (a) The dependent variable, income inequality, is measured by the Gini index 
                                                          
10 Figure 12 shows a visual representation of the design of the study. 
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composed by different indicators. (b) The concept of social contract is measured through two 
variables, social expenditure and social security contributors, which represent the explanatory 
variables. (c) Also, a control variable is added to the analysis to test the inference between the 
independent variables and the explained one and solving problems of endogeneity of the regression 
study. Education as the control variable is measured by the secondary school enrolment indicator.  
The dependency relation between the explanatory variables together with the control is tested 
through a multiple linear regression. This statistical model is commonly used to test the relationship 
between two or more explanatory variables and a response variable by fitting a linear equation to 
observed data. Specifically, the chosen model is the linear regression with panel-corrected standard 
errors, which is used by the STATA software to analyse the relation between the chosen variables. 
“The xtpcse is an alternative to feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) for fitting linear cross-
sectional time-series models when the disturbances are not assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.). Instead, the disturbances are assumed to be either heteroskedastic 
across panels or heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels. The 
disturbances may also be assumed to be autocorrelated within panel, and the autocorrelation 
parameter may be constant across panels or different for each panel”11. This model is chosen in 
order to try to resolve the limitations that may arise from the nature of this study: a longitudinal 
analysis with a small number of cases. 
The descriptive study, undertaken in Chapter 5, attempts to give an explanation for the results of 
the empirical study from Chapter 4 by analysing the following elements: the direction of social 
expenditure (how to spend the social budget) and the finance of this social budget (who contributes 
to the welfare state). Social expenditure allocations are divided and analysed through a longitudinal 
study from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s to understand the modifications in the social 
expenditure function in both countries. Afterwards, the different components of the social budget 
are classified from a sociological perspective following the so-called welfare classification of Esping-
Andersen (1990). This descriptive analysis frames the results of this study within the current debates 
about the different outcomes of a welfare model in one and another socioeconomic context, 
especially within the discussions between less developed and OECD countries. 
 
                                                          
11 Retrieved from: https://www.stata.com/manuals13/xtxtpcse.pdf 
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6. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The first Chapter after the introduction of this thesis (Chapter 2) presents the conceptual 
architecture of the thesis. In this Chapter I delve into the main concepts of this dissertation and the 
current debates around them. The main concepts developed and analysed during the first part of 
the thesis are: inequality, social contracts and welfare states. From these primary concepts there 
are other secondary ones that are more specific: income inequality, social conflict, citizenship, and 
welfare states in emerging countries. Also, I introduce the main indicators to be used to measure 
these concepts during the thesis. The Chapter unfolds in this way: First, the relevance of income 
inequality is highlighted as the dependent variable of the study as well as its desirability (or not), 
different kinds of income inequality and its measurement; Atkinson, Piketty and Amartya Sen are 
among the main references. Then, origins of the concept of the social contract is explained, starting 
with the philosophers Rousseau, Home and Locke. Then I revise the Esping-Andersen´s welfare 
classification. Lastly, the new concept of welfare states in emerging countries is explained through 
references to its main figures, such as Fernando Filgueira and Juliana Martinez.  
In the following Chapter (Chapter 3), a historical analysis of the evolution of the socioeconomic 
models in both countries is undertaken. First, the historical sequence will be divided into the most 
relevant periods that later will be analysed in detail. The main aim of this Chapter is to contextualise 
the analysis in both countries and to provide a solid background analysis of both countries that may 
help in understanding the current social contract and income inequality outcomes. To follow a 
logical pattern, the dichotomy presented in the book Varieties of Capitalism by Hall & Soskice (2001) 
between Liberal Market Economies (LME) and Coordinated Market Economies (CME) serves as a 
guiding tool to analyse and understand the German model. This reasoning is also followed by 
Wolfgang Streeck, Kathleen Thelen (2005) and Christopher Allen (1997), being that Germany is 
repetitively named as exemplifying the paradox of CME, as opposed to Anglo-Saxon countries such 
as the UK or US. The Structuralism current of thinking, first named by Raul Prebish after WWII, is the 
central threat that guides the analysis of Brazil.  Structuralism put into question the equality of 
international free-trade relations encouraged by Western countries, since primary-export countries 
lose against more industrialised regions (Prebish, 1962). 
After the historical analysis, I start with the core of the empirical analysis in Chapter 4 and Chapter 
5. First, I show the design of the study. Given the fact that this thesis is defined as a comparative 
study, throughout Chapter 4 I frame this thesis within the spectre of comparative studies in 
sociology, in this case it will be defined as an apple and oranges comparative study. Moreover, the 
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election of both variable oriented as well as case oriented studies12 is explained since they answer 
different research questions. Then, I go through the operationalization of the concepts, namely 
income inequality, social contract, and education. Thereafter, datasets used for the study are named 
as are the amendments to make them suitable for the empirical study. Lastly, the limitations of this 
methodology are highlighted. In the same line, in Chapter 5 the empirical analysis is undertaken. 
First, the specific formula and the different elements of the regression are described so that the 
results may be interpreted. Then the lagged and lead variables are named and explained before the 
analysis is conducted. Lastly, a first general summary of the results is presented to the reader with 
the most striking points emphasized, and the gross results from every regression is also shown in 
the appendix.  
Once the results of the empirical study are shown, in Chapter 6 they will be interpreted through a 
more in-depth analysis of the welfare states of both countries. Specially, I focus on the direction of 
social expenditure (how to spend the social budget) and the finance of this social budget (who 
contributes to the welfare state), social security contributors or taxpayers. Social expenditure 
allocations are divided and analysed from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s (depending on data 
availability) to understand the modifications in the social expenditure function in Brazil and 
Germany. All the different components of the social budget are descriptively classified from a 
sociological perspective following the so-called welfare classification of Esping-Andersen (1990). 
Through this analysis I aim to explain the results of the empirical study, but also the dynamics in 
welfare state policies in both countries. The main aspects of welfare policies that I tackle during this 
Chapter are related to: (a) the social security versus the social assistance policies, (b) the in-kind 
versus the cash transfers social policies, (c) the entitlements of social policies, (d) the financing of 
social policies and, (d) the different effect of social policies according the degree of development. 
Lastly, in the Conclusions section of this thesis I include the main contribution it makes, its 
limitations, and considerations for further studies. Chapter 7, therefore aims to provide the main 
contribution of this thesis to current debates around welfare studies and above all the welfare state 
in emerging countries. Additionally, I show the most striking points from the empirical and the 
descriptive analyses to answer the research questions of this thesis and test the hypothesis stated 
at the beginning of the thesis. I conclude with some recommendations for further research related 
to the limitations of the dissertation which are also mentioned at the end of this Chapter. 
                                                          
12 A variable-oriented study aims to generalise relations between variables. A case-oriented study aims to 














CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND ARGUMENTATION OF THE THESIS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The main aim of this Chapter is to show the reader the conceptual framework in which this thesis is 
based on. This task is extremely important not only for procedural reasons but to frame this thesis 
within the current debates in the social sciences. The vast literature about the two concepts namely, 
inequality and social contract, represent opportunities as well as challenges for the author. On the 
one hand, the topic of inequality has traditionally been discussed at length by social scientists due 
to the relevancy of the topic throughout modern history, especially since the industrial revolution 
and the beginning of capitalism as it is currently known. The social contract has also been widely 
discussed since the philosophers Hobbes, Hume, and Rousseau started to deal with these issues. On 
the other hand, it is a challenge to try to fill a gap within the ocean of literature regarding both 
concepts and the relation between them. This thesis does not pretend to be more than a modest 
contribution to this debate. 
In this Chapter the concepts are described one at a time, starting with inequality. There is an 
interdisciplinary character to inequality, as both sociologists and economists have spilled much ink 
discussing. While it is true that sociology has been more prolific in discussing the dimensions of 
inequality, economists, traditionally reluctant to discuss topics outside of the market, have recently 
focused on the concept of inequality, its causes and consequences. Furthermore, in this Chapter I 
outline the operationalisation process of inequality, from the concept to the variable, and I will 
justify why I take the Gini Index as the indicator to measure income inequality.  
Then, the concept of the social contract will be described as a determinant of income inequality. 
The philosophical origins of the concept will be traced through to the construction of the current 
institutions of social contract, namely welfare states. The institutions that shape the social contract 
are the pillars of this analysis, particularly their function as a welfare provider and their redistributive 
character. This set of institutions represent the result of an historical evolution that may be 
interpreted through different angles. The evolution of the configuration of social contracts is 
undertaken following the rails of social conflict and citizenship up to the present when welfare states 
represent the maximum manifestation of the social contract. Within the welfare states section, I 
highlight the emergence of a new current of studies regarding the welfare states in emerging 
countries. The following section delves into the formality character of the social contract, given the 
fact that this thesis classifies welfare states according to their degree of formality and social 
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expenditure. Lastly, I show the way in which I measure the complex concept of social contract 
through the two variables, namely social expenditure and social security contributors. I will explain 
why I take these two variables. At the end of the Chapter, I argue why I chose education as a control 
variable for the analysis in this thesis. Education is assumed to be a driver of socioeconomic equality 
by both economists and sociologists, and I show the arguments for this from the perspective of 
social scientists belonging to each of those disciplines to support this assumption.  
 
2. FLOWCHART OF THE CHAPTER 
I start the Chapter with a flowchart in order to show its structure to the reader. By doing this I try to 
facilitate the comprehension of the conceptual framework of the thesis. This flowchart is divided 
into two parts: (a) the general summary of the concepts to be used in this thesis. (b) A brief 
explanation of the operationalisation process from the concepts to the variables, to advance the 
elements to be further developed.  
As the main concepts of this thesis are inequality and social contract, I start by defining the two 
concepts and I subsequently show the way to measure these concepts through the chosen variables 
and indicators.  I name the most significant elements such as the authors, the questions to be 




































See figure 2. Concept of Inequality 
 
See figure 3. Variable and Indicator of Inequality 
See figure 5. Concept of social contract 
See figure 6. Variables and Indicators of Inequality 
See figure 7.- Cases of study 
See figure 4. Dependency relation Inequality & Social contract 
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Figure 3. Variable and Indicator of Inequality 
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 I will begin with the debates around the concept of inequality, starting with the sociological 
literature, which is traditionally more prolific on this topic than other disciplines. Later, I show and 
confront the debates around inequality for economists, who tend to be more reluctant to work on 
topics outside of the market. However, some authors and international institutions have recently 
shown concern about the consequences of high levels of inequality. In this section, I will try to 
explain key decisions about the selection of inequality as the phenomenon to be explained by this 
thesis, why income inequality in particular, and how to measure income inequality. 
 
Origin of the social contract and its 
modern translation into welfare 
state classifications. New sub-
classification: welfare states in 
emerging countries.  
Criterion to define social contracts: 
formality and informality. 
Figure 5. Concept of Social Contract 
Variables to define the 
formality of the social contract. 
The relation between security 
contributors and social 
expenditure represents the 
degree of formality of the 
national social contract. 
Figure 6. Variables and Indicators of Inequality 
Two cases of study: Germany and Brazil. A 
corporatist welfare model from a developed 
country and a hybrid welfare model from an 
emerging country. 
Figure 7. Cases of Study 
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3.1. INEQUALITY: SOCIOLOGICAL DEBATES 
Even though this thesis focuses on the economic aspects of inequality, a decision which will be 
explained later on, it is useful to frame this thesis within the wide sociological literature explaining 
the different factors that contribute to social inequality. In the Marxian and Weberian traditions 
(Wright, 2005; Goldthorpe, 1980; Dahrendorf, 1959; T.H. Marshall, 1981) as well as from the 
functionalist perspective, studies of social inequality have produced a rich body of analysis (Parsons, 
1970; Davis, 1953; Moore, 1963). Sociologists have developed sophisticated analyses that cover 
different stratification models which lead to various types of social inequalities. The main three 
approaches are related to the distribution of wealth (Marxist tradition), the distribution of power 
(Weberian traditions) and the stratification of systems (Functionalism). Moreover, social inequality 
manifests itself across gender, age, place of residence and among groups with diverse ethnic and 
cultural origin. The combinations of these variables make the study of social inequalities highly 
complex according to sociological perspectives and require considerable nuances. In order to 
understand social inequality and make the different models of stratification comparable I have 
taken the classification of Grusky (2001) (see Table 1) of assets that can be valuable intrinsically (e.g. 
consumption goods), excluding secondary goods (e.g. investments) that may be convertible into 
them. 
Table 1. Dimensions of Inequality according to Asset Groups 
Asset 
Group 
Selected Examples Relevant Scholars 
1. Economic  Ownership of land, farms, factories, 
professional practices, businesses, liquid assets, 
humans (i.e., slaves), labour power (e.g., serfs) 
Karl Marx; Erik Wright 
2. Political  Household authority (e.g., head of household); 
workplace authority (e.g., manager); party and 
societal authority (e.g., legislator); charismatic 
leader 
Max Weber; Ralf 
Dahrendorf 
3. Cultural  High-status consumption practices; "good 
manners"; privileged lifestyle 




4. Social  Access to high-status social networks, social 
ties, associations and clubs, union memberships 
W. Lloyd Warner; James 
Coleman 
5. Honorific  Prestige; "good reputation”; fame; deference 
and derogation; ethnic and religious purity 
Edward Shils; Donald 
Treiman 
6. Civil  Rights of property, contract, franchise, and 
membership in elective assemblies; freedom of 
association and speech 
T. H. Marshall; Rogers 
Brubaker 
7. Human  Skills; expertise; on-the-job training; experience; 
formal education; knowledge 
Kaare Svalastoga; Gary 
Becker 
Source: (Grusky, 2001: 4) 
Taking this stratification model as a reference, Table 2 was constructed to describe and compare 
the main theories of social inequality and the debates among them. In the first column I name the 
asset as the reward package which differentiates the social classes; in the second column the unit 
analysis is taken, which is the unit which is used as the object of analysis by each author; lastly, the 
combination of assets in different units of analysis create different causal paths towards social 
inequality, the phenomenon that is to be explained by these authors as well as this thesis. Through 
the construction of this generic scheme I aim to simplify the different theories of social inequality 
and, more importantly, make them comparable to understand the social stratification debate. This 
section will hopefully help to better explain the position of this thesis within the debates of 












Marx presents the concept of social class as a radical two-classes dichotomy between workers and 
capital owners (Grusky, 2001). For him, the differences in social classes are based on the ownership 
of the means of production. He saw domination and power as inherent to class as a driver of 
inequality. Marx’s class understanding was framed by social conflict and therefore class conflict was 
inevitable. This conceptualisation was later challenged by Weber, who referred to inequality in 
relation to the differences in life chances inherent to the position in the labour market.  Marx 
advocates for a social-conflict perspective to understand socioeconomic inequality from a historical 
perspective. This control over resources influences the bargaining power of owners and workers, 
which involves a conflict over production, not over distribution, as Weber points out. The only way 
to undermine this control over resources (and therefore to limit the exploitative relation), is by the 
organisation of the proletariat who will eventually overturn capitalism after leading a social 
revolution. A milder more reformist version of Marxian ideas puts the emphasis on unionisation 
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obtain property rights over the means of production. This control is present through co-
determination schemes, representation in the board of directors, or employee stock options 
(Wright, 2005) 
Weber and Marx do share some views about class-stratification as Parkin (1979: 25) claims: “inside 
every neo-Marxist there seems to be a Weberian struggling to get out”. The contributions of Marx 
to the class debate derive from the insight that control over the means of production leads to 
exploitative relations between the owner and the worker. The term ‘exploitation’ became the 
pivotal anchor on which the class theory from Marx is constructed. This interdependence of material 
interests fulfils the following three criteria13: 
- The inverse interdependence principle: which means that the interests of the owners are 
satisfied at the expense of the workers and vice versa.  
- The exclusion principle: the interdependence relation between owners and workers 
necessarily comes from the exclusion of the exploited to the means of production.  
- The appropriation principle: this exclusion benefits the exploiters as it comes with the 
ownership of the workers´ labour. 
Even though Marx advanced a two-class division, he acknowledged the existence of transitional 
classes (e.g. Peasans or lumpen proletariat), however, he expected that these third groups would 
position themselves on one side or another as “the centrifugal forces of class struggle and crisis 
flung all dritte personen to one camp or the other” (Parkin, 1979: 16). The neo-Marxist debates have 
                                                          
13 Retrieved from: (Wright, 1997, pp 9 -19). 
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revolved around the new concept of middle-class that has evolved from artisans to managers, 
professionals, and non-manual workers due to the new characteristics of the capitalistic forms of 
production (Dahrendorf, 1959). Neo-Marxist authors such as Wright (1985) navigate very close to 
neo-Weberian waters by proposing a working-class model in which he differentiates a semi-
autonomous and managerial class from other kinds of workers. This class division has been 
developed to create more complex divisions based on the concept of exploitation. Sørensen (2000) 
has circumscribed the exploitation as the limitation of access to the qualified labour that secure the 
excess of earnings of the high-skilled positions in terms of the cost of education (e.g. tuition fees). 
Again, these arguments could also fall into the neo-Weberian approaches which refers to a more 
disaggregated model of social stratification rather than the radical dichotomy concerning the 
ownership of the means of production. 
 
3.1.2. WEBER 
For Weber the one-dimension approach followed by Marx to define classes is too narrow and he 
advocated for a more multidimensional perspective, taking the labour market competition for jobs 
and valued goods as the main criteria in forming class structure (Weber, 1968). Neo-Weberians such 
as Erikson & Goldthorpe (1992) defined class location through the employment conditions of the 
employee (salary, pension rights, assurance or type of contract) to determine the social class (unit 
of analysis). However, Weber highlighted the fact that there is a multiplicity of status groups within 
classes, determined by variables such as ethnicity or nobility within the classes, but knowing this, he 
saw the labour market relations as the main criterion in defining social stratification.14 Yet, the main 
contribution of Weber (1968) to the social class debate is related to the causal path between classes 
                                                          
14 See table 4. 
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and inequality. The differences in life chances are determined by the labour market relations, 
according to Weber, and Giddens provides an accurate definition of the Weberian term of life 
chances: “the chances an individual has for sharing in the socially created economic or cultural 
‘goods’ that typically exist in any given society” (Giddens, 1973, pp. 130–1). For Weber, the 
enjoyment of these goods depends upon the position in the social class, in other words, the 
members of the same class share the same life chances. Unlike Marx, Weber not only delimited 
classes according to the property of the means of production, but he stated differences such as 
status within groups regarding their life chances. For Weber, the conflict between social classes do 
not represent a zero-sum situation in which one improves its well-being at the expense of another 
social class. Rather, he highlighted the complexity of factors that shape the socioeconomic order, 
and therefore inequality, within a capitalist society.  
The Weberian approach was later operationalised by neo-Weberian authors such as Goldthorpe and 
Ericsson (1992).  They try to explain why different positions within the labour market, resulting from 
the capitalist system, leads to a different array of outcomes in many different respects. Unlike the 
Marxist theory of social classes, Goldthorpe and Ericsson talk about working relations as the 
criterion to differentiate social classes within the labour market, instead of the ownership of the 
means of production. For them, the important classification is related to the positions that are 
regulated either through a labour contract or service relationship. Goldthorpe (2000: 213) mentions 
the degree of “asset specificity” and the extent of monitoring as the crucial dimensions involved in 
this dichotomy between labour contract and service relationship. For the former, he refers to the 
specific job-skills, whereas for the later the difficulty for the employer to monitor the work of the 
employee represents a higher degree of autonomy in respect to other kinds of labour relationship. 
In accordance with both of these elements Goldthorpe constructs a class schema from upper service 
to the semi- and unskilled workers in agriculture (Goldthorpe, 2000) with several divisions in 
between such as: small proprietors with employees and skilled manual workers. This class division 







Most of the authors mentioned throughout this section take a macro-level unit analysis to delimit 
social classes. In contradistinction,  Durkheim provides one of the main contributions to the class 
debate as it is related to the addition of Gemeinschaftlich (micro-divisions) as a unit of analysis that 
form the classes under a social stratification model.15 Grusky (2001: 18) explains the four main 
reasons to disaggregate the level of class-division: (a) the agency of incumbents operates to have 
like-minded employees do similar jobs. (b) The interactions between colleagues reinforce the 
common interests and values. (c) Also, specific training or apprenticeships operate as some formal 
forms of socialisation. (d) Lastly, the incumbents share common interests to be pursued inherit to 
their occupation (e.g. certifications). Weber agrees that this kind of class-unification only happens 
very seldomly when taking the macro-level unit of analysis (Weber, 1968).  
Some authors (Casey, 1995; Baron 1994; Drucker) from the post-occupational view of class-
distinctions seem to follow the Durkheimian vision of the current stratification of social classes, due 
to increasing job-divisions and skill-based differences. While the Marxian and Weberian 
contributions to class debates have become somewhat obsolete for most analysts during the last 
few decades, especially given the regulations and contentions at the macro-level, at the same time 
those occupational groups have arisen as the anchors of the new labour markets (Wright, 2005: 61).  
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While Marx and Weber departed from the market relations of people to define their social-class 
model,16 Bourdieu differentiates economic capital from cultural capital (and social capital) to 
establish the differences between classes. He proposes a multidimensional stratification model with 
two axes, namely cultural capital and economic capital (see figure 8). Bourdieu ascribed to the 
former the specific culturally competences – as a resource of power – that matter in the hierarchical 
scale of social-class (Lareau & Weininger, 2003). Therefore, he developed the concept of life chances 
from Weber and exploitation from Marx to conceptualize the class habitus: each social class shares 
a different habitus, a combination of cultural capital and social capital. This habitus is composed of 
the common actions that come from the agencies of the incumbents that form each social class.  
According to this model of stratification, the highest classes become the “taste-makers” who 
compete for the distinguished practices that downward classes adopt later on (Bourdieu, 1984). 
Thus, from Bourdieu’s point of view the social struggle is based not only on material goods but also 
on distinguished practices. By constructing this multidimensional model of social stratification, 
Bourdieu tries to avoid clear boundaries between classes and provides a more continuous character 
to the social space (Bourdieu, 1990). Furthermore, he names two different agents in determining 
the life trajectory of the incumbents that shape their habitus: family and school (Bourdieu, 1986: 
244). This continuous character of the class position differs from the Weberian and Marxist class 
structures. The continuous multidimensional class-division approach from Bourdieu opens a new 
                                                          
16 In different terms though. While Marx was focused on the exploitative relation between owners and 
workers, Weber uses the concept of lifestyle to define the social-classes. 













way of analysing new forms of social mobility and social conflict that other models of stratification 
ignore (Weininger, 2002). This redefinition of the boundaries between social classes and the 
trajectories of the incumbents convert the social space into a more fluid arena than that of his 
predecessors, Marx and Weber. These contributions to the class debate have provided a new way 
to analyse social mobility and social conflicts that other models ignore. Lastly, in later works 
Bourdieu (2001) accepts that even though social mobility is the primary factor of habitus distinction 
there are other dimensions that compete with it such as gender, ethnicity, age, or place of residence. 
 
3.1.5. POST-CLASS ANALYSIS 
The class stratification model has been criticised from very different angles due to its simplification 
of a more complex phenomenon, socioeconomic inequality. For example, classical stratification 
theorists have not taken factors such as gender and ethnicity as seriously as labour (Gruski, 2001). 
Multidimensional models of social stratification have gradually given way to new conceptual 
dimensions for inequality beyond the economic one. People from different countries have started 
to emphasise the importance of their group distinction, in terms of ethnicity for example (Glazer & 
Moynihan, 1975). Not only racialized groups but women too have laid claim to political 
representation through social movements, which are not class bounded. It is currently common to 
Figure 8. Bourdieu´s Social Structure Scheme 
 




hear about intersectional groups of stratification (e.g. white male working-class), which share 
lifestyles and experiences (Gruski, 2001: 29). These multidimensional stratification models compete 
with multidimensional post-Weberian approaches that focuses more on rare combinations such as 
a poorly educated lawyer. 
 
3.2. DEBATES IN ECONOMICS AROUND INEQUALITY 
Even considering that economists traditionally focused only on the market, leaving the rest of the 
social spheres to other social science’ disciplines, the literature in favour of considering inequality 
relevant to economists has been gradually increasing in recent years in quantity and quality. Let us 
start with a comprehensive report on inequality: The Global Inequality Report (Alvaredo, et al.; 
2018). This study relies on the WID (World Wealth and Income Database) (WID.world), which 
represents a huge effort to gather data from National Accounts and make then comparable 
throughout years and between countries. Even the most orthodox economic institution, the IMF, 
named inequality as the most likely global risk, as pronounced by its chairwoman Christine 
Lagarde17. Other international organisations, such as OECD and ECLAC have revealed in their works 
Structural Change for Equality: An Integrated Approach to Development and Divided We Stand: Why 
Inequality Keeps Rising respectively, that although the tools actually do exist to tackle inequality, 
policy-makers have not been able to undertake effective policies to face this phenomenon (ECLAC, 
2012) (OECD, 2011). Furthermore, there have been prominent groups of economists that make 
claims for new approaches towards socioeconomic equality. A new team of researchers, led by Dani 
Rodrik, have created a network named Economics for Inclusive Prosperity (ECONFIP) (econfip.org). 
In their introductory brief, they claim that the economy is not only the foundation of the market, 
but it should serve for the inclusive prosperity of all, not only for the top 1% (Rodrik, Naidu & 
Zucman; 2019). This ECONFIP group take some of their institutional approaches from Karl Polanyi, 
namely the double movement and embeddedness: “crucial markets (e.g. the “fictitious 
commodities” of labour, land, and capital) must be embedded in non-market institutions, the 
“rules of the game” supplied by government” (Rodrik, Naidu & Zucman; 2019: 6). 
Also, Kate Raworth (2018) in her best seller Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-
Century Economist, takes a more multidimensional approach. She even delves into the correlation 
of income inequality with health - life expectancy – as well as education levels (Raworth, 2018: 171). 
                                                          




Following the same line of research, Paul Krugman, Nobel Prize economist and prolific columnist, 
has repeatedly made claims for inequality reduction policies and other development indicators than 
the very popular (among economists) GDP.18 In this section of the Chapter I will go in depth into 
other economist’s views that are in favour of more redistributive approaches in economics, such as 
Thomas Pikkety, Branko Milanovic and Amartya Sen. 
I divide the economic debate regarding the desirability of reducing inequality into two main 
grounds, namely (a) extrinsic and (b) intrinsic reasons: 
(a) Extrinsic reasons:  
A lack of social cohesion, high crime rates, poor health, and the vast array of social problems are 
named as the main consequences of high-income inequality rates by authors such as Stiglitz 
(2012) in his book The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future. 
Secondly, the quality of democracy is correlated with the degree of inequality in a country, 
according to Atkinson (2015) in his last book Inequality: what can be done? He lays out the role 
of money in determining the results of elections. Therefore, low levels of inequality may 
improve politics and public institutions in general.  
Economic Growth: one the most controversial arguments in favour of high-income inequality 
levels is represented by the debate about economic growth and income inequality, which is not 
new. However, until recent years it has not been pointed out as a serious risk for overall 
economic performance, rather, it was seen as a collateral damage of growth. To quote Atkinson: 
“For much of the twentieth century the topic (income inequality) had been ignored, whereas I 
believe that it should be central to the study of economics” (Atkinson, 2015: 14). One of the 
pioneers in analysing the relation between income inequality and economic development, 
Simon Kuznets, defined the relation between both concepts. According to him, at the early 
stages of industrialisation, economic growth leads to higher income inequality levels due to the 
dualization between agricultural and industrial income. Subsequently, as countries develop 
further, higher levels of education and social protection can result in lower levels of income 
inequality (Kuznets, 1955). This point seems crucial for the developing countries, such as South 
America and Brazil, whose struggle with income inequality have traditionally been seen as part 
of the process of development of a region. This could be true for developed countries, such 
OECD countries (including Germany). On the other hand, there are a decent number of countries 
where this theory does not hold true: middle income countries such as Brazil, India, and China 
                                                          




have been widely studied in this regard. The findings of these analyses are ambiguous, at best. 
While it is true that Brazil still experiences notably high levels of inequality, the last years of 
steady growth have benefited the poor to a greater degree than in China and India, whose 
growth rate levels have not led to a decrease of income inequality (UNDESA, 2013). Therefore, 
the relation between economic growth and income inequality does not follow a universal 
pattern, to say nothing of its being automatic, but rather, it depends on its active pursuit by 
national policy makers and by the country’s specific context. Furthermore, as Nancy Birdsall 
(2012: 4) has stated: “Inequality can inhibit growth and slow poverty reduction”. Recently, some 
authors like her have emerged to state the fact that low levels of inequality result in higher 
levels of economic performance, ceteris paribus.  
(b) Intrinsic reasons: 
The principal idea of human well-being cannot be abandoned by legislators, since philosophers 
such as Hobbes and Locke depart from the concept of Natural Law as the preservation of 
humankind through the formation of a political pact, (Locke, 1988). Jeremy Bentham (1907), 
English philosopher and father of utilitarianism, was the first to identify well-being with utility. 
Subsequently, Hugh Dalton, also a British scientist, 19 argued that the sum of utilities is lower as 
the level of inequality rises. He reached this conclusion by assuming that the same amount of 
income increases the well-being of the worse-off to a greater degree than the wealthy. 
Therefore by redistributing one unit of income from the richest to the poorest the sum of 
utilities improves (Dalton, 1920). This positive relation between redistribution and economic 
justice contrasts with the theories of other influential economists such as Keynes. He argues 
that high levels of income inequality benefit the whole community. To use his words: “In fact, it 
was precisely the inequality of the redistribution of wealth which made possible those vast 
accumulations of fixed wealth and of capital improvements which distinguished that age from 
all others” (Keynes, 1920: 19).  
This concept of wellbeing (for all) has recently been revisited by different economists and 
political philosophers. John Rawls (2006) advocates for an array of basic goods that all human 
beings without exception must enjoy regardless their circumstances, which in his theory of 
justice he called primary goods. Later, Amartya Sen (1992) criticised Rawls in this regard, by 
stating that the same good would affect the well-being of a person in a different manner. Both 
Sen and Rawls stress the importance of a set of primary goods and social rights although Sen 
                                                          
19 English social scientists were prolific regarding socioeconomic inequalities and, above all, its 
measurement (Dalton, 1920). 
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points out in his book Inequality Re-examined (1992) the difference between himself and Rawls. 
Sen took the theory of primary goods from Rawls, which sets a common base of goods that are 
desirable for every human regardless of other external factors such as culture, gender, or 
national background (Sen, 1992: 20). However Sen explicitly differentiates himself from Rawls, 
especially in the “difference principle” (Sen, 1992: 21), which states that even when two people 
enjoy the same primary goods, they have the liberty of having different conceptions about what 
is good or not. Sen states Rawls’ approach regarding the equality of opportunities does not 
consider the diversity of human beings and their capabilities.  
● Earnings from work vs. earnings from capital 
Piketty, (2014: 549) whose work is based on authors such as Rawls and Sen, highlights the 
importance of a modern, effective, and strong state to administer the resources collected through 
taxes fairly and accurately, stressing the fact that taxes are mainly a political tool rather than a 
technical one. According to Piketty, income inequality can be divided into its different elements to 
ascertain their influence on income inequality more broadly, as well as their implications for the 
elections in Brazil and Germany, as the objects of this study. Market forces are generally considered 
a powerful factor in determining economic inequality. Piketty, one of the most notable authors of 
recent years who has addressed economic inequality, states that this is not only driven by 
exogenous forces. Instead, he contends that a reduction in income inequality is possible (even in a 
capitalistic scenario) through distinct mechanisms outside the market, such as public policies. To 
this point, the main elements of economic inequality examined in his book Capital in the Twenty-
First Century are: (1) earnings from capital and (2) earnings from work. More specifically, the 
question he attempts to answer is: To what extent do earnings of capital affect social inequality 
compared to earnings of work?  
In his book, Piketty20 sheds some light on the weight of both elements, earnings from work and 
capital, as they affect the total income inequality rate. To measure this, Piketty chooses three 
different countries according to their degree of inequality in different times: United States (year 
2030, estimation), United States (year 2010), Europe (2010) and Scandinavian countries (1970-1980) 
(Piketty, 2014). For earnings coming from work, inequality (measured by the Gini index) ranges from 
0.19 to 0.47 (Table 7). Whereas, for earnings from capital, inequality levels vary from 0.58 to 0.85 
                                                          
20 . The work of Piketty has been named as one of the most comprehensive and relevant studies which 
have been published on this regard, according to different Nobel prizes in Economy such as Paul Krugman, 
Robert Solow and Joseph Stiglitz. 
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(Table 8). In other words, the very high inequality level of earnings coming from work is less than 
the lowest inequality level of earnings coming from capital. 








Low Inequality 20% 5% 0.19 
Average inequality 25% 7% 0.26 
High inequality 35% 12% 0.36 
Very high inequality 45% 17% 0.47 
Source: (Piketty, 2014: 271) 
Table 8. Earnings from Capital 
 
10% 
richest 1% richest 
Gini 
coef. 
Low Inequality 20% 5% 0.58 
Average inequality 25% 7% 0.67 
High inequality 35% 12% 0.73 
Very high inequality 45% 17% 0.85 
Source: (Piketty, 2014: 272) 
According to this study, earnings from capital represent an extraordinary driver of d income 
inequality rates compared to earnings from work, regardless of the level of total inequality of the 
country namely. While it is true the variation from low inequality countries as compared to very high 
inequality ones are slightly higher for earnings from work, by 0.01 points, the difference is not 
substantial. This point is critical for the present study given the fact that levels of economic 





3.3. WHY INCOME INEQUALITY: EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITIES VS. EQUALITY OF OUTCOMES 
The goal of this section is to mention and analyse the limits of the selection of income inequality as 
a means of examining the different dimensions of social inequality. The current trend followed by 
sociologists regarding social inequality have switched from opportunities, measured through the 
distance between origins and destinations of individuals, to income mobility (Gruski, 2001). The 
development of this wave of thinking may be related with the impossibility of disregarding poverty 
as an intergenerational phenomenon (Corcoran & Adams, 1997). However, Sen (1992) in his book 
Inequality Reexamined, is the one that puts on the table the question: how equal is equality in a 
world of diversity?  This brings to the forefront the debate between inequality of opportunities 
versus inequality of outcomes. Considering that human beings have been born in different countries 
as well as in different environments, to what extent does equality in one aspect could mean 
inequality in the other one? He pointed out: “equal incomes can still leave much inequality in our 
ability to do what we would value doing” (Amrtya Sen, 1992: 20). 
The question, equality of what? incorporates implicitly the debate of liberty versus equality. This 
debate has been present for a long time in philosophy21. Libertarians often demand equal liberty, 
but this can conflict with other people who demand equality of income or well-being, for example. 
At the end they are mutually exclusive— both cannot be obtained together. Sen (1992) emphasises 
the fact that whatever aspect of equality one concentrates on it will only come at the expense of 
the other. The problems of conversion of income into wellbeing can be complex social issues or 
simply physical differences such as gender, metabolic rates or weather conditions. That illustrates 
two different perspectives: (a) the freedom to achieve and, (b) the actual achievement: 
(a) In order to deal with the central question, equality of what? Sen concentrates on the capability 
to obtain the valued functionings which comprise a person's life. Firstly, functionings are defined by 
Sen as a set of beings and doings that constitute the well-being of a person. Next, capability is 
defined as the aggregate of functionings that the person can, in fact, reach. This set of vectors of 
functionings indicate one´s freedom to have one kind of life or another. Nevertheless, the capability 
to achieve functionings will show a person's freedom to reach his or her feeling of wellbeing (Sen, 
1992). These functionings mentioned by Sen may be reached through money or through other 
means, depending on its nature (for example one cannot buy the weather but can buy a car). While 
it is true in capitalist economies, certain functionings such as food, health and education depend on 
the income levels of their citizens, not all the functionings to achieve one's well-being rest on income 
                                                          
21 See for example Richard Norman (1987): Free and Equal. 
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levels and the assumption of regional differences worldwide is to be considered to this point. Even 
so, income inequality is considered to cover a substantial number of functionings and for this reason 
income inequality has been chosen as a dependent variable of this study.  
(b) In the case of the actual achievement, it is pertinent to mention the limits of the utilitarian notion 
of value to measure individual utility in terms of mental conditions, for example pleasure or 
happiness. Though this mental state is seen as desirable it is difficult to measure or evaluate by 
those who advocate welfare policies. The principal difficulty of this utilitarian perspective lies in its 
psychological evaluation. Even if this evaluation is done in terms of happiness the rest of the 
functionings would be excluded or only used indirectly to the extent that they contribute to 
happiness. In a similar line of research Atkinson, in his last book Inequality: What Can Be Done? 
discusses the so-called dichotomy: inequality of opportunity and inequality of outcome (Atkinson, 
2015). According to him, the former is widely used in political rhetoric nowadays, with the result 
that the relevance of the latter is underestimated. In other words, the focus on inequality of 
opportunity is important to create an environment in which all individuals may reach their potential 
(in economic terms). However it is crucial to consider the circumstances under which goals are 
achieved. For example, if one wants to be an architect the opportunity of entering the university 
should be provided by the government, not by parents’ aid. However, the actual outcome must not 
be forgotten, which is that there should be other, deeper reasons the person’s goal is or is not 
accomplished, and the system provides highly unequal incentives for them. That is the reason why 
inequality of outcomes is relevant for this study.  
Despite the acknowledged limitations of choosing income as the main variable for measuring 
economic inequality and having highlighted the argument in favour of this decision, the universality 
of its use and the availability of data were relevant factors in favour of choosing this variable.  
 
3.4. THE MEASUREMENT OF INCOME INEQUALITY 
David Ricardo (1817), one the first classic economists interested in income distribution in societies, 
distinguished in his book Principles of Political Economy three different sources for the total income 
of an individual: dividends, rent from real estate, and wages. In the early 19th century, the division 
between owners and workers was basically equivalent to the division between rich and poor. 
Therefore, capitalists increased the likelihood of greater income inequality and vice versa. With the 
advent of the middle class the approach to income inequality changed. One of the few researchers 
on this topic during mid-19th century, Vilfredo Pareto, introduced the principle of Pareto 
improvement (Scapparone, 2017) by which a political decision will be socially accepted if it improves 
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the situation of everybody or keeps it the same. However, Pareto's principle seems difficult to 
accomplish because there are always some losers when political decisions are made regarding 
distribution. Moreover, he stated that historically there had been a sort of iron law regarding income 
inequality among individuals (feudalism, capitalism or socialism) (Scapparone, 2017).  
The next step in the history of income inequality represents the leap from kinds of societies to 
degrees of development. In that regard, Simon Kuznets’ hypothesis of the inverted U attempted to 
show the relation between the level of industrialisation and income distribution. At the early stages 
of the industrialisation process high income inequality levels are assumed to raise as a kind of 
collateral damage. There are two very different levels of earnings at that time: (1) the people in the 
agricultural sector with lower productivity and salaries and (2) the workers in the cities working in 
the new industrial sector. However, as the workers move from one sector to the other the salary 
levels become more homogeneous. The inverted U of Kuznets has been much tested in relation to 
different kinds of countries, and the findings show that this theory better fits very developed 
countries. However, Latin American countries (such as Brazil) do not comply with the hypothetical 
evolution of income inequality rates according to inverted U theory (Milanovic, 2011). The general 
reason given for the exception of Latin American countries is the colonial legacy of the region and 
the unequal terms of commerce that they were subjected to since the decolonisation process 
(Prebish, 1962). 
Milanovic (2016), former chief economist of the World Bank, discussed the problems he went 
through in the process of gathering the income data in order to compare the global evolution of 
income inequality in a longitudinal perspective. Among the various limitations in obtaining reliable 
and comparable data between countries, he finds critical issues such as, (a) the sources of 
information are limited in availability due to legal or technological (difficulty to use the statistical 
software) restrictions. (b) There is also a methodological limitation: even though, administrative 
data is more reliable than survey data, it only measures the citizens who pay taxes, thus all the 
people working under informality conditions are not included (Alvaredo, et al.; 2018). (c) There are 
differences in purchase power: even if one converts the national currency into another foreign 
currency there is the problem of converting both into an amount of materials goods22. To solve this 
problem of comparability, the income of different countries is converted through the Purchase 
Parity Power (PPP) coefficient to make them comparable in value terms. (d) Nevertheless, another 
problem arises in constructing the basic goods basket since there are notable differences between 
                                                          
22 For example: one person in small town in Switzerland may not spend the same money to buy a house 
than a person from small town in India.  
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the goods that cover the same level of well-being in different countries. To sum up, there are 
countless limitations in measuring income inequality between countries (the kind of inequality 
analysed in this thesis) and I have tried to mention most of the major ones. Even though enormous 
efforts have been made in order to resolve limitations, some still remain insurmountable. 
 
3.4.1. GINI INDEX & DISTRIBUTION RATIOS 
The Gini index is the indicator used for measuring income inequality in this thesis. The index was 
developed by Corrado Gini in 1912 and built on the work of American economist Max Lorenz. In 
1905 Lorenz published a hypothetical way to depict total equality — as a straight diagonal line on a 
graph (Ceriani & Verme, 2012). The difference between this hypothetical line and the actual line 
produced by people's incomes is the Gini ratio. 
The Gini ratio converts all income distribution into one single number. It ranges between 0 and 1, 
where 0 represents perfect income equality and 1 is maximal inequality among individuals. Even 
though there are many ways to measure income inequality, the Gini index is chosen for two main 
reasons: (1) the availability of data in the main databases, (2) because it is widely used among social 
scientists, economists, as well as sociologists (Atkinson, 2015). Even though Gini is the most popular 
index to measure income inequality due to the simplicity of the interpretation, being 0 perfectly 
equal and 1 perfectly unequal, it is not the only indicator to measure income inequality. Other 
indicators measure the distribution of income across different segments of the population. They are 
grouped into (a) indexes and (b) ratios: (a) Gini is, arguably, the best-known index to measure 
income inequality. However, there are others, such as Theil index. This index, unlike Gini, is 
decomposable into the income sources, and it uses a parameter α, which assigns a weight to 
distances between income. That is, for higher values of α, it becomes more sensitive in the upper 
tail, whereas, it would be more sensitive in the lower tail for smaller values of α (Atkinson and 
Bourguignon, 2015). (b) There are also ratios that measure income distribution between different 
groups of the population. For example, the Palma23 coefficient divides the income share of the top 
10% between that of the bottom 40%. This index tackles the insensitivity of the Gini to the variations 
in the richest strata as well as the oversensitivity in the middle of the distribution. The UN uses the 
20:20 ratio, which is more focused on the difference between the poorest and the richest and omits 
the middle 60% of the distribution. The 20:20 ratio results are more useful for social stability and 
development purposes. Lastly, the concentration of the share of income by the top groups (1%-
                                                          
23 Named after the Gabriel Palma, the Chilean economist who created it.  
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10%), it is also in a simple way to understand the wealth condensation of a country or a region, 
without complex formulas (UN, 2015) 
The main drawback of using Gini index is that it cannot show where the inequality exists within the 
population as a whole. In fact, two countries may enjoy same Gini coefficient with very different 
distributions of income. The over-sensitivity of Gini to the middle classes neglects the variations in 
the share of incomes at the extremes, and the opposite is the case with the Palma index. To sum 
up, much ink has been spilled about income inequality between individuals (Atkinson, 2015) 
(Piketty, 2014) (Stiglitz, 2012) (Milanovic, 2011) (Naidu, Rodrik & Zucman; 2019) and it would be 
rather ambitious to attempt to fill a gap in this topic with this thesis. The role of income inequality, 
measured by the Gini index, is comparable with other major studies and is clearly understood, hence 
the selection of Gini as the way to measure the above-mentioned dependent variable, income 
inequality. Even knowing the limitations of making this decision, the availability of data and the 
desire that this thesis will be compared with other analysis, does not leave much room for another 
option. 
After realizing that the results of the German set of regressions do not prove any statistical inference 
between the explicatory variables and the explained one, I decided to go deeper into the distribution 
of income in Germany to obtain some insights. I acknowledge that the Gini index does not perform 
perfectly for the whole population and that, in fact, two countries may have the same Gini 
coefficient with very different distributions of income given the over-sensitivity for middle classes 
which neglects the variations in the share of incomes at the extremes. I decided to test a similar 
hypothesis24 against different income inequality measures. Instead of an index, I choose three ratios 
that supplement the Gini Index and help to fill the gap missed by the Gini index, namely the P90/P10, 
P90/P50 and the P50/P10 ratios. Therefore, after this analysis I will be able to obtain different 
conclusions than the other analysis that use the Gini as the dependent variable. 
 
4. SOCIAL CONTRACT 
This thesis tests the hypothesis that the social contract may explain income inequality. Therefore, it 
is relevant to go deeper into the origins of the concept starting with political philosophers, follow it 
through the social conflict and then address the major institutional construction of the social 
contract — the welfare state. The different evolutions of national social contracts have prompted 
                                                          
24 It is true that these ratios do not measure the disposable income but rather gross earnings. See point 
4.1 in chapter 4 for more information. 
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the classification of different welfare regimes as manifestations of the evolution of social contracts 
between the state and its citizens (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
Concretely, in the following sections, I first address the origins of the social contract and the 
philosophical traditions that influenced current analysis. From this, the study will follow the 
foundations upon which the current social contract is based, particularly in western societies. The 
main concepts taken to be relevant in this process of framing the social contract are citizenship and 
social conflict. Both transversal elements have been in debates from various reputable authors from 
Dahrendorf or Polanyi to Esping-Andersen; the main contributions by them are discussed during this 
part of the thesis. Then I focus on welfare state institutions as the institutions that currently 
constitute the materialisation of the social contract. I explain the main welfare classifications, 
specifically the one from Esping-Andersen and the former one from Titmuss. Also, I focus on welfare 
states in emerging countries, taking into account some of the main contributors to this debate. 
Lastly, I deal with the formality of the social contract as a dimension that may explain its 
redistributive character and, therefore, the explained variable of this study, income inequality. Even 
though the definition of informality it is still ongoing, I try to show the different approaches to it. 
Furthermore, I outline the evolution of the social contract in Brazil and Germany following the 
formal-informal classification before the next Chapter where both countries are thoroughly 
described. 
 
4.1. ORIGIN OF SOCIAL CONTRACT 
In medieval times, before the advent of the school of Natural Law, the head of state, the King, 
participated implicitly in a contract with his feudatories by guaranteeing good government. 
However, in case of a breach of contract the only right of the people to withhold the power of the 
King derived from the Pope. He embodied divine power, thus only he could take away the divine 
right of authority through excommunication. With the emergence of the school of natural law, 
whose precursor was Hobbes, divine power ceased to be the element which legitimated the 
authority in favour of natural law and natural rights. 
Authors such as Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Rousseau have much to tell us, now more than ever, 
when the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression has fiercely hit western economies 
(Crotty, 2008). The so-called Global Financial Crisis brought national and international 
socioeconomic structures to their limits and the ability of the government to secure a certain level 
of well-being for its citizens was put into question. This function, attributed to national 
governments, of constituting the right of citizens originally derive from the ideas of natural rights, 
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which were already analysed centuries ago. These classic authors set the fundamental pillars of this 
relation that is also called the social contract and today’s western civilisation would not be the same 
without their contribution. The goal of this section is to summarise and highlight the rich debate 
that led to the concept of the social contract which, in turn, was subsequently developed and 
applied by an array of social scientists. 
 
4.1.1. STATE OF NATURE AND NATURAL LAW  
According to Locke, the state of nature is a state in which human beings are in perfect freedom to 
conduct their actions and to do with their belongings and other people as they see fit. As per Locke, 
all people have the same capacities and opportunities to enjoy the benefits and advantages given 
by the nature to humans. However, in the state of nature one does not have the capacity to harm 
others’ freedom, health, or possessions and has no autonomy to destroy himself. This natural law, 
called fundamental law of nature by Locke, consists of “man being to be preserved, as much as 
possible” (Locke, 1988: 6) or “salus populi suprema lex (The health of the people should be the 
supreme law)” (Locke, 1988: 134). Natural Law defines the general framework that limits the actions 
of individuals and determines, in a sense, future laws. This means when humanity decides to leave 
the state of nature and institutes the state through a political pact, fundamental ideas such as 
preservation of human life and society imposed by natural law cannot be rescinded by the instituted 
legislator (Locke, 1988). The fundamental natural law can be known through the reason. “Reason, 
which is that law, teaches all humankind” (Ibid, 1988:6). This is related to the idea that humans have 
been born free to the extent we have been born rational and we know the natural law due to the 
reason. Therefore, those who do not have reason cannot know the natural law (Locke, 1988). Locke 
claims that individual rights have priority over the will of the legislator. For him the concepts of state 
of nature, reason, natural law, freedom, and general well-being are closely related. This is a state in 
which mankind is associated as their reason dictates (Locke, 1988). 
● Liberty and justice as main elements of social contract: 
Both Thomas Hobbes and John Locke use elements of social contract theory to justify the origin of 
political power and both also assume the individual as a free, equal, and rational being. They both 
view the pact as an anchor of political power. Lastly both propose that a state was built to overcome 
insecurities and inequalities specific to the state of nature. However, there is a significant difference 
between the authors: Locke advocates for a model of the liberal state whereas Hobbes believes in 
absolutism as a model of the state. In the Second Treatise on Civil Government Locke argues that 
people have the right to legitimately resist against the power holder (Barker, 1947). 
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In his model of the state, Hobbes, considers human beings to be individuals oriented to the 
attainment of their basic interests, defined by the Leviatan25 in terms of the natural rights of life, 
freedom, and property. But Hobbes goes further and shows that the individual accepts limits to their 
freedom in favour of a sovereign so that they can enjoy their civil freedom as a member of the state. 
Locke, however, intends to demonstrate that absolutism is incompatible with a legitimate 
government. He believes that absolute government can never be legitimate because, in his opinion, 
absolutism is worse than the state of nature. To summarise, Locke argues that a legitimate 
government can only emerge from the consent of people who are subject to themselves. He uses 
the idea of the social contract to warrant freedom and security. In other words, Locke maintains 
that the legitimate government can only be based on the consent of free and equal people that are 
all sovereign themselves. Locke thereby tried to restrict possible forms of absolute political regimes 
and justify the resistance against the crown on the basis of constitutional division of powers (Cortés, 
2010). 
 
4.1.2. CONTRACT OF SOCIETY (SOCIETAS) AND CONTRACT OF GOVERNMENT (POTESTAS) 
Two kinds of social contracts will now be described in order to clarify the different dimensions of 
the concept (Barker, 1947). Firstly, the contract of society can be defined as a prior condition before 
the contract of government. Secondly, the contract of society or pacte d´association represents the 
social will which subsequently will legitimise the fact of being subjected to a ruler. The result of this 
agreement between the potential ruler and subjects represents the idea of the contract of 
government  
A society can be constituted by either the contract of society, or the contract of society and the 
contract of government. The former, named self-government, consists of a community where the 
rulers and subjects are the same, without any contract between them whatsoever. This was 
Rousseau´s theory. On the contrary, the latter would represent a society where all the subjects of 
the community renounce their political rights right in favour of a sovereign Leviathan which is not a 
part of any contract. This was Hobbes´ theory. In the middle, there might be a community where 
the subject may name a fiduciary government which can be dismissed for a breach of trust about 
the understanding of the nature of trust. This was Locke’s theory (Barker, 1947). 
● Conception of trust 
                                                          
25 Book written by Hobbes; it stands for a social contract rule by an absolute sovereign. 
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Locke also delves into the idea of trust and its role within the social contract. First, he distinguishes 
three parties of the term trust: trustor (the creator of the trust), trustee, and beneficiary. The trustee 
accepts an obligation that emerges from the trustor towards the third party (beneficiary) but this 
obligation is unilateral; thus, the beneficiary does not have any obligation towards the trustee. In 
political context this means that, from Locke´s point of view, the community is both the trustor and 
beneficiary while the government is the trustee. Therefore, the government would accept 
unilaterally an obligation towards the community within the limits of the law of nature, which rest 
on trust (Barker, 1947). 
This trust-conception of government is therefore more unfavourable for the government than a 
mere contract whereby both community and government would have obligations. In Locke’s theory 
the trustee has duties and not rights. As Ernest Barker says: “the government only exists through, 
and for the community” (Barker, 1947: 30). 
 
4.1.3 COMMUNITARIAN TRADITION: ROUSSEAU 
Rousseau, in his theory, distinguishes the will of all (omnes ut singulis) from the general will (volonté 
générale). For him it is a matter of quality versus quantity; the will of a particular quality, general 
intention, versus the mere will of all. Actually, he renounces the mere will of all and points to the 
general will, which may be expressed by only one legislator. This idea can become a double-edged 
sword because instead of defending democracy (which seems to be his intent), his theory ends up 
being not far from the Leviathan. Here Rousseau finds a major difficulty: on the one hand he wants 
to defend primary democracy within the boundaries of the small state, but on the other hand he 
has already denied democracy by rejecting quantity. It can be affirmed that Rousseau is like Hobbes 
in the sense that he too empties each individual in the moment of the contract. However, in the 
case of Rousseau, but not Hobbes it is a submission to no man. Individuals are active as well as 
passive bodies of the community. He expresses this idea like this: “Each, giving himself to all, gives 
himself to nobody” (Barker, 1947: 46). In this line of thought, Rousseau claims that property, like 
everything else that is covered under the rights of the subject, is the creation of government, and 
as such is subject to the control of its creator. 
For Rousseau, the most important function of the general will is to inform the creation of the laws 
of the state. These laws, though codified by an impartial, noncitizen “lawgiver,” must in their 
essence express the general will. Though all laws must uphold the rights of equality among citizens 
and individual freedom, Rousseau states that their particulars can be made according to local 
circumstances. Although laws owe their existence to the general will of the sovereign, or the 
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collective of all people, some form of government is necessary to carry out the executive function 
of enforcing laws and overseeing the day-to-day functioning of the state (Barker, 1947). He states 
that to maintain informed of the general will, the sovereign must convene in regular, periodic 
assemblies to determine the general will, at which point it is imperative that individual citizens vote, 
not according to their own personal interests, but according to their conception of the general will 
of all the people at that moment. As such, in a healthy state, virtually all assembly votes should 
approach unanimity, as the people will all recognize their common interests. Furthermore, 
Rousseau explains, it is crucial that all people exercise their sovereignty by attending such 
assemblies or elect representatives to do so in their place. For whenever people stop doing so, their 
sovereignty is lost. Foreseeing that the conflict between the sovereign and the government may at 
times be contentious, Rousseau also advocates for the existence of a court to mediate in all conflicts 
between the sovereign and the government or in conflicts between individual people (Barker, 1947). 
 
4.1.4. LIBERAL TRADITION: LOCKE AND HUME 
Regarding the liberal tradition, Locke distinguishes two separate acts which differentiates his theory 
from Hobbes idea of contract as surrender. First, the idea of majority is introduced in order to make 
one body politic once a man has consented to make a community. Second, he points to legislative 
power as the supreme power, provided that the trust whereby government has formed is not 
broken. In cases where trust is broken, he notes another higher power to remove or alter the 
legislative power. The general conception of the power of government, according to Locke, consist 
of two main powers: (1) legislative (as discussed above) and (2) executive, which apparently include 
judicial power. Regarding the later one, he notes that there should be a power which should see to 
the execution of the laws (Barker, 1947). 
Furthermore, Locke was truly the author who inspired Adam Smith in his system of natural right, 
which became the basis of the Liberal State. According to Locke no political society can subsist 
without having the power to preserve property (life, liberty and state in the law of nature); there, 
and there only, is where all its members relinquish their natural power, and hand to a community. 
There is a right of property, because each person has property over their labour. They construct the 
idea of a paternal State in which we are born free as we are born rational, but it is age that brings 
about the exercise of both. Just as health, necessities, and information are subject to the parents, 




Property and freedom have also been linked by Hume, one of the first institutional economist. 
Before the 18th century, only landowners were allowed to vote, which is the reason why, according 
to him, freedom and property were very interrelated. For this reason, the main goal of the state 
should be providing security (security to enjoy the fruits of their labour) for its citizens and this can 
only be done through political freedom, with the universal right to vote as the best way to guarantee 
this security. This, in turn, means that property rights also bring equality, not only because of 
common human nature, but also speaking to facts. By this he does not mean equality of results, 
(income) which are not possible according to him, but equality of opportunities, by which every 
person has the same opportunity to obtain wealth (Hume, 2003). 
 
4.2. SOCIAL CONFLICT AND CITIZENSHIP 
Before dealing with the different models of social contract, it is important to point out that it would 
not have developed without the need to approximate positions and negotiate conflicts between 
social agents and the state. These negotiations between social agents such as trade unions, firms, 
and states have evolved by establishing different kinds of relations between them that have resulted 
in different social contracts. As Dahrendorf (2008: 25) points out: “There are times in which social 
conflicts as well as their analysis assume a fundamental or constitutional character. The issue then 
is not just an improvement of pensions, or even the extension of suffrage, but the social contract 
itself.”  
Social contracts define, among other considerations, the rights to entitlements to be enjoyed by 
different societal groups. Sen (1981) referred to entitlements in relation to the access people have 
to commodities. Sen did not limit entitlements to material commodities but also opened the door 
to non-economic commodities such as education or the right to vote, and actually infinite choices 
are opened by this term. Dahrendorf (2008) refers to the provision and entitlement scheme and 
states that the preservation of the current entitlement structure is a cause of famine and 
redistributional failure. This explains why there is famine in countries in Asia or Africa when they 
have enough quantity of goods to survive. He defines entitlements as follows: “entry tickets to open 
doors, but for those who do not have them these doors remain closed” (Dahrendorf, 2008: 11). In 
fact, provisions represent the objects you can choose instead of the right to choose (which we have 
defined as an entitlement). They are the array of alternatives people have in order to make a choice 
(Dahrendorf, 2008). They can be classified by the amount, variety or quality. This reasoning may 
help to understand modern social conflicts. For example, the French Revolution could be interpreted 
in terms of a revolution of entitlements whereas the Industrial Revolution would be seen as a 
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provisions Revolution. Starting from the 18th century, provision parties and entitlement parties have 
struggled until today.  They represent the dichotomy of modern political thought. 
Recently, Atkinson, in his latest book Inequality: What can be done? (2016) included the 
entitlements and provisions theoretical framework in his analysis by assumed the standard 
objection against redistributive policies: redistribution undermines economic growth (Atkinson, 
2015: 243). However, by embracing this assumption he does not validate all efforts or side damages 
in pursuit of this goal of economic growth. Following this reasoning, he mentions other scenarios in 
which greater distribution of wealth weakens growth that could be possible and even desirable for 
most of the citizens given the fact that there are both winners and losers that result from political 
decisions between economic growth and inequality. Therefore, according to him, inequality 
depends not only on exogenous factors but also on internal ones influenced by national 
governments, through their political decisions. By facing this trade-off between growth and 
inequality, and its consequences regarding citizens’ welfare, the debate strongly tilted towards 
political grounds rather than economic. Finally, Atkinson highlights the possibility and even the 
convenience of using wealth distribution to improve the economic performance of a country 
(Atkinson, 2015: 244). However, the success of combining both elements (equality and economic 
growth) are determined by the socioeconomic institutions, whose role is decisive in shaping an 
economic model. This thesis is supported by Andrea Brandolini (1992), who points out that 
entitlement rules, distribution of the economic output, is a major determinant of inequality. This 
last element that links institutions with the performance of economic growth and inequality is dealt 
with in this thesis. 
The social contract also includes the relation between citizenship and entitlements, that is, the array 
of entitlements that every person enjoys just for being a citizen. Citizens’ aspirations for the 
extension of entitlements could lead to social movements or even civil wars. Social conflicts over 
entitlements also occur when they do not include the majority of the population. Historically, the 
creation of a nation-state represents the beginning of the idea of citizenship which also means the 
end of legal entitlement boundaries. It must be emphasized that modern social conflicts rest on this 
new status quo of civil society. Modern social conflict s are not about legally binding obstacles but 
about tackling inequalities that limit full civic participation in the political community.  Equality 
before law within a territory was the very first definition of citizenship26, yet unless all citizens have 
the chance to participate in the law-making process, citizenship will involve inequalities of 
entitlement. This in turn means that if people are not educated, they cannot defend their interests 
                                                          
26 See point 4.1.1 in this chapter: State of Nature and Natural Law. 
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before the law and therefore social, political and civil rights are extremely enmeshed from the 
beginning.  Specifically, the concept of citizenship may be gathered in three main groups: (a) Civil 
rights: represent equality before the law and the right to be judged (bourgeoisie during the 18th 
century linked entitlements with provisions by civil rights). (b) Political rights: universal suffrage. (c) 
Social rights: minimum welfare level guaranteed by law to be a citizen of a country. In Europe, social 
rights were included tacitly, in opposition to civil and political rights that were drawn up in the 
constitution Citizen struggles for social inclusion, such as the suffragette movement stand for the 
right to vote as a way to extend citizenship (Dahrendorf, 2008). 
According to Dahrendorf this would lead to a concept of a worldwide citizen who each have the 
same rights and thus same legal framework (Dahrendorf, 2008). Atkinson in his last book, just before 
he passed away, refers to the idea of a global citizen in terms similar to Dahrendorf’s: “a set of basic 
human rights which must be protected for people everywhere regardless of circumstances”27 
(Atkinson, 2014: 235). Furthermore, “merit goods” are mentioned in the same book to refer to the 
same idea of minimum welfare standards to be guaranteed to every person worldwide, extending 
the concept of national citizenship as it is known to world citizenship. However, global wealth 
distribution is not as easy a task as domestic redistribution, especially considering the 1% bar set as 
the standard for international aid by the international community (Atkinson, 2014: 233). The logic 
behind world citizenship is that nation states are severely limited by the power of global actors and 
particularistic interests, which was proved in the 2007 economic and financial crisis.  Other authors 
such as Sen and Rawls also stress the importance of enjoying a set of primary goods and social rights 
linked to citizenship. Although it should be noted again28 that Sen distinguishes himself from Rawls 
by way of the “difference principle” (Sen, 1992: 21) and through stating that Rawls approach 
regarding the equality of opportunities does not consider the diversity of human beings and their 
capabilities. To reiterate, according to Sen, even when two people have the liberty of holding 
different conceptions about what is good or not even when they enjoy the same primary goods. 
 
4.3. INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: FROM CITIZENSHIP TO WELFARE STATES 
While it is true that civil rights provide access to the markets, the markets might offer a fair standard 
of living. Politics and economics do enter into a conception of citizenship insofar as provisions and 
entitlements are part of the political economy of a country’ understanding of citizenship. The debate 
between market ideas and socialised ones may be better understood by considering Polanyi´s 
                                                          
27 Paraphrasing David Miller (Miller, 2007) 
28 Se point 3.2. Debates in Economics Around Inequality in this chapter 2. 
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concept of double movement. By this idea, Polanyi stresses the evolutive character of the process 
of embeddedness, de-embeddedness and re-embeddedness between the market and society 
(Block, 2003) (Andreotti, Benassi & Kazepov; 2018). In every new economic stage (i.e. the industrial 
revolution) a process of economic de-embeddedness from social and institutional relations takes 
place. As a counter movement, active citizens engage in creating new social and institutional 
structures for re-embeddedness. As T.H. Marshall (1992) states, citizenship has brought many 
changes, some of them related to class. In former times inequalities required political actions but 
currently they depend more strongly upon the markets. Through a comprehensive study of the 
evolution of citizenship from feudal times to the modern welfare state, he highlights the role of the 
state as a mediator/ regulator between the working class claim for equality and capitalists struggling 
to keep their positions. It is in this spirit that citizenship represents a social contract. Within the 
framework of a social contract, work relations are regulated under a private contract since markets 
regulate all of the elements of industry, including labour markets. Marshall (1992) advocates for a 
moderate capitalism in which social citizenship plays a major role in absorbing the tensions 
generated by extreme inequalities inherent to capitalist societies. 
Some critical institutions regulating social life in modern societies, like trade unions, are rooted in 
both the re-embedding instantaneous necessity to invent new bonds of social protection and in the 
emancipation trends that fight social oppression. To quote Maucourant: “Institutionalising means 
shaping economic facts according to certain social relations” (2013: 524). The commodification of 
the labour force supposes a deficit of social protection (Polanyi, 2001). For example, in Germany the 
strength of trade unions, materialised according to the principle of codetermination with the board 
of a company, shows one way to de-commodify labour in favour of social protection. It is true that 
the evolutive character of this double movement is seen in Germany as the tensions from the market 
gain more power.  
Although the nation state is the unit of analysis for this thesis, it is important to remember that an 
international process of commodification also occurs and erodes social bonds the same way 
nationwide. One example that affects Brazil (cited again later in this work) is the unequal global 
exchange that has a devastating impact on employment conditions and therefore the social bonds 
of society. Nevertheless, in this case it is difficult to de-commodify labour, given that in the context 
of a global economy there is no political body at the appropriate scale (beyond the national one) 
that can legislate de facto in the international sphere (Prebish, 1962). In relation to this point, Joseph 
Stiglitz in his book Globalisation and Its Discontents (2002) puts on the table the failure of 
international institutions to mitigate capitalist collateral worldwide (Stiglitz, 2002). 
63 
 
In a post-capitalist society, fictitious commodities (labour, land, and money) are abolished and 
institutions controlled by society such as trade unions, cooperatives, schools, or churches will 
emerge from a democratically elected management. All institutions beyond the control of society 
define their destinies and therefore the economy will never be social without the control of society. 
This is what Polanyi points out in his book The Great Transformation (1944). One cannot see this 
sort of interference in a capitalist system: “It is not the economy that is framed by the social system, 
but rather the social system that is framed by the economy” (Cardoso, 2011: 15). The de-
commodification process may occur in three different ways, according to Esping-Andersen (1990): 
through the family, market, or welfare state. In the present thesis social expenditure and social 
security are the indicators that are taken as independent variables to explain inequality, which in 
turn is chosen as the re-embeddedness variable with previously discussed limitations. 
 
4.4. WELFARE STATES 
The welfare state is the modern institution responsible for the implementation of social rights and 
entitlements. The importance of economic institutions has been stressed by new institutional 
economics. During the post war years, the economy was conceived as a specific segment of a wider 
social order, and society’s economic subsystem was domesticated by institutionalised social values, 
particularly in the Western world. In fact, all social spheres were ruled by values such as solidarity 
rather than by economic rational decisions (Streeck, 2008). The thirty glorious years after WWII are 
an example of the double movement of de-embeddedness and re-embeddedness (Polanyi, 2001) 
with the expansion of the urban economy as well as the expansion of social rights and entitlements. 
As more and more societies modernise through industrialisation and urbanisation, the central role 
of the economy in the destruction of rural social bonds was compensated not only by the 
accommodation of new market opportunities, but also by the constitution of new socially oriented 
institutions within the scope of the welfare state.  
However, nowadays utility-maximizing principles currently govern much of the economic science, 
and this change in favour of a rational choice approach defines institutions (unlike former times) as 
devices for maximization of efficiency. After the 1980’s, faith in the economy as a wealth machine 
waned in comparison to the previous decades. However, politics nonetheless gave way to economy 
as the organiser of society. Elements such as privatisation, reorganisation of public services, 
commodification of labour markets (encouragement of labour market participation), and the use of 
economic rules that manifested in normative notions of justice demonstrate the influence of 
economics in socioeconomic institutions (Streeck, 2008). 
64 
 
Tensions between markets and society have historically led to the construction of institutions to 
organise social life and re-embeddedness movements. Trade unions, for instance, have become a 
powerful tool to confer new bonds of social protection. This is especially relevant in the case of 
Bismarckian influenced region, above all in central and northern European countries, such as 
Germany. In his book The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen, following Karl 
Polanyi, describes the intrinsic process of commodification of work characteristics of capitalist 
economies. He refers to commodification as the obligation of a worker to sell their labour-power so 
as to have a regular income in order to survive (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Hence, the importance of 
welfare institutions as part of the de-commodification not only of labour-power but of different 
areas of social life. This double movement of commodification–decommodification conforms to the 
model of welfare capitalist societies over different times in modern history. However, the debate in 
the present study will start after World War II when current welfare states had been framed (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). 
● Role of institutions: case of unionism in Germany 
Currently, in developed economies such as Germany, there is a negative trend regarding unionism 
enrolment. This fact has led to a debate about the relevancy of this historically important institution 
in Germany that set salaries and generally represented an important part of income dispersion in a 
country (Piketty, 2014). The labour market has become more flexible and so-called labour 
commodification is more visible than ever (Eichhorst, 2009). This is especially critical in a corporatist 
country whose socioeconomic model is based on a high-skills and high wages model. Not belonging 
to this high-skills and high wages model entails notable differences regarding not only salaries but 
certain social services provided by the government. This is especially true in Germany over the last 
two decades, since reunification, when social security policies began to rest increasingly on means-
tested methods (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2008). 
Unionism has historically been a powerful counterweight to employment abuses and therefore it 
could be assumed that different degrees of power might allow trade unions to influence inequality 
rates through the creation of fairer working conditions including, for example, instituting higher 
salaries and fewer working hours. However, the OECD report Divided We Stand shows that trade 
union membership decreased in all OECD countries apart from Spain between 1980 to 2008 (OECD, 
2011). There is a current debate about how this phenomenon may affect inequality regarding 
salaries. Atkinson (2015) has made contributions to this debate, referencing a study undertaken by 
David Card, Thomas Lemieux, and Craig Riddel which demonstrates the low level of influence of 
union membership in various countries, such as the UK, Canada, and the US. The findings show that 
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only a fraction of wage dispersion can be explained by union membership in these countries (Card 
et. al., 2004: 555). In other words, there are other factors that have greater influence. They are also 
mentioned by Atkinson: supply and demand shifts as well as technical changes (Atkinson, 2015: 93-
94). Regarding the latter, there are some authors that argue that technological changes amplify the 
gap between high skill workers and the least skilled ones (Acemoglu et. al, 2001c). This may create, 
on the one hand, a lack of union coalition and, on the other hand, wage dispersion between both 
groups. These findings are in line with trends in Germany where unions are losing power within 
corporations as well as nationwide in political decisions as the labour market is becoming more 
polarised (Allen, 2004). In the case of Brazil, high levels of informality within the labour market has 
limited the power of unionism in improving working conditions. Most social improvements have 
followed a top down flow, that is, major changes have come from the will of governments that 
support working classes. 
Furthermore, decisions about the supply of jobs are more under the control of companies than 
governments, now more than ever given the fact that “Economies of high taxations are not possible 
anymore since people can move their investment from one country to another” (Atkinson, 2015: 
103)29. Thus, unions and even governments have seen their power in setting wage standards lessen 
as that power increases for companies due to the free movement of capital. 
A political approach to setting wage levels in a country is also relevant for the study. Minimum wage 
is a paradox of political influence on salary dispersion in a given country. On the one hand, critics of 
a high minimum wage usually arise from right wing parties arguing that it raises unemployment 
rates. This simple argument comes from the supply and demand model in which higher salaries 
suppose less demand for workers and greater supply. On the other hand, advocates of setting higher 
salaries such as Nobel Prize-winners George Akerlof and Janet Yellen (1986) argue that the 
productivity of a worker depends on factors related to health, formation, energy levels, and 
wellbeing, which, in turn, rest on his consumption level, namely his salary. The gain in the salary of 
the employee supposes a higher cost of leaving his job and, hypothetically, more loyalty to the 
employer. Thus, in this debate about setting a minimum salary, there are some winners and losers 
in each scenario and who those are differ with different authors and approaches. Hence, economic 
output is not the only relevant determinant of earnings inequality, but rather politics too may 
influence inequality rates to a great degree. 
● Role of Firms in welfare state policies 
                                                          
29In the words of George Osborne, addressing the 2014 Conservative Party Conference.  
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Even though companies are not the subject of this thesis, it is relevant to mention the role of firms 
not only due to their direct impact on individual income, but also because of their contribution to 
public budgets and social security systems. Welfare state policies rely on contributions by both 
companies and workers, above all corporatist welfare states in which the entitlement to certain 
social policies is dependent upon the condition of being an employee, not just a mere citizen. 
Therefore, even though the main goal of firms is to satisfy the shareholders’ interests, they play a 
key role in welfare state policies, and for that reason regulations from the national governments 
that stimulate the contributions from firms to the welfare system may affect income inequality 
levels. Hence, firms become a transversal element in this thesis that will be brought up 
systematically given their influence on the social contract and, in particular, on welfare states. Firms 
have a direct impact on personal incomes. The role of firms in income inequality may be powerful, 
but their rules are not democratically elected and therefore their foremost commitments are to 
their shareholders, rather than their workers. Hence, the decisions undertaken by the managers of 
a company are focused on profit, which is in the interest of their shareholders. Although there can 
be cases in which companies promote income inequality reducing policies, due to their structures 
the cases are scarce, and regulations are not tight enough in most of the countries to promote this. 
The free capital movement combined with the lack of an international body to regulate it makes an 
actual regulation in that regard within companies impossible (Atkinson, 2015).  
 
4.4.1. WELFARE STATE CLASSIFICATIONS 
Institutions, such as welfare states, play an important role in wealth redistribution. However, the 
difficulty of measuring the well-being of a person and the collective has traditionally represented a 
challenge to classify them. Therefore, before defining the different welfare state regimes I outline 
the debates around well-being measurement. The lack of tools to measure the level of welfare of a 
society in former times created a rich academic debate around the individual versus the collective 
unit of measurement about welfare levels, represented by the egalitarians and the marginalists 
respectively. They are defined and explained as follows: On the one hand, the marginalists (also 
called paretians), represented by Paul A. Samuelson, Abram Bergson, and Keneth Arrow were the 
first to construct the welfare function to measure the welfare level of a society. In the construction 
of the welfare function, they followed a scientific-positive perspective, by which it is only possible 
to note an improvement in the degree of welfare in a society insofar as individual X may increase 
their level of welfare without any harm to individual Y (Sen, 1970). On the other hand egalitarian 
currents of thinking, represented by authors such as Gunnar Myrdal, criticize the lack of ethical 
elements in a utilitarian welfare function focused on the poor (Myrdal, 1953). Likewise, John Rawls, 
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whose theory of social justice recalls the Contractualism of Rousseau, refers to a mandatory set of 
primary goods to be provided to guarantee the freedom of every citizen (Rawls, 2006). Therefore, 
this debate between marginalists and egalitarians lays down different issues such as social justice, 
redistribution, and freedom of opportunities (among others); which set the stage for subsequent 
welfare state classifications. Those main welfare state classifications, which take some of the 
elements debated by the pioneers of welfare measurement, are defined later in this paper.  
To start with the first welfare state classification, before Esping-Andersen, Richard Titmuss (1974) 
goes beyond social policies and introduces the welfare classifications as a new tool for cross-national 
analysis in the field of social policy. This model assigns a significant role to welfare as a major 
integrated institution, procuring universal services outside the market on the principle of need. It is 
grounded in the principle of social equality and the multiple effects of social change (Titmuss, 1947). 
Furthermore, he introduces new dimensions to the welfare state analysis such as targeted versus 
universal policies, working life within citizen rights, quality versus quantity of social services, and 
entitlement to social policies. He was a pioneer in defining the three welfare models that are 
presented here: 
1. The Residual Welfare Model of Social Policy: 
This model is based on the idea that there are two ways in which an individual’s needs are correctly 
met: private market and the family. Only when both fail do social welfare institutions come in to 
attend these citizens temporarily (Titmuss, 1947). 
2. The Industrial Achievement-Performance Model of social policy: 
This model links social welfare institutions with economic institutions. According to this model social 
needs should be met on the principles of merit, work performance, and productivity (Titmuss, 1947). 
3. The Institutional Redistributive Model of Social Policy: 
In more recent times, Esping-Andersen, updates Titmuss ́ classification and the new three welfare 
models are: Residual, Universal, and Corporatist (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This classification of 
welfare models is defined by the role of the following three institutions in providing social protection 
to the individuals of a country: the family, the state, and the market respectively. The classification 
of Esping-Anderson represents a solid and reliable reference to interpret the results of the study 
undertaken in chapter 5 from a sociological perspective beyond the purely redistributive function 




In light of the foregoing discussion, a welfare state model, as we know it today, is understood as the 
result of the conflict between social agents. Hence, the historical background of each country would 
define its own welfare system. According to this reasoning, there should be as many welfare models 
as the number of countries worldwide. However Esping-Andersen (1990) has defined the three main 
types of welfare states (in developed countries), namely: Liberal, Corporatist-Statist, and Social 
Democratic. He categorises the different welfare systems according to the interrelation between 
the family, the state, and the market in the welfare systems as it is shown in figure 9. Korpi & Palme 
(1998) also describe the market and the politics which intervene in the welfare construction in terms 
of trade-off between them: If there is less market influence there is more political influence and 
vice-versa. 
The classification defined by Andersen shows the balance of power of the family, the state and the 
market in their role of social protection (basically, unemployment compensation, pensions, 
education, and health) in a region or country. Each one of the models rest on different institutions:  
a. Social democratic regimes rely mainly upon the public system and the criterion to be covered 
under this protection is citizenship since the government is mainly responsible for it.  
b. Corporatist-statist regimes are based on mandatory contributions from workers who are, in turn, 
the ones entitled to the social protection scheme provided in a manner related to the breadwinner 
model. Employment not only guarantees a salary but security against unemployment, pension after 
working age, and maternity/paternity leave.  
Family State 
Market 
Figure 9. Esping-Andersen Welfare Matrix 
Source: Elaborated by the author adapted from (Esping- Andersen, 1990) 
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c. Liberal regimes under which social protection is neither mandatory nor covered through 
citizenship. Only the lowest strata of the population are covered by a safety net and means-tested 
methods are the most common to describe who is entitled to social aid.  
However, apart from Titmuss and the often-cited classification of Esping-Andersen, which define 
the welfare states constructed in developed countries, there have been other definitions or 
approaches to the concept of social policies, before the welfare state definition was even created. 
For example, the definition given by Professor Macbeath (1957: 1): “Social policies are concerned 
with the right ordering of the network of relationships between men and women who live together 
in societies, or with the principles which should govern the activities of individuals and groups so far 
as they affect the lives and interests of people”. As one may notice there is no mention of altruism, 
solidarity, or redistribution (connotations that usually are linked with this term); he simply puts the 
life of the community as the central issue to be tackled by social policy. This broad definition is useful 
because it would be valid for social as well as economic social sciences. This definition is compatible 
with another by Professor Hagenbuch (1971: 205), who argues that “the main goal of social policy 
is ensuring every citizen of a country certain standard of living and opportunities”. 
 
4.4.2. WELFARE STATE CLASSIFICATIONS IN EMERGING COUNTRIES 
This thesis is in line with literature that describe the welfare state models in emerging countries and 
more specifically in Latin American countries. Given the fact that the most well-known welfare state 
classifications from Titmuss (1974) and later Esping Andersen (1990) mainly focus on European 
countries, Latin American countries have not been the object of welfare state classifications until 
recently when Julianna Martinez (2007) undertook one of the most comprehensive studies 
regarding Latin American welfare state classifications (Ubasart-González & Minteguiaga, 2017). It is 
true that some authors such as Mesa-Lago (2005) and Filgueira (1998) have tried to categorise not 
welfare states but the social policies according to time of introduction and degree of coverage 
(among other criteria), respectively. However, these last two studies were based on the period from 
the 1920s-1930s to the 1970s while the one from Martinez (2007) is more recent, covering the last 
part of the Washington Consensus period from 1998 to 2005. 
Martinez (2007) considers the role of the state and the family in the welfare provision. She defines 
a common root for all Latin American countries: the informality of the welfare provision. However, 
there are differences between the countries in terms of the level of commodification of the labour 
market, the access to the basic needs provided by the state, and the degree of welfare relying family, 
mainly non-working mothers (Martinez, 2007: 85). Following these criteria, three welfare models 
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are defined: (a) state based-productivist, (b) state based-protectionist, and (c) family based. In the 
first two models the state play an important role in providing welfare to its citizens, however 
according to the first the state only acts in case of a lack of provision from the market, while in the 
second the state intervenes in areas where the market also acts, and applies mostly to people 
working under formality conditions. The last one refers to welfare models relying on the family, 
mainly on the role of non-working women. She describes Brazil as following a state based-
productivist model, that is, a welfare model in which people working under formality conditions are 
the main focus of the welfare model (Martinez, 2007:24). 
The informality of the welfare provision seems to be a common element for the majority of Latin 
American countries, particularly during the neoliberal period from 1990 to the mid-2000s. 
Barrientos (2004) also highlights this informality. However, he points out a transition from an 
informal-conservative to an informal-liberal model with the release of the Consensus of Washington 
policies to Latin America. The informal-conservative model gives way to an informal-liberal one, 
characterised by a privatisation process in which social security, labour protection, health, and 
education have steadily gone from public to private hands.  
However, the literature regarding welfare states in emerging countries is still very recent. This is in 
part due to the presence of welfare regimes instead of welfare states in these regions, but it is also 
because of a lack of tools to understand different socioeconomic configurations of capitalist 
economies and consolidated liberal democracy as named by Gough & Geof (2004). This thesis aims 
to contribute to the analysis of social welfare in a Latin American country by comparing the two 
aspects of social policy - social security contributions and social expenditure - in Brazil and Germany 
and departing from the welfare state classification of Esping-Andersen. 
 
4.5. FORMALITY OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: SOCIAL EXPENDITURE AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
CONTRIBUTORS 
The formality of the social contract represents an important dimension of the concept of a social 
contract, and this is particularly the case for social expenditure. This dimension together with social 
security contributions are considered drivers of income inequality in this thesis. The dichotomy 
between the people under the umbrella of the social protection and the ones left out of the formal 
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social contract is included in the welfare state classifications30. Therefore, the definition of the 
concept of informality, and the debates around it and its measurement will now be dealt with.  
Informality has not been considered an important phenomenon in economics until recently when 
developing countries such as India, China and Brazil (among others) have started to play a major 
role in the global economy. The importance of informal economy in those developing and very 
populated countries creates a different configuration of socioeconomic relations, which are more 
informal, and also represents difficult challenges in political terms. That is the reason why 
international organisations have recently focused on informality. The World Bank (2019) for 
instance has included a chapter on this issue enclosed to the Global Economic Prospects: January 
2019. The global numbers regarding informality are remarkable and account for “about a third of 
GDP and 70 percent of employment (…) in emerging market and developing economies” (World 
Bank: 129). Later, I will go into more depth regarding the numbers for the specific cases of study: 
Brazil and Germany.31 However, first it is important to outline the different approaches to defining 
informality.  
The first definition of informality come from an ILO report in 1973 which differentiates paid 
employment from self-employment, with the term informality applying to the latter (Hart, 1973: 
68). The definition soon evolved within ILO towards a synonym of poverty, above all in urban areas. 
Various studies from ILO, PREALC (Regional Employment Programme for Latin America and Caribe) 
and the World Bank (Sethuraman, 1981; Gerry, 1978; Pérez Sáinz, 1992) have worked on this 
correlation between urban poverty and informality, using the term subemployment for people who 
cannot integrate into the modern economy. Other studies, however, have shown the positive side 
of informality as a driver of economic dynamism due to the opportunities that informality provides 
for entrepreneurship outside of the tight regulations from the state (Hart, 1990: 158). More 
contemporary definitions of informality avoid judgements and highlight the intuitional aspect of the 
concept outside of the legal framework (Feige, 1990: 990). It is important to mention that these 
definitions do not address the entire extent of the concept, given the huge range of activities that 
fall under informality (Portes & Haller, 2004): Other analyses have contributed to the classification 
of informality following a functional approach, (Portes, Castells & Benton, 1989) demarcating  three 
kinds of informality according to the goal of the informal relation: (a) survival, (b) flexibility, and (c) 
growth. The first refers to people that have no alternative to this kind of labour relation and must 
engage in it to survive. (b) The second revolves around the flexibility of companies to choose the 
                                                          
30 See section 4.4.1 of the same chapter. 
31 See the point 4.5.3 of this chapter. 
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informal sector over the formal one by outsourcing tasks to informal workers. (c) The third 
emphasises the benefits of solidarity relations that individuals may obtain from merging all together.  
One of the main characteristics of informality is the difficulty in measuring the degree of informality 
of a country. The main and obvious reason for this is the illegal character of informality, it being a 
condition that nobody wishes to recognise. Nevertheless, there are different degrees of social 
acceptance of informality depending on the country. Generally speaking, the more developed a is 
country the more difficult it is to measure informality due to the lack of validity of surveys and also 
because of the hiddenness of this phenomenon. There are different methodologies for measuring 
the degree of informality: (a) labour market approach, (b) household consumption, and (c) 
macroeconomic discrepancies (Portes & Haller, 2004: 29). However, the measurement of 
informality still represents a huge challenge for most countries, which makes it extremely difficult 
to implement policies such as welfare policies. If governments are not able to assert with accuracy 
the socioeconomic situation of their citizens, which includes people under conditions of informality, 
it is nearly impossible to implement the right policies, regardless of the aim of the government. 
However, it is true that the more open the conception of informality is, the better informality is 
measured, due to the good quality of the surveys conducted (Portes & Haller, 2004). According to 
this argument, the Brazilian government would be more aware of the degree of informality of their 
citizens than the German government. Thus, welfare policies may be more oriented to people within 
formal or informal social contracts depending on two criteria: (a) the accuracy of the measurement, 
as well as (b) the actual degree of formality in the society. 
We will now return to the explanatory variables in this thesis: social spending and social security 
contributors. On the one hand, investments in social assistance, social security, health, labour, 
education, housing, and sanitation may arguably be related to the social contract since they improve 
the quality of life of their recipients. On the other hand, the number of social security contributors 
is especially relevant for the social contract in the comparison between Brazil and Germany. The 
fact that the German social contract is based on social security contributions by workers – the formal 
social contract – contrasts with the Brazilian one, which is to a greater extent based on providing 
basic goods to the bottom of the social strata outside of the formal social contract – the informal 
social contract. In the following sections, I take into consideration the two variables – social 
expenditure and social security contributions – as the main variables to explain social inequality. 
Both variables considered within the framework of formality remind us that the world of informality 




4.5.1. SOCIAL EXPENDITURE 
Most of the literature on social expenditure is based on OECD countries and their welfare state 
structure and institutions (Huber et al., 2008). Therefore the question about the determinants of 
social spending in Latin American countries and particularly the case of Brazil remains partially 
unanswered. Moreover, some authors argue, like Rudra (2004) did in a study that covered the years 
from 1972 to 1996, that social spending affects inequality rates to a greater degree in developed 
countries than in less developed ones. The reasons for this are related to the institutional constraints 
and clientelism that favour the middle-upper classes, which characterise less developed countries. 
A more orthodox international organisation like the IMF states that social expenditure may be a 
powerful tool to improve equality levels, and above all it points out education investment as a key 
determinant of income disparity levels (Clements, 1997).  
One of the main reasons why social spending is selected as an explanatory variable for the present 
study is its hypothetical relation with the political forces behind it; within a democratic regimen 
(assuming their differences) all strata of society participate, to a greater or lesser extent, in the 
policy making process by choosing one or another party and their political programmes. It is known 
from OECD scholars and experts that the left-right political spectrum has a strong correlation with 
social spending and redistribution policies throughout recent history (Bradley et al., 2003). Firstly, 
left wing parties generally promote higher redistributive and welfare policies whereas right wing 
ones tend to rely on means testing welfare policies and a small budget for social expenditure 
(Bradley et al., 2003). Lastly, right wing Christian democratic parties usually result in strong welfare 
state policies, although they heavily rely on private investments and keep a low profile on 
redistribution matters (Bradley et al., 2003). Other studies show inconsistent results regarding the 
partisan effects in social spending (Iversen et al., 1998). Finally, still more studies demonstrate the 
opposite thesis; Armingeon et al. (2001) state that leftist parties are more prone to reducing social 
budgets given that they have more credibility when it comes to retrenchment, this argument is 
consistent with the social democratic Schröder government in Germany, where social policies 
suffered a substantial budget cut back. 
Regarding Germany, one of the main elements of social expenditure that it shares with Brazil would 
be that both practice cooperation between the state, unions, and corporations in the policy making 
process (which include social spending) (Streeck et al. 2004). The fact that employees’ and 
employers’ interests become extraordinarily closed strongly affects social policies. Furthermore, the 
lack of unilateral enforcement powers to some degree necessitates that national as well as federal 
governments cooperate with social actors such as unions and employers’ associations. This 
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cooperation between social actors is also reflected in what Streeck called: “delegation of public 
responsibility” (Streeck, 2005: 139). By this Streeck means how public institutions take advantage 
of the proximity between employees and employers in delegating the negotiation of social 
insurance provisions to companies to be done directly with workers (or their representatives).  
Despite social policies first being undertaken as far back as the 1970s in Latin America (Huber et al., 
2008), the variation in political regimes compared to OECD countries (Germany in this case) as well 
as political institutions supposes a real challenge for the analysis. Despite this, the period starting in 
the 1990s was intentionally chosen to represent the coming of democracy to Brazil after nearly 
three decades of military regime in order to minimise the deviations that may have been caused by 
that political regime.  
While it is true that Latin American parties have generally been perceived as weaker and less 
consolidated than those in longer standing democracies, some authors have already demonstrated 
that Latin American parties really care, and they represent the electors’ preferences despite their 
“youth” (Luna et. al, 2005). Having said this, social spending and political forces both represent a 
relevant variable to be considered to analyse the effects of either a left or a right set of social policies 
in two countries with different (but comparable) structural and historical circumstances, namely 
Brazil and Germany. 
 
4.5.2. SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTORS 
Keynes made the argument after the crisis in 1929 that the economic society of that time failed to 
provide full employment. Furthermore, it was incapable of addressing unequal distribution of 
wealth and income. This statement was perceived as the end of capitalism for some and the 
salvation of it for others. In fact, he switched the focus from the supply side to the demand side by 
proposing certain political and social changes to promote economic growth (Dahrendorf, 2008). 
Apparently, market institutions were not enough to mitigate the cyclic crisis intrinsic to the market 
economy, and hence Keynes suggested that the entitlements structure had to be modified to 
increase provisions. In other words, he states that better incomes lead to higher growth rates, the 
final goal of a capitalist country.  
Inherited from these Keynesian ideas to increase entitlements of citizens, the concept of welfare 
state was re-defined during the period after WWII until the mid-1970s, the so-called thirty glorious 
years. During this period the most industrialised countries in the world reached high levels of 
economic growth, employment and productivity thanks to the standardisation of work. The figure 
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of a worker-citizen resulted from the social conflict that shaped the social contract in these countries 
and was made possible because of its system of protection and rights that provided a certain level 
of well-being. The nature of the benefits from the welfare state systems, ranging from legal to 
economic, became intrinsic to the participation of workers in the society. This implies that the 
unemployed or those in the informal economy did not enjoy the same social contract as those 
contributing with their work and thus well-being was not necessarily improved by welfare state 
policies for them. Only workers in the formal economy could have the right to unemployment 
benefits and social services as part of the de-commodification process.  It is important to remember 
that the link between formal work and citizen rights depends on the country’s type of social 
contract. 
In the specific case of Latin America, at the beginning of 1950s social security schemes in the region 
were rather fragmented, which is linked to the ISI strategy (Huber et al., 2008). First with the left 
parties of several countries coming to power, privileged groups such as militaries and civil servants 
received benefits from these programmes. However, employers only covered the contributions of 
blue-collar employees. Latin American (and especially Brazilian) governments kept tariffs high in 
order to protect domestic markets, leaving informal workers out of any social security system 
(Huber et al., 2008). For this reason, it is more relevant to focus on the allocation of social spending 
instead of the magnitude of the overall expenditure. A study undertaken by the World Bank on social 
security policies in Latin America sheds light on this topic and reveals that regressive components 
exceed progressive ones in the region (De Ferranti et al., 2004). Another study (ECLAC, 2002) 
demonstrates that social security systems in the Latin American region benefit the middle and upper 
classes to the detriment of the lower ones. Moreover, the same study (ECLAC, 2002) states that the 
most progressive areas of social spending, in terms of redistribution, are education and health care 
in that order. That is one of the reasons why the proportion of social security contributors is 
relevant, and it is taken as an explanatory variable for inequality rates in this thesis. Social 
expenditure is hypothesised to explain, in part, income inequality rates but also the number of 
people who contribute and benefit from it.  
Therefore, assigning security contributors as the second independent variable for the regression 
study takes into account two main arguments: (1) reputable authors such as Polanyi through his 
theory on entitlements and provisions points out the notion of the citizen as recipient of certain 
rights or privileges (Polanyi, 2001). But this entitlement is not always linked with a nationality or 
residence, and so either a formal job or the figure as contributor to the public social security scheme 
become more relevant criteria in order to receive most public services. (2) The citizen in an informal 
situation outside of the social security public system is benefited, depending on the country they 
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are in, from non-contributory benefits (universal or means tested) in the form of subsides or public 
services provided by other institutions. By taking social security contributors as an independent 
variable I define as formal the situation of people who do contribute to social security system in a 
country and define the situation of other as informal. I am aware that this operationalisation of the 
concept of formality has its limits, and so during the design of the study thy I identify its advantages 
and drawbacks as well as the way that I try to overcome these limitations.  
 
4.5.3. GERMANY AND BRAZIL: DIFFERENT EVOLUTIONS OF SOCIAL CONTRACTS  
As previously mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, Brazil and Germany have been chosen as 
two paradigmatic countries in terms of the evolution of their social contracts. Brazil as a decolonised 
region is arguably the most populated country in Latin America and is known to have been one of 
the most unequal countries in the world for years. Germany also represents one of the most 
populated countries in the European region, and it was reconstructed in post-war years and caught 
up with the western economies in an extraordinarily short period of time while dealing with the 
shock of the unification process at the beginning of the 1990s. Both societies have struggled, to a 
greater or lesser extent, to provide welfare to their population through different mechanisms: 
redistribution policies (direct and indirect taxation), education, social security programmes, and/or 
subsidies.  
The efforts of both countries to reach low income inequality levels, in the case of Brazil; or maintain 
them, in the case of Germany, during the last decades has been the main motivation of this thesis. 
While Germany has been a solidly developed country since WWII, it has paradoxically seen an 
increase in income inequality levels since 1990. Brazil, being far less developed in economic terms 
(GDP) has enjoyed a steady decrease in income inequality terms. While it is true that the income 
inequality level has decreased in relative terms in Brazil and it has increased in Germany between 
1990 to 2014, looking at the gross figures the differences between Brazil and Germany hover around 
0.2 and 0.3 (see figure 10) depending on the year. That is still a tremendous difference. At the 
starting point, in 1990, the Gini index for Brazil was twice as large as Germany’s. It is particularly 
important to investigate the causes of this opposite evolution in Brazil and Germany in terms of 
income inequality since the different countries’ trends appear to go against the main theories about 
the relation between development and income inequality (Rostow, 1962).  
In this thesis I hypothesize that the social contract is one of the reasons for this opposite evolution 
of their income inequality. In Brazil, the informal sector is very robust as compared to other 
developing countries, accounting for one-third of the population and representing one-third of the 
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GDP of the country32 (World Bank, 2019). At the same, the people in this informal situation 
represent, arguably, the lowest strata of the population. Thus, if the direction of the social policies 
focuses on this informal sector it may be able to tackle the high inequality rates through two kinds 
of policies: (a) the ones focused on poverty alleviation and (b) the ones that facilitate the entrance 
of citizens from informal conditions to formal activities. The same argument is valid for Germany, 
were the alarm bells have rung during the past decades showing some fragilities to the German 
socioeconomic model, which is seen as one of the most equals models. Quoting Christopher S. Allen 
the “siren song of deregulation” (Allen, 1997: 19) has challenged the German corporatist welfare 
model based on a social security system in which contributions and entitlements are closely linked. 
Informality has been assumed as an anomaly of the system and therefore the hypothesis of this 
thesis is that higher levels of informality in a system based on contributions has led to higher income 
inequality rates in the case of Germany.  
 
                                                          
32 This figure is higher than other developing countries with similar levels of informal economy such as 
Pakistan where, representing two-thirds of the population it accounts for one-third of the total 














































































































Figure 10. Income Inequality Rates (Gini Index) for Brazil and Germany (1990-2014) 




In Germany, one of the main examples of a strong welfare state after WWII, the implicit agreement 
between firms, government, and unions has proven to be a successful formula for the 
Wirtschaftswunder33. The principle of codetermination between unions and firms has provided a 
stable framework in which participation of employees in the decision-making process was 
encouraged.  
However, different external shocks such as the oil crisis in the early 1970s, the unification in the 
1990s, and the financial crisis in the mid-00s have challenged the formal social contract articulated 
by the welfare state. Especially since the unification process (an object of study of the subsequent 
analysis) a wave of liberalisation has given rise to low rates of economic growth and has left many 
German citizens out of the welfare state model. 
In Latin America and especially Brazil, after WWII structuralism was followed as a new economic 
current of thinking. Prebish (1962), the precursor of structuralism, stated that the new economic 
order after the war was not fair for the Latin American regions. He focused on the unfair terms 
concerning international trade, since primary-export countries suffer as more industrialised 
developed regions benefit. He highlights two elements: (1) the deterioration in the terms of added 
value compared to Western developed economies, (2) the unlimited work-force supply with low-
wages, and (3) weak institutional structures reluctant to invest in new technologies (Bielchowski, 
2009). The solution proposed by Prebish (1962) in order to overcome this unequal situation of 
peripheral countries such as Brazil was the Import Substitution Industrialisation Strategy (ISI). 
Through the implementation of this model Brazil has attempted to modify not only industrialisation 
patterns, but also the living conditions of Brazilian citizens through improvements in productivity 
rates that resulted in the model being able to become competitive (Bielchowski, 2009). This 
industrialisation strategy and protectionism were the two most characteristic elements of Brazilian 
socioeconomic model until the late 1970s and early 1980s when the Consensus of Washington 
policies substituted for the ISI strategy, provoked by  strong social tensions resulting from the  ISI in 
Brazil only benefiting a small fraction of the Brazilian population due to accumulation of capital 
(Furtado, 1966:32). 
With the coming of democracy and the new constitution of 1988, Brazil sought to change the former 
social contract based on contributory systems in which mostly workers in the formal labour market 
were benefited by the social security system. However, people in rural areas working under 
informality conditions, the unemployed, and domestic workers did not benefit from any social 
                                                          
33 German economic miracle. 
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policy. The new constitution contained terms such as citizenship understood as a body of rights and 
obligations. However, the reality did not truly reflect the spirit of the new constitution in regards to 
social rights. The inherited social institutions were founded on a contribution system in which the 
contributor was also the receiver of the social system. These weak foundations presented a limit to 
be faced by the Cardoso ś administration at the beginning of its mandate. In these circumstances 
the main pillar in which the welfare systems relied upon during the 1990s and 2000s were focused 
on poverty alleviation. 
 
4.6. THE EFFECT OF EDUCATION ON INCOME INEQUALITY LEVELS 
Finally, I will introduce the secondary school enrolment variable, which is included to control the 
effects of social expenditure and social security contributors on income inequality. Education is 
taken as an important driver of income inequality and it is assumed to play a determining role in 
income equality rates according to numerous authors from different currents of thinking and 
reputable organisations. Both economists and sociologists agree, regardless of their political 
orientation, that education is negatively correlated with income inequality, which is to say that the 
higher the level of higher education is, the lower income inequality rates will be. This section does 
not aim to discuss the debates about the role of education in income inequality levels but only 
mentions relevant studies and authors that support this assumption about the relation between 
education and income inequality. 
Starting with the economists, institutions such as the IMF explicitly name: “extreme disparities in 
educational attainment levels” (Clements, 1997: 10) as a determinant of income inequality in 
countries such as Brazil. Furthermore, a study undertaken by Rudra (2004) points out that education 
is a powerful driver to decrease inequality rates. In fact, the outcomes of this study show that this is 
valid for both developed and less developed countries. Also, official institutions, for instance the 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations in its work: Inequality Matters - 
Report of the World Social Situation 2013, have stated that improvements in secondary education 
levels are closely related to a decrease in equality levels in fourteen out of twenty Latin-American 
countries, (UNDESA, 2013). Therefore, secondary education has been taken as the control variable 
so as to draw out the inference between social contract and inequality. It is true, however, that the 
same authors encourage further studies at different levels, such as tertiary education (Rudra, 2004). 
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Education, as a pre-distributive concept34, became a key area in order to provide highly skilled 
workers to develop an industrialisation strategy coordinated by the state. The German social 
security model (anchor of German corporatist welfare state) relies on highly skilled and educated 
workers to be competitive in high added value markets, and this requires an education programme 
which meets the requirements of those industries. In the case of Germany, the dual educational 
system has become an essential part of their industrial model, in addition to the universal education 
system with almost free tertiary education. In LDCs such as Brazil, there are institutional limitations 
and governmental clientelist practices that allocate resources to middle and upper-middle classes, 
which leaves education as one of the only escape routes towards a better income opportunity for 
the poorer strata. Education became one of the main drivers to improve the position of a 
son/daughter in respect to his/her parents, according to different institutions and scholars (IMF, 
2017). Di Stasio and Solga (2017: 1) mention: “all authors critically engage with the social investment 
state approach that sees in education and training investment the lynchpin of a pre-distribution 
agenda protecting individuals from the new social risks of a competitive, knowledge-driven 
economy”. 
In the same vein, sociologists such as Gruski (2001) refer to education as an asset that can be 
converted not only into future income streams, as economists do, but also as a cultural resource or 
social reputation asset. However there is no agreement about education in terms of its classification 
between: (a) the assets that are valuable in their own right and, (b) the second order goods that 
may provide access to former ones. Maybe the clearest relation between education and social 
stratification is represented by the range of occupations that an incumbent may reach. Webberian 
authors, such as Goldthorpe (2000: 213), mention the degree of monitoring as the mechanism to 
divide social classes, and he refers to the dichotomy between labour contracts and service 
relationships. The higher the job-skills, the more difficult it is for an employer to monitor the work 
of an employee, it may therefore be deduced through the Weberian argument that education may 
define, at least partially, the life-chances of individuals. Bourdieu (1986) is more explicit about the 
role of education as the ultimate asset that sets the division between different social strata. School 
is named as one of the two different agents in life trajectories that shape the habitus of incumbents 
(Bourdieu, 1986: 244). But it is not only that education may affect social mobility through cultural 
capital, which is the social environment around different social strata. To sum up, there is a great 
degree of agreement regarding the role of education as a mechanism of social stratification. To 
quote Grusky (2001:13): “In nearly all models of advanced industrial society, it is further assumed 
                                                          
34 The pre-distributive character of education is discussed in Chapter 5, 8.1. 
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that education is the principal mechanism by which individuals are sorted into such classes, and 





CHAPTER 3. COMPARATIVE GERMANY AND BRAZIL: ECONOMIC MODEL, REDISTRIBUTION 
POLICIES AND SOCIAL CONTRACT 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The main goal of this chapter is to determine the main drivers of the construction of the current 
social contract in Brazil and Germany. In order to achieve this, one has to go through other 
challenges such as: (1) finding the historical roots of the national economic model that shape the 
socioeconomic panorama in Germany and Brazil today. (2) Comparing the evolution of the actors 
and institutions which determines the social contract in Germany and Brazil, that is, the dynamics 
and behaviour of national socioeconomic institutions as internal and external shocks happened. 
How to increase or at least maintain economic outcomes as well as welfare levels when these shocks 
hit Germany or Brazil is the secondary question this chapter aims to answer. Therefore, this chapter 
highlights the transformation of socioeconomic national institutions as they assimilate different 
realities in different periods of time. (3) Analysing the redistribution policies undertaken in each 
country through certain periods of time and their influence on the social contract. (4) Finally, the 
chapter argues that cultural aspects and welfare models are closely related to economic models as 
well. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) work, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism is one of the main 
references. 
This analysis of the evolution of both socioeconomic models is important in order to interpret the 
results of the empirical studies of both countries and understand the different traditions upon which 
the two social contracts are based. The historical sequence will be defined and divided into its most 
relevant periods, which will later be analysed in detail one by one. This is necessary, as a social 
contract is not a static phenomenon, it evolves alongside the internal and external socioeconomic 
context. One recent paradigmatic example that shows the fragility of social contracts in a national 
context may be the situation of southern European countries, such as Greece, Portugal, or Spain 
during the 2007 global financial crisis. In these cases, when the socioeconomic circumstances 
changed, the current social contract was broken insofar as it was meant to provide jobs, social 
policies or public services such as health or education. Here, the diachronic study of the current 
social contract and its determinants in both countries will become the core of the study.  
Before going deeper into the historical analysis, it is important to clarify some definitions. The term 
economic model is understood in this thesis as an institutional arrangement and it may only be 
explained a posteriori. By this I mean that the recognition of a model requires a backward look in 
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time since the creation of an economic model is an experimental (trial-error) process (Streeck, 
2005). The major components to be taken for the characterisation of a model are institutional as 
well as ideational. More specifically, much of the success (or failure) in constructing the correct 
institutions to be able to accommodate any circumstance rests on the capacity of the economic and 
political actors to understand their own socioeconomic circumstances. For this reason, the analysis 
of both German and Brazilian economic models takes the actor-centred perspective from Peter A. 
Hall and David Soskice (2001) in Varieties of Capitalism. I will use the dichotomy presented in 
Varieties of Capitalism between Liberal Market Economies (LME) and Coordinated Market 
Economies (CME). 
The chapter unfolds the following way: first, it examines the historical socioeconomic backgrounds 
of Germany and Brazil that shape their current socioeconomic institutions. Next, the most important 
turning points in their modern history are pointed out and described in more depth. Lastly, I analyse 
the concrete welfare policies undertaken from 1990 to 2016 and the national political contexts that 
prompt them. Then I present the conclusions with a brief summary of the socioeconomic pillars of 
both societies and their similarities and differences that are relevant for this thesis. At the beginning 
of the analysis of both countries I have constructed a historical framework with the structure of each 
country to show the reader the most striking points to be further analysed. 
 
2. HISTORICAL SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUNDS 
Before delving into the analysis of Germany and Brazil, a time-framework is presented in order to 
provide an architecture to be taken for further analysis. This has two main goals: (a) framing the 
period to be analysed and, (b) setting the points to be developed subsequently. During this task, 
one finds it difficult to choose which is most suitable factor between two options: relevancy and 
comparability. If the former is chosen, the analysis would then attempt to go as far back in as much 
depth as would be necessary to understand the actual political and socioeconomic situation in Brazil 
and Germany. For the latter, the period of time chosen for the study should be homogenised for 
both countries in order to make them comparable and consistent as otherwise the outcome would 
lack reliability. 
Taking all these elements into account, four periods are clearly distinguished to establish a base 
framework. (1) Both countries set the basis of their economic and/or welfare model, to a greater or 
lesser extent in Germany and Brazil, at the end of the 19th century. (2) Subsequently, the post-war 
era between the 1950s and 1990s is when Germany accomplished the Wirtschaftswunder and Brazil 
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assimilated the idea of endogenous growth as its own with more or less success. (3) Thirdly, the 
period from the 1990s to the beginning of the 2000s will form the core of the chapter as in this 
period major transformations happened in both countries and it helps a great deal to be able to 
understand the current socioeconomic national contexts. (4) Lastly, the last decade is studied 
through the lens of the drivers of social contract formerly named. I will proceed by examining first 
Germany, in the following section, followed by Brazil. 
In order to better understand the German reality, it is relevant to introduce the term ‘Coordinated 
Market Economy’ (CME) since it is being used as the backbone of German socioeconomic analysis. 
Two political economic models are differentiated in this chapter, namely CMEs and Liberal Market 
Economies (LMEs). This distinction has been taken from Hall and Soskice’s Varieties of Capitalism 
and represent the two poles a nation can be closer or further from. LMEs are characterised by their 
central role in the market; the supply of goods and services are adjusted according to price 
indicators and the relation between economic actors is regulated by formal contracts. On the other 
hand CMEs believe in non-market systems of coordination, whereby actors rely more on 
collaborative relations as opposed to the more competitive behaviours of LMEs. Strategic long-term 
relations are promoted in CMEs to a greater extent as compared to LMEs whose relationship 
durations commonly rest on competitive rules (Hall/Soskice, 2001: 8). The main reason for the 
selection of CME and LME classification to define the German economic system is the temporary 
character of it. Germany as a latecomer industrialised country was able to catch up with Great 
Britain because of the variety of capitalism it created, not only based on market principles but 
cooperative forces from different agencies towards the same direction. Furthermore, the fact that 
reputable scholars writing about the German economic model such as Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen 
Thelen (2005) and Christopher Allen (1997) have followed the same rhetoric, encouraged me to take 
the same perspective. Germany has repeatedly been named the paradox of CME, in contrast to 
Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United Kingdom or the United States which are identified as the 
best examples of LME (Hall/Soskice, 2001). Through this debate, I attempt to characterise the 
German economy and to understand the institutions as well as mechanisms which configure its 
functioning. 
Even though the same classification is not used for Brazil, structuralism, which names the theory 
behind the current Brazilian socioeconomic system, shares the Hall & Soskice´s (2001) view of the 
decolonised Latin American countries after WWII. However, in this case being a latecomer to 
industrialisation is not the only barrier to overcome but rather there are other challenges that other 
less developed countries face, such as the unequal terms of exchange in international markets, and 
these define its modern socioeconomic historical context (Prebish, 1962). The structuralism theory 
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links development (or the lack of development) to exogenous factors and is the reason for the 
Import Substitution Industrialization Strategy (ISI). This strategy meant focusing on constructing its 
own national industries which provide higher added value than primary goods. This strategy may 
share some characteristics with the German CME, for example the development of national 
industries to improve the quality of the jobs and therefore the standard of living for workers. 
However, the main goal for Brazil was providing manufactured goods for their internal market and 
substituting for imports from developed countries with them. Germany meanwhile focused on 
beating the competition in the international markets.  
From these departure points of Brazil and Germany I will describe the evolution of both 
socioeconomic systems. These descriptions will follow the same scheme divided into four 
dimensions: the international economic context, national politics, redistribution policies, and 
economic models. By describing both historical roots of the socioeconomic systems of both 
countries I aim to lay the foundations for the results of the empirical analysis.  
 
2.1. BRAZIL 
In this section I conduct a similar descriptive analysis for Germany and Brazil. The following table 
summarises the main features of the political economy evolution for this country. 
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2.1.1. 1950s – 1960s FOUNDATIONS OF STRUCTURALISM: ECONOMIC MODEL OF BRAZIL  
 Structuralism, as a new economic current of thinking, was first named by Raul Prebish after WWII. 
He stated that the new economic order after the war, which was based on classic economic 
theories35, undermined the economic development of Latin American regions (Prebish, 1962). 
Specifically, he questioned the equality of international free-trade relations encouraged by Western 
countries, since primary-export countries lose out against more industrialised regions (Prebish, 
1962). Furthermore, he named the condition of Latin American countries ‘periphery’ as opposed to 
the ‘centres’: Western developed countries. The main arguments he put forth for this distinction 
                                                          
35 In particular, he referred to the theory of comparative advantage whose author was David Ricardo.  
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were: (1) the deterioration in the terms of added value compared to Western developed economies, 
(2) the unlimited work-force supply with low-wages, and (3) weak institutional structures reluctant 
to invest in new technologies (Bielchowski, 2009).  
The solution proposed by Prebish (1962) in order to overcome the unequal situation of peripheral 
countries such as Brazil was the Import Substitution Industrialisation Strategy. By modifying 
industrialisation patterns, Prebish attempted to improve the living conditions of Latin American 
citizens through improvements in productivity rates that resulted in the model being able to reach 
levels of competitiveness on international markets (Bielchowski, 2009). This industrialisation 
strategy and protectionism were the two most characteristic elements of the years between the 
1950s and 1970s, according to Jose Antonio Ocampo (2011). Furthermore, he highlighted that these 
ideas supposed the continuity of an economic model whose success was already tested during 
WWII, when Latin America together with United States were the regions with the highest growth 
rates (Ocampo, 2011). The controversy of protectionism during the cold war period when this term 
might sound close to soviet positions, above all for more orthodox economists, was nuanced in its 
articulation by the CEPAL as well as by development authors such as Hirschman (Ocampo, 2008). 
More specifically, they stated that Latin American regions did not take an explicitly protectionist 
position after WWII, and supported this with the following arguments: (1) during the war and given 
the difficulties importing in key sectors, Latin American states had to play a stronger role in 
developing their national industry; (2) this, together with the abandonment of the gold standard, 
the control of exchange rates, and the countercyclical macroeconomic policies demonstrated the 
general recognition of industrialisation as a source of economic growth for any nation and not only 
for Latin American countries (Ocampo, 2008). 
With the coming of the 1960s, came the first outcomes of the ISI strategy. The optimism of the 
Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean countries (ECLAC) about industrialisation 
was moderate since problems derived from urbanisation, such as urban poverty and inequality of 
income, became collateral damage of this new production pattern (Bielchowski, 2009). Therefore, 
the issue of unequal growth observed during this process of industrialisation became a major line 
of research and has been since then. ECLAC researchers such as Tavares, Furtado, and Pinto 
increasingly delved into the causes of disparities between sectors, regions, and people. Pinto 
defined those differences as structural heterogeneity (Bielchowski, 2009: 175), which as a term was 
taken by other CEPAL authors and embodied the inequality between the industrial and primary 
sector. The former was barely able to employ the total workforce due to insufficient investments, 
and therefore even if the surpluses had become substantially higher in the industrial sector than the 
primary sector (which was apparently true) the benefits would have been extremely concentrated 
89 
 
(Di Filippo, 2009). Since then, institutional reforms in the fields of agriculture, taxation and finance 
were proposed by the ECLAC in order to deepen and improve the industrialisation strategy 
(Bielchowski, 2009).  
● Structural heterogeneity (Bielchowski, 2009) 
During the 1950s and 1960s there were a few authors such as Pinto, Furtado, Tavares, and Serra 
that linked poverty with the unequal distribution of incomes related to the growing disparities 
between productivity and remuneration. This is the origin of the concept of structural heterogeneity 
according to Bielchowski (Bielchowski, 2009). 
Pinto (1970) in his work Naturaleza e Implicaciones de la Heterogeneidad Estructural de la América 
Latina, delved into the causes of this phenomenon and its consequences for the development 
patterns in Latin American countries, particularly in Brazil. Unlike the dualism theory which 
approaches the analysis of primary-export countries through the distinction of two enclaves, namely 
the export complex and the rest, Pinto, with the advent of modern technology and the ISI strategy, 
points out the differences in productivity between primary and secondary sectors. These banana 
republic countries (Pinto, 1970: 550) represent the paradox of primary-export countries whose 
population was not to be benefited from the profit of the export specialisation. This divorce was 
less pronounced in countries such as Brazil with lower grades of specialisation where the production 
was shared between local and export markets. With the introduction of the process of Import 
Substitution Industrialisation (subsequently explained in more detail) in Brazil, structural 
heterogeneity was slightly modified. Inward-oriented diversification raised the grade of 
modernisation together with average levels of productivity, especially in comparison to the primary-
export production model. 
From the same article written by Pinto, and only considering two broad sectors, namely primitive36 
and modern37, it can clearly be seen that in 1960 the modern sector employed 14% of Brazilian 
population while it contributed 42% of the GDP. The primitive sector only contributed 10% of the 
GDP, however the percentage of workers in this sector comprised 42% of the Brazilian population 
(Pinto, 1970: 566). Other authors such as Tavares and Serra point to this unequal income distribution 
as well as the demand structure in Brazil during the 1960s as the main causes of the decadence of 
the ISI model (Serra and Tavares; 1998: 584) 
                                                          
36 Primary sector goods. 




2.1.1.1. IMPORT SUBSTITUTION INDUSTRIALISATION STRATEGY  
Albert Hirschman (1958), who is considered not only a reputable economist but also a social 
scientist, explained the industrialisation in Latin America by comparing it with Gerschenkrons´ 
concept of the late industrialisation characteristics of Europe’s industrialisation period. Through this 
analysis, Gerschenkron (1962) deduced four common features of the Continental European process 
of industrialisation: (1) historical discontinuity, (2) focus on big corporations resulting in a tendency 
towards monopolists’ agreements, (3) production oriented to intermediate goods over 
consumption goods, and (4) this process took place in an organised manner either by private 
organisations or public institutions, usually in the earlier steps of the process in the case of the latter. 
In the case of the Latin American process of industrialisation, commonly called ISI38, none of the four 
above characteristics of the European late industrialisation strategy were met, according to 
Hirschman (1958). On the contrary, in Latin America the development of the industrial network took 
place gradually, from the export of consumption goods in relatively small plants, compared to 
European counterparts. In fact, the primary sector by 1950s still played a major role in the trade 
balance of Latin American countries, and therefore attempts to switch from primary to 
manufacturing goods was not as effective as expected, as stated by Ocampo (2008).  
Although the local industrial sector was growing (inward growth), WWII hampered the import of 
intermediate and capital goods from more industrialised countries. Both facts, outward and inward 
growth, contributed to the construction of the ISI Strategy. In countries such as Brazil, the export of 
primary goods was seen as a way of obtaining foreign currencies in order to finance the import of 
capital goods to increase the importance of the industrial national sector. Therefore, export and 
industrial sectors were not perceived as enemies, in contrast to the way orthodox literature tried to 
present them (Ocampo, 2008: 43). This fact gave way to an explicit set of policies undertaken by 
national governments in Latin American countries. Developments were rapidly resulting in an 
academic discussion, which started, in the words of Prebish (1962: 5), with the following: “The 
doctrinaire discussion, however, is far from being ended. In the economic field, ideologies follow at 
distance events.” 
 
                                                          
38 According to Ocampo, this is not the most accurate term to define the process of industrialisation in 
Latin America given the fact that it embodies only one part of the general industrialisation strategy. He 
would rather call it “industrialisation managed by the state” (Ocampo 2008: 43) 
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2.1.1.2. ISI IN BRAZIL 
Brazil, after WWII, became one of the most successful examples of the Import Substitution 
Industrialization model (ISI). Brazilian employment issues, like other countries, were faced through 
Keynesianism39 , rather than specific labour policies. Still, it is also true that the Brazilian government 
at that time undertook a massive training programme to accommodate the rural workforce 
(specialized in the agriculture sector) in new urban manufacturing, although this set of policies was 
secondary (Ramos, 2002).  
During the government of Getúlio Vargas40 a great process of industrialisation was undertaken 
following the development currents of the region. The efforts to improve the industrial strategy 
during the 1950and 1960s were remarkable; the Brazilian state used all its capacities to assure the 
success of this strategy. The same state assumed the role of a productive agent in strategic sectors 
such as infrastructure and basic goods, which was not very attractive for private investors. This new 
industrial model was based on various institutions created for the same purpose. They were 
intending to embrace the demands of such a challenge in terms of human resources, technology, 
and funding. As a result, the main institutions created for the purpose of industrialisation in Brazil 
were the following (CEPAL, 2014): 
- SESI (Servicio Social de la Industria), CAPES (Coordinación de Perfeccionamiento de Personal de 
Nivel Superior) and ITA (Instituto Tecnológico de Aeronáutica): all related to the formation of Human 
resources (CEPAL, 2014: 88) 
- CNP (Consejo Nacional de Investigación), BNDE (Banco Nacional de Desarrollo Económico) and later 
FINEP (Financiadora de Estudios y Proyectos) which assumed the management of these two funds 
in turn: FNDCT (Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Científico y Tecnológico) and FINEP (Fondo de 
Desarrollo Técnico-Científico). Also, local Institutions from different states of Brazil supported 
investigation projects, for example, the FAPESP (Fundación de Amparo a la Investigación del Estado 
de San Pablo). Subsequently other regions followed the same model with a set of institutions that 
intended to provide for financial, technological, and research sectors to improve the dimension and 
productivity of the industrial sector (CEPAL, 2014: 89). 
 
                                                          
39 The belief that economic growth would improve unemployment rates.  
40 He governed from 1930 to 1945 and from 1951 to 1953 until he committed suicide during his second mandate. 
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2.1.2. 1970s – 1980s: END OF STRUCTURALISM AND THE LOST DECADE 
The 1970s started with a discussion on two main topics: the difficulties of improving economic 
growth, and inequality in the distribution of incomes. Regarding the former, ECLAC highlighted the 
limits of the ISI strategy in providing stable economic growth resulting from (1) the lack of 
institutional frameworks focused on investment and technological innovation, as well as (2) the 
excess of protectionism.  The proposal from ECLAC to overcome these boundaries was oriented 
towards improving the position of Latin American countries not only in internal markets but also in 
foreign ones to face the external vulnerability they were suffering. This strategy was presented in 
contrast to the opposite option, external debt, whose risk was pointed out by ECLAC. In terms of 
the latter, the debate between supply as capital accumulation and demand as distribution of income 
was intensified and it was evident (according to ECLAC authors) that the current model at that stage 
perpetuated inequality and undermined the efforts to decrease poverty rates. The solutions 
proposed by ECLAC were oriented towards moderating inequality of income levels to recover real 
democracy (in part lost during the last decades) through fairer economic growth (Bielchowsky, 
2009). 
The following decade, also called the Lost Decade due to the general fall in income per capita caused 
by the debt crisis, changed the focus of the work within the ECLAC organisation. They moved to 
macroeconomic topics that had not been explored as much by the institution that until then had 
put the emphasis more on development and equality issues. This shift was strongly precipitated by 
the disagreement with the orthodoxy represented by the IMF about the response to the inflationary 
process in the region. The solution of IMF to advance big sums to Latin American countries was 
criticised because of the short-term perspective of the matter and the ECLAC proposed in turn a 
more structural solution (in line with its own principles) combining the control of inflation and the 
renegotiation of the terms of the external debt in order to support investment and growth. 
However, ECLAC researchers did not forget economic development completely, especially not its 
productive and distributive spheres. While the main exponent of structuralism was Prebish, 
Fernando Fajnzylber (1990) represented the face of the new current in the ECLAC called 
Neostructuralism. The major work by him, Industrialization in Latin America: From the "black box" 
to the "empty box": a comparative of contemporary industrialization patterns, was erected as one 
of the texts of reference of this new stage within the ECLAC organisation. Broadly, in his work 
Fajnzylber (1990) disagreed with neoliberals on the weak role of the state in developing the 
economy. Instead, he put the state in the centre of the development model (Bielchowsky, 2009).  
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Also, the lost decade supposed a breach in the social contract in Brazil. Furtado (1966) stressed the 
fact that ISI strategy was not able to provide high skill jobs for most of the population. The 
combination of pre-capitalist structures, focused primarily on the export industry with some 
modern features of the modern sector, was trying to move towards manufacturing goods and has 
not been proven successful in labour terms.  
 
2.1.2.1. DECADENCE OF ISI 
Celso Furtado focused his analysis on the causes of the decline of ISI and the demand structure 
which depended upon the distribution of income in turn. In his opinion the industrialisation process 
undertaken in Brazil was not able to modify the concentration of income patterns inherited from 
the primary export model before the 1950s. The demand was increasingly oriented to high-middle 
income classes, instead of reaching a more socially integrated market which was the goal at the 
instatement of the ISI model (Serra, Tavares; 1998: 576). Rama stated that while ISI contributed to 
improving the quality of life of wide sectors of society, the benefits of the process were concentrated 
in the medium-high layers of the population. Those urban areas whose consumption is not 
concentrated on industrial goods fell outside the ISI purview (Rama, 1987: 20). CEPAL gave numbers 
to support the same idea of unequal distribution of outcome; the rate of poverty in Latin America 
in 1950 was 50% and it dropped to 35% in 1980 while the GDP doubled during the period (Rama, 
1987: 20). Therefore, according to this data, it is clear that low social strata were not benefiting from 
the industrialisation process to the same extent as middle upper-strata. This is even more plausibly 
the case in Brazil where the relation of income between the 10% richest and the 20% poorest in 
1970 was 51 five times more than in Argentina, where the same relation was 8,8 in 1972 (Rama, 
1987: 22). 
There were scholars such as Hirschman that refused to use the term ‘exhaustion’ (used by other 
authors) to define the limits of the ISI. He did not agree with either the orthodoxy or the more 
heterodox explanations of the causes of the decline of the ISI. On the one hand, critics of the ISI 
argued that the economies of scale, generated at the advanced stage of the process, generate rising 
costs and, therefore, diminishing the profit rates. They pointed out the inaccurate assignation of 
resources, forgetting the main principles of macroeconomics and focusing on the balance of 
payments more than on fiscal discipline. On the other hand, from the left side of the argument, they 
highlighted the new forms of dependency (on foreign capitals) that arose with the implementation 
of ISI due to the strong polarisation of the world’s economy. These critics, coming from both sides, 
undermined the efforts of policy makers in most Latin American countries to maintain the ISI. 
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However, Hirschman stresses that there is more emphasis on the struggle between different 
economic ideologies than on the actual inefficiencies or dynamics of the process (Ocampo, 2008). 
 
2.1.2.2. EXTERNAL DEBT AND THE LOST DECADE 
The 1980s are remembered as the ‘Lost Decade’ due to the structural adjustments undertaken by 
Latin American countries. These measures were a consequence of the growing debt assumed in the 
region that started with the first oil crisis in 1973 and got worse at the end of the 1970s, anticipating 
the economic meltdown. The rise in the price of oil increased the income of oil exporting countries, 
whose money in turn was deposited in European banks. Those oil exporting countries lent part of 
this money with low rates of interest and flexible conditions to developing countries, mainly, and 
for this thesis most importantly, to Latin American ones. At the beginning, all these amounts were 
used to finance the growing public expenditure in these countries. During the years when the prices 
of commodities were rising, those countries could regularly pay back the debt without difficulties, 
however, at the beginning of the 1980s notable changes took place: (1) The prices of the 
commodities dropped sharply, deteriorating the exchange terms41 in Latin American countries. (2) 
Given the fact that oil prices rocketed, inflation in developed countries grew accordingly and 
national governments decided to use monetary policies increasing interest rates, dramatically 
affecting the debts incurred by its borrowers. Both circumstances, together with the lack of 
dynamism of the ISI model to diversify production and exports42, left Latin American countries in a 
similar position as in the past in world markets — depending again on primary goods.  
The national governments tried to compensate for their weak position in the balance of payments 
with internal financing; in Brazil the public expenditure rose from 35.9% of the GDP in 1970 to 52.7% 
of the GDP ten years later (Pereyra, 2008: 7). Also, massive amounts of capital were taken outside 
the countries due to the evidence of economic unrest within the region. Subsequently, the first 
country in the region, Mexico, failed to pay back the external debt contracted in 1982. This resulted 
into something like a domino effect, with the whole region collapsing and paralysing most of its 
economic activity and consequently depleting finance resources (Pereyra, 2008). The IMF entered 
the scenario at the beginning of the 1980s providing resources to keep the region functioning, 
however these came with conditions called structural adjustments plans. The receipts coming from 
IMF were related to: (1) fiscal and monetary restrictive policies, diminishing public expenditure 
                                                          
41 Exchange terms: relation between import and export prices.  
42 Already discussed in the point 2.2.2 
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considerably and likewise consumption rates and aggregate demand; (2) interest rates were not 
raised in order to attract foreign capitals, therefore incoming capitals had merely speculative 
purposes and did not enhance the macroeconomic situation; (3) the national currency was devalued 
in order to improve the balance of payments and, together with the control of capital movements, 
import quotes were established (Pereyra, 2008). 
ECLACs fields of study moved during the 1980s from equality and productive development to 
macroeconomic analyses which were for the most part not studied during former decades 
(Bielchowski, 2009). This may be explained by the fact that inflation rates rose by around 1750% 
between 1980 and 1990 (Pereyra, 2008: 8) and in countries such as Brazil this consequently left 
other topics to the side until the primary problem was solved. The position of the institution about 
the way of fighting against this hyperinflation was not clear at the beginning. ECLAC authors debated 
between more orthodox sides closer to IMF policies and more familiar heterodox positions in favour 
of renegotiating the external debt to recover the path of economic growth. Finally, the latter was 
taken as the general position of ECLAC, avoiding the significant short-term sacrifices imposed on 
creditors to reach medium/long term competitiveness in foreign markets. This message followed 
the traditional ECLAC position from its birth, focussing again on the long-term perspectives rather 
than facing short term issues and providing structural solutions related to increasing and diversifying 
production and exports (Bielchowski, 2009). 
 
2.1.2.3. BREACH IN THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
The already mentioned structural heterogeneity resulting from the ISI strategy did not only have 
economic implications, but also had social consequences in Latin American countries. The fact that 
only a very small fraction of the population was benefiting from the national economic growth was 
reflected in the political sphere. It can be observed that extremely dependent political groups were 
unable to take political actions given their situation under clientelistic practices together with other 
parties whose cultural level allowed them to pursue different logics of development (Rama, 1987). 
Related to this idea, it is paradoxical that the most developed regions were the ones most against 
the model adapted in the name of equality. That is the reason why countries that reached high 
degrees of development had undertaken measures to integrate lower social strata in the 
development strategies (Rama, 1987). 
Nevertheless, the emergence of new political groups was relatively weak compared to the 
traditional groups of interest. The influence of a new bourgeoisie had been affected by its double 
relation of dependency, on the one hand internally on the state and on the other hand externally 
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on transnational companies. This political instability was reflected in the fact that alliances between 
dominant groups and the popular ones were conceived not as alternatives but as tactical ways to 
overcome the resistances within the same dominant party. In that situation, amongst the 
population, whose role was merely to be a passive spectator, the social legitimation of national 
governments steadily decreased. Therefore, during the 1970s the population’s demands could not 
be fulfilled by promises anymore, regardless of the colour of the party in charge, but instead resulted 
in a call for political voice as well as participation in the national income (Rama, 1987). 
The middle class played a key role in the development style in Latin American regions. According to 
Rama (1987), the dominant groups divided the middle class. On one hand it pushed the lowest strata 
to extreme poverty, from which they could not grow an accumulation of capital. On the other hand, 
it improved the accumulation levels of the higher strata through the appropriation of their own 
incomes. The main channel to improve the socioeconomic level was education and the subsequent 
recognition of these achievements through rewards such as higher incomes or social reputation. 
These structural channels are object of restrictions and tend to precipitate claims either in its own 
interests or representing lower strata (Rama, 1987). 
In the case of Brazil, the dynamics of the ISI together with the advance of the concentration of 
capital, characteristic of capitalist economies, caused strong social tensions and only benefited a 
small fraction of Brazilian population. Furtado (1966) pointed to this unequal redistribution of 
income as one of the main causes of the stagnation of the ISI in Brazil and stated that there was no 
evidence of significant changes in the social structure, although the process could last a few more 
years. Both authors, Furtado (1966: 33) and Hirschman,43 agreed with the idea that the development 
model in Latin America through the ISI was not comparable with the one undertaken by capitalist 
countries decades or centuries ago. Furtado (1966: 34) highlighted that the dualistic paradigm of 
Brazil, which combines pre-capitalist structures with the modern sector, was not able to provide a 
substantial amount of jobs to Brazilian citizens. The attempt to move from a primary export model 
towards an ISI model to keep high value industries in the country had not succeeded in terms of 
equality. To the contrary, the dualism characteristic of capitalistic countries arose between the 
participants in the sector and the underemployed (in urban areas) or agricultural sectors (between 
rural and urban areas). The fact that there was no redistribution between both pre-capitalist and 
modern-industrial society may have limited the success of the ISI model due to the lack of domestic 
demand for manufactured goods. At the same time, the decrease in agricultural investment in new 
                                                          
43 Hirschman, according to Ocampo (2008:50), compared the patterns of development of late-
industrialising countries and he concluded that ISI model was closer to Marxist development model.  
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equipment had harmed the productivity of the primary sector, creating a vicious circle of dualistic 
society (Furtado, 1966). 
 
2.1.3. 1990s: NEW WAVE OF NEOLIBERALISM AND 1988´S CONSTITUTION 
Latin American politicians were exposed to enormous pressure after the Lost Decade. Inequality 
rates, social unrest, and commodity prices together with internal macroeconomic difficulties obliged 
governments to undertake a set of political reforms to overcome these issues. The countries of the 
region adopted different measures. However, all were strongly influenced by orthodoxy that aimed 
to reply to the success of emergent countries in Southeast Asia. The World Bank stated that these 
reforms should be undertaken as soon as possible to reduce further possible cost (Bauman, 2001: 
151). 
Financial institutions as well as academics agreed to the indispensable policies that immediately had 
to be adopted in what today is known as the Washington Consensus.44 These policies were taken as 
the main handbook to face economic matters in the region, especially hyperinflation. In general, the 
recommendations were to focus on the market and, based on economic liberalisation, the 
arguments presented were for: (1) the reduction of inefficiencies generated by inadequate 
distribution, (2) stimulating the learning process, (3) opening economies so that they could better 
face external shocks, and (4) market economies that do not promote clientelist relations (Bauman, 
2001). 
The application of neoliberal measures together with the lack of competences in economic issues 
of Latin American governments caused, according to Pereyra, breaches in the social contract. By 
putting economic topics before social matters, developing countries such as Brazil showed notable 
deficiencies, namely high levels of unemployment, deficiencies in the public health system, increase 
in poverty rates, and social exclusion (Pereyra, 2008). 
In the case of Brazil, the arrival of Fernando Collor, the first president democratically elected after 
the dictatorship, supposed even deeper changes than in the rest of the Latin American countries. 
Because it was after a long period of inflation and because it had been one of the most closed 
economies in the region, with the state as the main provider of goods, Brazil undertook market-
oriented measures. At the end of the decade, Brazil was able to have the longest period of price 
stability to date, reducing the inflation dramatically from 2439% in 1993 to 5.3% in 1996 (Bauman, 
                                                          




2001: 154). Nevertheless, this plan was criticised for lacking long and even medium perspective, all 
fields having been subordinated to the reduction of inflation (Bauman, 2001). 
 
2.1.3.1. WASHINGTON CONSENSUS AND THE WAVE OF NEOLIBERALISM 
The crisis of debt during the 1980s had negative consequences in economic terms, and the so-called 
hyperinflation phenomenon became a major issue for countries such as Brazil. Furthermore, these 
economic matters affected governability and democratic institutions. Within this context, at the 
beginning of the 1990s, neoliberalism was established as the new pattern of development in Latin 
American countries. The Consensus of Washington materialised this new economic current in ten 
broad points to be further developed (Pereyra, 2008):  
- Change in the patterns of public expenditure to health, education, and infrastructures; 
- Budget discipline, balancing the public expenditure, and reforming fiscal system; 
- Reforming the fiscal system, aiming at broader tax bases and moderate marginal rates; 
- Financial liberalisation through deregulation of the financial system and promoting the 
competition in this sector; 
- Pursuing competitive exchange rates; 
- Trade liberalisation in order to improve the position of developing countries in world 
markets;  
- Liberalisation of capital markets allowing the entry of foreign direct investments; 
- Privatisations so as to undermine the role of the state in the economy aiming for more 
efficient services;  
- Deregulations, above all in administration; 
- Guarantee of property rights.  
During the first years of the application of these policies, growth rates and economic stability 
improved, providing economic relief for the region. However, the sudden opening of national 
markets through sharply lowering the tariffs from 105% in 1988 to 35%45 in 1993, provoked negative 
effects given the lack of competitiveness of local industries compared to their European or North 
American counterparts (Pereyra, 2008). 
● Critics to Washington Consensus: 
                                                          
45 Maximum tariff applicable each year.   
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Joseph Stiglitz advocated for using the market as a tool for development, notwithstanding the 
reforms that had to be undertaken in a sequenced way. He proposed that before market liberation, 
other reforms should be implemented to increase the competitiveness of the industrial net so as to 
promote the creation of jobs. Subsequently, when the country opened the borders to foreign 
capital, most of the population could benefit from this (Stiglizt, 2002: 87). 
Additionally, he was slightly sceptical about the leading role of the market in the reforms proposed 
by the Washington Consensus to detriment of governments. According to him the IMF’s view of the 
market as a panacea for all ills is exaggerated. It had already been demonstrated that for the 
developing countries which had embraced orthodox (market oriented) recommendations and had 
been able to achieve decent levels of growth, the concentration of benefits that took place were 
ephemeral. On the contrary, the same countries that opted for more state streams-oriented policies 
and supported domestic industries to compete against imports achieved a more stable growth. For 
example, during the 1960s when the Import Substitution Industrialisation Strategies were enacted 
the Latin American growth average was 5.4%, whereas during the 1990s when the Consensus of 
Washington was implemented as the economic paradigm the growth average was just more than 
half that - 2.9% (Stiglitz, 2002: 86). 
 
2.1.3.2. CONSTITUTION OF 1988: TOWARDS ECONOMIC STABILITY 
The recent constitution written at the end of the 1980s sharply demarcated the role of the executive, 
legislative, and judicial powers. One of the main changes in the role of public institutions was the 
drastically increased power given to the President. Their main role (after the so-called Lost Decade) 
was none other than to guarantee the economic stability, focussing on economic growth, inflation 
and unemployment. Basically, the President became the advanced student of the Washington 
Consensus policies and the Brazilian electorate held the president accountable for maintaining this 
economic stability in turn. The motivations for pushing the President towards orthodoxy could not 
provide the outcomes that were expected. However, international financial markets saw this as a 
positive signal and any deviation would be punished by the electorate (Alston et. al., 2006: 72). 
Nonetheless, this move towards orthodoxy supposed instability in other socioeconomic spheres, 
such as poverty alleviation, health care, education, and infrastructure. All these were defined as 
residuals compared to the main goal of economic stability and therefore the constitution of 1988 
constrained the policymaking process in these fields secured by judicial power and therefore being 
highly independent on issues of constitutionality. Legislative power, in turn, represented the only 




2.1.3.3. EVOLUTION IN THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
The application of the Consensus of Washington Decalogue has been criticised as having only 
focused on economic matters, especially the inflationary process. Nevertheless, the consumption 
rates diminished dramatically, provoking in turn an increase in unemployment levels. Moreover, 
one of the main problems, according to Pereyra, lay in the fact that equality was never pursued by 
neoliberal mandates. This was especially detrimental in Latin American countries, where inequality 
has been a major issue since the end of WWII: GDP per capita of the 20% richest was 18.7 times 
higher than that of the 20% poorest, while world average of the same indicator was 7.1%. While 
neoliberal policies achieved a certain degree of success in economic matters, such as lowering 
inflation rates or diminishing fiscal deficit, it proved to be unable to improve social indicators: 
unemployment rates, the public health system, poverty rates, or social exclusion (Pereyra, 2008: 
13). 
The stability of prices together with public transfers generated positive effects on the real income 
of employees, reducing the number of homes under the poverty line by 22% from 1990 to 1996 
(Bauman, 2001). Income inequality still constituted the Achilles' heel of Brazilian society, as between 
1990 and 1997 the Gini index remained similar, around 0.7, and the Theil index also showed the 
same trend at around 0.6 (Bauman, 2001: 167). More qualitative analyses46 of these results revealed 
that the participation of the richest strata in the total income of Brazil was still very high. The reasons 
these individuals obtained much higher incomes were related to different factors, namely (1) 
greater levels of qualification, (2) kind of activity, and (3) financial profit coming from higher interest 
rates (Neri & Camargo, 1999). 
In respect to the employment situation during the 1990s there is a study undertaken by ECLAC, ILO 
and UNDP (ECLAC, ILO, UNDP; 2008) that measured the deficit of the jobs through four dimensions: 
(1) kind of job, (2) employment rights, (3) social protection, and (4) social dialogue. The conclusions 
of the study showed that the deficits of jobs in Brazil during this decade were notably high regarding 
both quantity and quality. Women were still far from being completely integrated in the job market, 
same for people of black ethnicity whose income was also far lower than the average. Minimum 
salary barely increased during this decade and the people working excessive hours remained notably 
high. Regarding the rights of employees, there was a clear advance in the field of child labour as the 
proportion of children working dropped by 50%. Furthermore, the number of affiliates to a Union 
                                                          
46 (Neri, Camargo; 1999)  
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grew notably, especially amongst black women. Finally, it has to be mentioned that the percentage 
of the population contributing to the existing social security system was moving steadily towards 
around 50% of all workers in Brazil (ECLAC, ILO, UNDP; 2008). 
 
2.1.4. 2000s: PLANO AVANÇA AND PLANO BRASIL DE TODOS 
The second government of Fernando Cardoso (2000-2003) was marked by the Plano Avança Brazil. 
In the same context of neoliberalism that pursued both market economy as well as reforming the 
state, the so-called custo Brasil (Brazil cost) appeared as a limit to the economic development of the 
country.  In order to overcome this boundary and reduce this cost, the Brazilian state undertook a 
set of measures: (1) eliminating restrictions of foreign capitals; (2) stopping public monopolies, and 
(3) promoting new regulations on energy, telecommunications, oil, and ports. Moreover, the 
directives of this plan were focused on: (1) consolidating the economic stability so as to generate 
employments and improve incomes, (2) facing poverty and promoting social inclusion, (3) 
consolidating democracy and human rights, (4) reducing regional inequality rates, and (5) improving 
the rights of minorities, usually victims of discrimination.  The rationale of this plan was that by 
investing in social development, environment, and research and development a virtuous circle 
would be created improving socioeconomic indicators, such as employment rates, income per 
capita, GDP and equality rates amongst others (Senra, 2010). 
The subsequent three-year plan (2003-2006), Plano Brasil de Todos (Brazil plan for all), undertaken 
by the president Luis Inácio Lula da Silva followed the same goals of economic stability, but above 
all highlighted the importance of economic growth and competitiveness. The plan sought to 
improve the former indicators through creating a favourable environment for private investments 
as well as a reduction of the so-called Brazilian Cost. Regarding social policies, Plano Brasil de Todos 
included measures oriented to increasing income levels as well as consumption rates. The plan 
especially aimed to improve poverty incomes to a greater degree amongst the poorest and not only 
through direct transfers, but by raising the salaries of the lowest qualified jobs above market levels. 
Additionally, inequality was not only faced vertically in this plan, horizontal differences between 
regions were prioritised and it was taken into consideration that regional policies could not be 
subordinated to the market principles which promoted economic concentration and therefore 
worsening inequality rates. It pursued reducing inequality among regions, but also considered 
regional disparities. Next, multi-year plans followed the same line of work, with the difference of 
adding research and development as a priority to the other factors already mentioned (Senra, 2010). 
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There were also critics of the overemphasised inflation-focused policies in Latin American countries 
and especially in Brazil during the 1990s and 2000s. Joseph Stiglitz in his book Globalisation and its 
Discontents (Stiglitz, 2002) stated that putting inflation in the centre of the table resulted in 
automatically taking other necessary reforms off the table. For example, land or financial reforms 
were under-emphasised and the excessive focus on inflation therefore led to high interest rates as 
well as high exchange rates, provoking unemployment. With this orientation of reforms, financial 
markets benefited to the detriment of their own workers (Stiglitz, 2002: 81).  
 
2.1.4.1. REDISTRIBUTION POLICIES 
Lulas administration shifted the orientation of the poverty alleviation strategy. While Comunidade 
Solidaria (Solidarity Community) represented the flagship programme in this field, Fome Zero (Zero 
Hunger) became the major programme at the beginning of Lulas government. When Lula took 
power, he created the Ministério Estraordinário para a Segurança Alimentar a Fome (Ministry for 
food security). The programme Fome Zero managed by this ministry prioritised the poorest regions 
over the richest, and lower incomes over the highest. After ten months of the application of the 
programme, it was already criticised from different sectors, such as NGOs or other political parties, 
to be extremely uncontrolled (not attached to any condition) before it was finally ended by the 
administration. Thereafter, the same ministry was renamed Ministério para o Desenvolvimento 
Social e Combate à Fome and the Cartão Família (single card) was introduced. This card entitled 
families to receive food as well as other conditional benefits, namely vaccinations and school 
admission. This initiative supposed a merger of cash transfer programmes during Cardoso’s period: 
bolsa escolar, bolsa alimentacão and gas benefit. Thus, the idea of creating a single card was already 
undertaken by former administrations, but the Lulas government tried to emphasise the positive 
effects of the Fome Zero programme, in particular that is would use few resources than the ones 
planned at the beginning (Alston, 2006: 53).  
Another important leg of the redistribution policies was health policy. Regarding this, the 
Constitution of 1988 merged pensions, social assistance benefits, and health care into one budget. 
The fusion of these three expenses caused a pernicious effect in health care policies since pensions 
were named a contractual expenditure, whereas health care was a current expenditure by 
definition. The former finished when the pensioner died, however the latter may vary depending 
upon the fiscal management. Furthermore, the civil servants under the umbrella of a pension system 
notably grew together with the equalisation of rural pensions to urban standards. These changes 
provoked a shock in the health care system just at the beginning of implementation. All these 
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matters turned the health sector into a major problem for every coming government: infant 
mortality rates for example were considerably higher than in other similar countries (according to 
GDP per capita). The development of the country rested partially on its health system, with the 
executive being well informed about this critical fact. For this reason, they tried a great deal of 
proposals in order to overcome this major issue, until it was finally stopped by finance planners as 
the implementation would have added even more rigidity to the budget. Finally, the 
decentralisation of health care (by the Constitution) limited the freedom of action of the federal 
government, which depends mostly on voluntary health transfers from one state to another (Alston, 
2006: 59). 
Finally, education represents a key to shedding light on redistribution policies. Despite the critics of 
the Workers party during Cardoso’s administration in the field of education, Lula did not increase 
the federal funding allocated to it. They tried to control sub-national competences such as 
education, but at the same time they wanted to maintain the federal fiscal priorities. Municipalities 
sought as many pupils as possible as federal transfers depended on this. Thus, the same states 
decentralised education even further to the local sphere, following the preferences for fiscal 
expansion at local levels to meet the government’s priority of raising national universal per capita 
levels in a manner similar to those amongst the health policies they created (Alston, 2006: 62). 
 
2.1.4.2. MODERN SOCIAL CONTRACT 
Regarding the employment situation during the 2000s, the same  tools that were used for the 
decade before have been considered47 (ECLAC, ILO, UNDP; 2008), which measured the deficit of jobs 
through four dimensions: (1) kind of job, (2) employment rights, (3) social protection, and (4) social 
dialogue. The conclusions of the study showed that the deficit of jobs in Brazil during this decade 
were lower than in the decade before both in terms of quantity and quality of jobs. The 
representation of women in the active job market was indeed higher, though nevertheless there 
were around 24% less women than men holding occupations in 2006 (ECLAC, ILO, UNDP; 2008: 72). 
The same was true for the black population whose income was 47% less than that of the white 
population (ECLAC, ILO, UNDP; 2008: 72). Despite these figures, equality of income improved in 
general. In respect to the minimum salary, it can be stated that it remained similar, however, for the 
people earning exactly around this amount it was still considerable. Regarding employees’ rights, 
indicators of child labour continued to improve considerably and the number of affiliates to a Union 
                                                          
47 Point 3.3.2 
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was still in plain growth. Last but not least, the percentage of the population contributing to the 
social security system went up steadily (ECLAC, ILO, UNDP; 2008). 
The Consensus of Washington was not especially focused on the social contract when they set the 
patterns of development for developing economies. Indicators such as redistribution of income or 
poor alleviation were not on its agenda. According to Stiglizt (2002), one of the main critics of the 
institutions behind it, namely the IMF, WB and Federal Reserve of US; they trust on trickle-down48 
economics to eventually reach the poor. While it is true that economic growth is important to fight 
poverty, the opposite is not necessarily true (growth itself does not benefit all strata of society). As 
the Nobel Prize winner Simon Kuznets stated, at the beginning of the development process 
inequality rates grow but the trend changes to its opposite in more advanced stages. In the case of 
Latin America, the growth during the implementation of orthodox policies was not accompanied by 
poverty reduction or reduced inequality rates. They looked promising in terms of advances in market 
reforms but less was said about poverty (Stiglitz, 2002: 79). He argues that there are three kinds of 
policies which may improve economic growth as well as poverty rates: (1) win-win, the ones that 
improve both indicators, (2) lose-lose, the ones that do very little in favour of one in a short term 
but worsen the other and (3) the ones that present trade-offs between both. In respect of the latter, 
trade liberation could be considered an example since it improves growth but affects poverty rates 
negatively. All this is said without considering the political risks assumed in the long term when a 
society is polarised to the detriment of the so-called middle class who traditionally are the drivers 
of new laws in favour of citizen rights such as education or universal public health. Moreover, Stiglitz 
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48 Term usually associated with criticism of laissez-faire capitalism. It refers especially to the policies that 
favoured the rich or privilege.  
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2.2.1. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE GERMAN CME 
Two stages of German CMEs are highlighted, the first CME with Bismarck as the main leader and 
subsequently the second CME during post-war times with Adenauer in charge. Both rest on the 
same pillars, although they also have their singularities. 
According to Christopher Allen (2010), much can be understood of a Country by observing the timing 
of industrialisation as well as democratisation. Germany may be named as one of the latecomers 
(among others such as Japan) while the UK and the US were the pioneers regarding the free-market 
and laissez-faire economy, The latter ones are in the best position to have relatively easy access to 
resources, markets, and capital compared to the former ones, the latecomers. Lacking this 
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advantage at the end of the nineteenth century, Germany faced the dilemma of how to overcome 
this, especially considering the underdevelopment of its own domestic market. They needed to build 
a model that provided efficient access to resources, targeting foreign markets for growth, which 
they did so by allocating investments to improving the likelihood of this success. The architect of an 
Economic model able to face this great challenge was Bismarck.  The route chosen by him was to 
form a tight net of coordination between firms, employees, and their financial partners. The role of 
the State consisted mainly in providing a legal framework to encourage strategic long-term relations 
between economic actors. Latecomers such as Germany did not have time to follow the “trial and 
error” undertaken by the earlier industrialisers. 
Other authors such as Wolfram Fisher as Economic Historian use the rivalry between Britain and 
Germany to explain the decline of Britain through the success of Germany, as he states: “The early 
winners became a late loser” (Fisher, 1997: 298). The lack of common historical ties and the rise of 
a recently unified country allowed Germany to design a made-to-measure economic model 
according to its own peculiarities and promoting science and education above all their applications.  
The capacity of German innovation and its leader at that time, Bismarck, precipitated another path 
to success never undertaken before, instead of following the pioneer of industrial revolution, Great 
Britain (Fisher, 1997). 
 
2.2.2. BISMARCK ERA: FIRST CME 
By the latter half of the nineteenth century, Bismarck, according to Christopher S. Allen an architect 
more than interventionist, designed a set of institutions to accomplish quick and stable growth 
based on easy access to resources and by focusing on certain sectors that had high potential in 
foreign markets: (1) Banks played a crucial role in CME, later called Modell. Large sums of money 
were needed to start the economic model tried by Bismarck, where this financing was provided 
through loans, acquiring ownership of a company, and allowing the banks to have seats on the board 
of directors (with voice and vote in the main German companies). These long-term loans and 
investments allowed the firms to compete in world markets with guarantees. (2) Domestic firms, 
acting as a cartel, did not see each other as competitors as they were working together to gain 
position in foreign markets. Their common adversaries were other industries abroad. (3) The 
education system; skilled labour was also one of the anchors of the Modell whereby highly skilled 
workers were able to provide the knowledge to be competitive in sectors which assured a high 
added value. (Allen, 2010) 
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Alongside the creation of this set of institutions, there were two visionary ideas that backed the 
development of this Modell: (1) “Marriage of iron and rye” (Allen, 2010: 11); feudal Prussians 
needed a way to transport their grain to the market and the new industrialists needed a load to 
transport in turn. (2) “Iron fist in a velvet glove” (Allen, 2010: 11); in 1878 Bismarck forbade the SPD 
(Social Democratic Party) party, however, he had to deal with one of its major strikes for a welfare 
system during the 1880s. As soon as the SPD party was legalised the behaviour of its members was 
far less revolutionary due to the concessions made by Bismarck. 
However, this model had its shadows since it relied upon aggressive nationalism as well as political 
repression. It showed a great degree of success in political and economic fields, but it ended in 
World War I and finally in its own destruction. Moreover, a combination of exogenous/ endogenous 
factors fuelled the end of the first OCM: (a) Endogenous factors were: the lack of resources needed 
for feeding the Modell led to an aggressive late imperialism. The weak commitment to democracy 
and the division of German left sphere and dysfunctional economic policy were problematic (b) 
Exogenous factors included: the strategy of anticipating WWI and the Russian revolution influenced 
a weak basis upon which Bismarck built the second Reich (Allen, 2010). 
● Beginning of the welfare state in Germany 
The CME was based on high value industries and a high wages model and not everyone could fit into 
the CME labour market to the same extent. However, providing social protection to the citizens who 
did not benefit from the CME was another important pillar of Bismarck’s strategy, not because of 
the altruistic spirit of the leaders of this model, but to minimise social tension and political 
opposition. This Bismarckian view of state as entrepreneur needed a completely new set of 
institutions that could achieve a fast economic and political development, which was clearly needed 
in the light of the advances of its main competitors, the UK and the US. The institutional pillar of this 
new CME was the unification of a universal banking system and large-strong firms. This economic 
policy model embodied both fast growth and social protection at the same time. (Allen, 2010).  
The origins of the corporatist-statist welfare state model can also be found in this period. In 
response to the mistrust of some traditional sectors of society such as the church, Catholic doctrine 
started to be redefined. With the rise of these kinds of movements, the welfare state model was 
also influenced and was molded by this way of thinking. The principle of subsidiarity that remains 
predominant today and marked the Bismarckian welfare regimes as the German way. This 
important principle states that family is the first provider of welfare to its members, religious or 
charity institutions are entitled to provide them next, and the state only appears as the last resort. 
This Catholic doctrine also established the male-breadwinner role as a welfare provider within the 
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family, whose members would only be entitled to benefits or subsidies through the male-worker 
figure (Palier, 2010). 
 
2.2.3. POST-WAR ERA: SECOND CME & NEW SET OF INSTITUTIONS 
After WWII, the challenge for Germany was to maintain the success of the first CME, in terms of 
providing rapid economic growth for everyone under circumstances that the Modell had not yet 
proven, namely a truly democratic system, political accountability, and a commitment to pacifistic 
relations after the events of the former decades. 
The new institutions born in the post-war era could be defined as a compromise between two 
counterbalanced forces: (1) the new current of liberalism and (2) socialism. They could also be 
named capital versus labour. Wolfgang Streeck (1995) delves into the new set of institutions in his 
work German Capitalism: Does it exist? Can it survive? He points out the following five main changes 
in the institutions that shape the new socioeconomic structure in Germany: (1) Markets, (2) Firms, 
(3) State, (4) Business Associations, and (5) German Culture: 
(1) The freedom of the market was limited by the state, for example certain sectors such as 
education, health care, or social insurance do not follow market principles. In the sectors where 
competition was allowed, the market was combined with a generous welfare state which acted as 
a floor for employees (Streeck, 1995: 9). 
(2) German firms were far from being classic the Capitalist Corporations that characterises LME 
(Hall/Soskice, 2001). They were considered a public matter as such, which means they were strongly 
regulated by law, and the involvement of capital as well as labour in the daily life of the firms was 
evident (Streeck, 1995: 9). 
(3) Streeck defined the role of the German state as “neither laissez-faire nor etatiste and is best 
described as an enabling state” (Streeck, 1995: 10). The lack of sovereignty in economic affairs that 
the constitution provided the government leaves a high degree of flexibility to the agents of the 
economy. In compensation, the government spent a notable share of the GDP in research and 
development, and social protection (compared to its competitors) (Streeck, 1995: 10). 
(4) Probably the most particular institution within Western economies at the time were the business 
associations. They behave as quasi-public institutions that fill the gap of in the role of the state in 
controlling market forces and they do so by establishing high quality standards and avoiding low-
cost strategies. Nevertheless, cartel agreements were explicitly forbidden, which banned the setting 
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of prices or similar activities. Vocational training programmes were one of the most important 
outcomes of these associations since a high-skilled workforce is the basis of the high-wage, high-
tech model that Germany aspires to (Streeck, 1995: 11). 
(5) In the German economic culture short-term decisions were rare and not well-supported by 
decision-makers. It is commonly known as traditionalist, and their commitment to and support of a 
tax redistribution system reflected this historically long-term view. Collectivism is also seen as one 
of the main features of this marked traditionalism, and privacy, autonomy, and low participation in 
paid unemployment represent the German economic culture which backs the Modell. Finally, 
vocational trainings likewise reflected how institutions were constructed according to long-term 
values (Streeck, 1995:12). 
A very interesting point related to the German economic tradition is the high rate of savings 
compared to other developed countries. Consumer credits were growing far less than in other 
countries with traditionally higher saving rates, such as The Netherlands or Italy49. 
This graph, displayed in appendix 1, on household savings shows that Germany was by far more 
traditional than the UK and the US for example and it was the only country which hovered around 
12% - 15% savings rates, making it the least unstable country since reliability as well as availability 
of data made comparisons in terms of harmonisation possible. 
● Principle of co-determination 
Important decisions were continuously being approved by all parties, employers, unions and banks; 
this system was called co-determination. However, shareholdings were highly concentrated, with 
only a small fraction of capital traded on the stock exchange. Within this economic model, banks 
participate jointly through equity, thus they may control the performance of the companies and 
occasionally influence decision making. Moreover, this system facilitates long term loans for firms 
thereby avoiding the speculation of stocks (Hall/Soskice, 2001). 
Also, the role of unions was far stronger within the firms than in liberal countries, such as the UK or 
the US. The principle of co-determination, enforced by law, makes it very difficult for employers to 
dismiss employees. Aside from this, the presence of the representatives of workers in the 
supervisory board as well as in banks, which has already been mentioned, reflects the so-called long-
term approach that characterised the OCM. All this, together with collective bargaining made 
Germany one of the countries where the workers were employed by the same company the highest 
                                                          
49 See Appendix 1. 
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number of years within western economies, close to Japan and far ahead of the US and the UK 
(Streeck, 1995). 
● Long term approach 
The so-called German long-term approach can be seen transversally in all institutions that shape the 
new Modell. Three main features characterise German economic institutions: (1) German industrial 
improvements are typically slow but steady, and institutional constraints limit low-cost production 
though they adapt conveniently to high-quality industries; (2) long-term decisions are also common 
in German institutional structures, and co-determination between unions and firm associations 
make the decision-making process arduous, whilst it encourages the industry to move to quality-
competitive markets through improving skills, cooperative training programmes, and technology; 
(3) they offer opportunities for continuous growth in existing sectors, but do not foster the 
development of new ones, and lastly; (4), the German pattern of innovation provides high average 
outcomes with sharp variations being extremely unusual (Streeck, 1995). 
 
2.2.3.1. WELFARE STATE: SOCIAL PRESSURE FOR AN EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOMES 
High skilled labour capacity is a key component of the OCM, which corresponds to high salaries. That 
is why this model must focus on high quality markets. It is true that this strategy could leave out the 
low-skilled workers within the labour market,  although there are two ways this matter can be faced: 
(1) a market policy that improves the skills of employees and introduces them to the high-skilled 
labour market that characterises the OCM; (2) Redistribution policies could also be possible as long 
as the demand for high-quality products (in national or international markets) is large enough to 
provide a workplace for the majority with the state still providing welfare for a small unemployed 
group out of the system  (Streeck, 1995). 
Social institutions which rule out underemployment are able to maintain the status quo under the 
provision that the number of people in situations of underemployment is small enough to be socially 
acceptable. However, if this number exceeds the level at which the majority of society is benefited 
by the Modell, and underemployment turns into high levels of unemployment, two main risks might 
arise: (1) the expenditure to support them must increase, deteriorating competitiveness in 
international markets and (2) social unrest resulting from unemployment would challenge the 
political stability necessary for the success of the CME. Therefore, a high degree of equality among 
the employed would result in sharp inequality between the employed and long-term unemployed 




2.2.4. REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY 
The analysis of the period between early-1990s and mid-2000s supposes the start of a more detailed 
conceptualisation of the recent German socio-economic model. Two important aspects must be 
noted. Firstly, during this time Germany witnessed not only one crisis but two, namely reunification 
and the decline of the conservative welfare state50, both widely recognised by scholars years later 
(Morel, 2006). Secondly, the solidification of redistribution policies undertaken during this period 
will be crucial at this point since their outcomes will be tested in further empirical analyses. In this 
one, I will attempt to answer the research question regarding the success of the redistribution 
policies undertaken by Germany, and will also look to how it was done in Brazil.  
The reunification period challenged the previous German socio-economic structure even more than 
in the post-war era. The process of reunification put the so-called German institutional scheme 
under limits unheard of since the Bismarckian era. The chancellor in charge during this period, 
Helmut Kohl (the governmental force was formed by centre-right CDU in coalition with the liberal 
FDP by then), misjudged the difficulty of the reunification project not only economically but 
politically as well.  In retrospect it was more than a political change, the 1990s necessitated a critical 
re-examination of the Coordinated Market Economy system for Germany. The same economic 
foundations that had guided Germany for the last century and had achieved the Wirtschaftswunder 
during 1950s after WWII were being rethought (Allen, 1997). 
Moreover, apart from the Reunification process, during late-1980s and early-2000s there were two 
other phenomena, namely Europeanization and Globalisation; the three of them formed a triple 
shock to Modell Deutschland. Both the process of reunification as well as the subsequent 
Europeanization brought into view the rigidity and singularity of the German set of institutions. The 
difficulty of replicating them in other national or regional levels was remarkable, as had already 
been demonstrated with the integration of East Germany and how European regulations affected 
the German Rahmenbedingungen (legal framework).  (Allen, 1997). 
 
                                                          
50 Esping-Andersen had divided welfare states system into three: Social Democratic, Conservative, and 
Liberal. Esping-Andersen himself defined German welfare state as conservative.  
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2.2.3.2. REUNIFICATION CRISIS: KOHLS MISJUDGEMENT OF REUNIFICATION COSTS 
First of all, it is relevant to point out that the structural challenges of this period were far deeper 
than any other since 1950. Having mentioned this, Helmut Kohl, the political leader responsible for 
such a challenging task, might not have understood the risks of reunification, according to Allen. 
Firstly, the resources used by the mid-1990s considerably exceeded the ones Kohl had planned for 
at the beginning; secondly, the difference in productivity levels between East and West Germany 
remained higher than expected, with the consequence that the Treuhand51 privatised more than 
60% of the companies. Finally, the unemployment rate did not improve substantially in the former 
GDR, despite the substantial amount of money budgeted for the reunification project (Allen, 1997). 
Delving into concrete policies undertaken during this period, these three were the main set of 
mistaken policies according to Allen (1997): (1) property ownership, (2) currency reform, and (3) 
Treuhand: 
(1) With regard to property ownership, before any investment took place in East Germany, property 
title issues had to be resolved. There were the property questions emerging from the soviet regime, 
but also confiscations conducted during the Nazi period. Compensations became a major issue for 
the Kohl government and the reunification treaty emphasized that all compensations must be paid 
at “current” prices. This in fact implied that there were big differences between rural and developed 
locations. However, private property was not the only problem. Importantly commercial property 
also posed a problem. Massive reinvestment was necessary to make industrial tools and electrics 
(which represented the pillars of the German high wages economic model) profitable in the five 
Länder of East Germany. Despite these difficulties, experts have stated that a solid base was 
constructed in order to succeed in setting a long term sustainable industrial structure in the East 
that was similar to the West (Allen, 1997). 
(2) One of the big concerns about reunification was how this massive amount of money was 
supposed to be paid. At the beginning, Kohl said that this was not going to be paid with new taxes, 
but there was no choice in the end. East German Reichsmarks were exchanged at a favourable rate 
for the former GDR citizens, encouraging consumption rather than long-term investment (property-
holders). This short-term approach (in contrast to the so-called German long-term perspective 
inherited from Bismarckian times) applied to the monetary policy was largely criticised. Critics also 
mention the controversial issue concerning the salary differences between the former GDR and 
                                                          
51 Government reconstruction agency (institution created ad-hoc for the reunification process in charge 
of privatisations of national firms in East Germany). 
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western Germany (Silvia, 1997), plus the increase in basic goods and services in market conditions 
(Allen, 1997).  
(3) One of the new institutions created ad-hoc for the reunification, the Treuhand, was seen, in 
words of Allen, as: “very un-German state vs. market set of choices” (Allen, 2004: 19). The German 
legal framework represented a substantial boundary to entering the game, however once you were 
inside it was extraordinarily flexible. The Treuhandanstalt (Trusteeship Agency) represented the 
contrary, on the one hand it provided an easy entry to the market but on the other hand the state 
assumed the role of regulating market irregularities, more characteristic of laissez faire economic 
models. The Treuhand was seen by many observers as a way of “selling the reunification” (Allen, 
2004: 18). 
 
2.2.3.3. CRISIS OF CONSERVATIVE WELFARE MODEL 
Much ink has been spilled since Esping-Andersen distinguished the so-called three welfare models 
at the beginning of the 1990s decade, namely liberal, corporatist-Statist (conservative) and social 
Democratic (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The German welfare model was classified as corporatist-
Statist or conservative. The main feature of this model was the central role of the family in providing 
care for its members. The state only appeared if families failed to do so. Apart from this principle of 
subsidiarity, this conservative model was dominated by the figure of the male bread-winner, and 
women were not supposed to work after giving birth and lacked individual social entitlements which 
were addressed through the husband (Morel, 2006).  
Many of the redistribution policies undertaken during the 1990s and early 2000s by German 
governments were related to the decline of the conservative welfare model based on the role of 
the male-breadwinner, above all the aspects concerning childcare and elder care. Two periods may 
be distinguished: (1) during the early 1990s policy-makers strengthened the male-breadwinner 
model and (female) labour shedding strategy to maintain the salary of the male-bread-winner who 
was usually the only welfare provider. (2) The increase in unemployment rates during the late 1990s 
have shown the unsustainability of the conservative model as an increasing number of women took 
part in the labour market for the first time. Nevertheless, the dichotomy of working conditions was 
evident: “care policy reforms have provided a backdoor for the introduction of labour” (Morel, 2006: 
620). 
● Towards a new model: the new role of the state 
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A new model of care was emerging in Germany as both childcare and care for the elderly became 
the focus of the Kohl and above all the Schroeder governments. They became aware of important 
societal changes taking place in the country. On the one hand the crisis of the male-breadwinner 
model and ageing population implied the increase of women in the labour market but on the other 
hand, this meant that the family could not provide care either for elderly people or for their children. 
Therefore, the trend in the 1990s showed an enlargement of the role of the state in providing care 
instead of the families, thereby moving away from the principle of subsidiarity52. Although laws had 
changed, the investment needed to implement them was scarce and slowly released (Morel, 2006). 
● Dual path into employment 
If one looks at the evolution of unemployment rates together with the reforms initiated by the 
different political parties between the 1990s and early 2000s, a clear dual path of flexibility can be 
observed. Both atypical and standard jobs have progressively been deregulated. Nevertheless, the 
reforms undertaken in the former ones have increasingly become more important in quantitative 
as well as qualitative terms during this decade (Eichhorst, 2009). Moreover, the concern of trade 
unions during this period was none other than to keep the male-breadwinner model whose heavy 
fixed cost spurred a rise in informal sector jobs so as to satisfy the job-demand (Morel, 2006). 
Three different sets of reforms can be recognised according to political parties and unemployment 
levels. These reforms were introduced by specific political coalitions: 
(1) For the Christian Democrats/ Liberals government: during early-mid 1990s the boundaries to the 
labour market became a problem rather than a solution. Despite strong efforts to maintain the 
status quo in the German labour market, high unemployment levels and the pressure of additional 
working women practically forced that government to begin the deregulation of atypical jobs in 
large measure, while the regulation of standard jobs remained practically the same. The difference   
in regulations between the former and the latter started. While the government aimed to keep the 
high wages model, external (women’s pressure) and internal (ageing population, unemployment 
levels) strains forced them to offer other types of employment positions (Eichhorst, 2009: 7) 
(2) The Social Democrats/ Green party (1998-2001 government): the red-green coalition started its 
legislature with the purpose of re-regulating at the margin, given the employment growth and the 
improvement of economic context. On the one hand This reform intended to extend the number of 
                                                          
52 The concrete welfare policies undertaken will be discussed later in the subsection: Redistribution 
policies undertaken during 1990s in Germany. 
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employees under social insurance scheme and on the other hand, to provide more incentives for 
long term contracts (Eichhorst, 2009: 9).  
(3) The Social Democrats/ Green party (2002-2005) government: On the contrary, the second part 
of the red-green legislature supposed a setback regarding standard jobs. Firstly, the legal framework 
was modified in favour of atypical jobs, above all the expansion of Mini-jobs. Beside this, the erosion 
of collective bargaining meant that fewer employees worked under its umbrella. This set of reforms 
was called the Hartz package and together with the Agenda 2010 encouraged jobseekers to seek 
low-paid jobs (Eichhorst, 2009: 10). 
Some scholars point out that instead of creating new high-quality jobs Germany was bypassing the 
rigidities of its labour market by creating a parallel low-paid job market through different sets of 
institutions and regulations (Morel, 2006) 
● Reconfiguration of the German social contract 
Following the firm-centred perspective of Hall and Soskice in their book Varieties of Capitalism 
(2001), welfare states rest partially on the role of firms. These authors challenged the common view 
that social policies are against business interests due to the rise in costs of labour. Hall and Soskice 
highlight the importance of social policies in improving the performance of the labour market from 
the perspective of the firms. Moreover, they note the relation between economic models and 
welfare systems. For example, in CMEs trade unions, business groups, and public officials are the 
ones in charge of the national social policy scheme and a company’s specific skills are not only 
encouraged, but generously rewarded. (Hall/Soskice, 2001). Their analysis is useful for the German 
case. 
The crisis of the conservative welfare model together with the dualized labour market have notably 
modified the German social contract configuration. The role of key social actors such as firms, 
unions, and families have changed at an accelerating rate since the unification process took place 
at the beginning of the 1990s. The great challenges that Germany faced during this period have 
proven its policy-makers experts at maintaining the level of welfare achieved after 
Wirtschaftswunder. Nevertheless, not only did unification challenge the German social contract, but 
the strains of globalisation and its small brother Europeanization did too (Streeck, 2005). To sum up, 
on the one hand the liberalisation of the German economy (Allen, 1997) challenged the role of 
unions, firms, and public officials in determining the national social policies in favour of the market 
and, on the other hand, the regionalisation process of the European states under the umbrella of 
the European Union seemed to be incompatible with the rigidity of the German set of institutions 




2.2.3.4. REDISTRIBUTION POLICIES UNDERTAKEN DURING 1990s IN GERMANY: TOWARDS A NEW 
WELFARE MODEL 
Redistribution policies represent the relation between governments and citizens within the 
framework of a social contract. This link between social contract and redistribution policies is one 
of the crucial points of the present study. The more accurate the analysis of redistribution policies, 
namely social expenses and social security contributors, the more credible the further analysis 
(chapter 3) will be in relation to the outcome of these policies.  
German welfare policies have not systematically been based on Keynesianism,53 nevertheless, at 
the beginning of the 1990s, right after unification took place, German governments followed 
different approaches (rather than Keynesianism) probably due to the magnitude of the project. The 
German welfare system was consistently based on a stability approach through fiscal conservatism 
(avoiding sharp tax hikes), and policy-makers pursued the continuity of the socioeconomic model 
constructed more than a hundred years ago. Elected governments were committed to maintaining 
living standards (for breadwinners) through social insurance and benefits based on means-tests 
(Seeleib-Kaiser, 2008).  
Regarding social expenditure during the 1990s, the trend did not show notable changes in Western 
parts of Germany, but the increase in social expenditure was remarkable in the East, reaching almost 
half of the GDP at the beginning of the 2000s. This massive increase in expenditure in the East had 
mainly been financed through West-East transfers whose amount totalled 160 billion between 1996 
and 2010. Moreover, the traditional earning-related benefits method, based on the two main pillars 
of the German welfare system, namely pensions and unemployment benefits, had been gradually 
changed in favour of means-tested and privatisation methods since unification (ibid, 2008). 
How did welfare expenditure change as a result of unification? To analyse welfare expenditure it is 
best to distinguish two periods: (1) the early 1990s (first period of unification) and (2) from 1993 to 
the early 2000s: 
● The Early 1990s 
Public deficit rose from 19.2 billion German marks to 46.7 billion, with this enormous increase being 
ascribed to the effort of the Kohl government to transfer western welfare structures to the former 
GDR and this was seen as a symbol of social justice across Germany. In addition to this expense, 
                                                          
53 This means using public expending so as to increase domestic demand.   
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active labour market policies (ALMP) were implemented. (1) Firstly, the government increased the 
number of apprenticeships by almost one million and the number of public employees rocketed 
from 83000 in 1990 to 466000 in 1992. (2) Secondly, a short-term work benefit was given despite 
German aversion to Keynesian policies and was referred to as “unification Keynesianism against 
political will” (Beyme, 1994:265). The Kohl administration apparently did not have any choice. 
Unemployment rates were growing and policy-makers in charge of unification had an urge to 
preserve stability, at least at the beginning of the process (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2008). 
In terms of the social security system: from the beginning of the unification process to 1993, 
substantial changes had been undertaken in regard to social coverage, though some programmes 
were more affected than others. Unemployment benefits were not modified until 1993, and the 
conditions of this programme followed similar lines as its last modification in 1987. However, in 
1989, a Pension Reform Act was enacted to tackle early retirement options. There was a tendency 
among workers to seek early retirement and with this new law the government limited the ways of 
obtaining it.  
In terms of family policies, with the crisis of the male-breadwinner model (Morel, 2006), new family 
policies were introduced in order to accommodate this new social reality. In 1992, conditions for 
working parents, such as time off or provisions (either for the mother or father), were considerably 
increased. Furthermore, by 1992 (and more effectively since 1996) childcare facilities were 
guaranteed for every child between from 3 to 6 years (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2008). 
● From 1993 to early 2000s 
Right after 1993 and as soon as the Kohl’s coalition realised that the costs of unification were 
misjudged, a process of budgeting took place. Public expenditure was decreased gradually until 
2000, when it reached the lowest point of the last 40 years.  On one hand, the ALMP (Active Labour 
Market Policies) measures had decreased. In 1993 for instance, less than one year later, the number 
of people under the umbrella of these policies decreased to 642 000. Moreover, the number of 
beneficiaries was further reduced with the advent of the red-green coalition in 1998 and reached 
their lowest numbers in 2000 with roughly 400 000 recipients. On the other hand, around 4% of the 
GDP was transferred from the West to the East. Considering their situation, it was extremely difficult 
for Germany to comply with the European Union stability criteria during this decade. However, even 
under all these financial strains income and corporate tax were progressively lowered, first by the 
Kohl government and later by the Schröder red-green coalition. Therefore the costs of unification 




Social security programmes: right after 1993, with its unusually high rates of unemployment, 
unemployment insurance benefits based on earning-tested methods were under severe strain, 
gradually giving way to a means-tested system through assistant employment benefits. Later on, 
the red-green coalition abolished the ordinary unemployment assistant benefit and tightened the 
criteria to be eligible for unemployment compensation payment and thus jeopardising their chances 
of finding a new job. During this period the number of early pensioners soared despite the measures 
undertaken at the beginning of the 1990s to prevent this. The conservative government reacted to 
this situation with the Pension Reform of 1999 and a commitment to abolishing early pensions by 
2012 (Ibid, 2008). 
Family policies: the red-green coalition reinforced the work and family conciliation improvements 
which had started at the beginning of the decade since the traditional model of the male-
breadwinner was no-longer the model of a German family. They have done so by (1) extending child 
allowance, (2) increasing time devoted to child-rearing, and (3) improving parental leave benefits 
(Ibid, 2008). 
 
2.2.3.5. “SIREN SONG OF DEREGULATION” 54 
One might think that the Kohls years may look like the Bismarck or Adenauer periods; characterised 
by an organised, flexible, and controlling state, but without being autocratic like in Bismarckian 
times. However, there were no clear signs that Kohl chose the route of his predecessors, despite the 
system having proven successful before in similar “departure form.” 55 Moreover, a debate about 
the continuity of the so-called German Modell that has been present since reunification occurred 
anew in the early 1990s. Christopher Allen, for instance, sees Anglo-American deregulatory features 
in the German economic model, such as: 
(1) Historical complexity: Countries such as Germany and Japan put all their energy into economic 
growth between the 1950s and 1980s; the political role in world order was determined not to be a 
top priority at that time. Nevertheless, with the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the cold war 
Germany was forced to take international political responsibilities. This meant that talking about a 
                                                          
54 Taken from Christopher S. Allen: “Institutions Challenged: German Reunification, Policy Errors and the 
‘Siren Song’ of Deregulation”. It represents the dichotomy of laissez-faire vs. Coordinated Market 
Economy characteristic of Germany.  
55 Allen used this expression in: “Ideas, Institutions and the Exhaustion of Modell Deutschland” so as to 
set a benchmark for analysing further political prescriptions from the fall of the Berlin wall onwards. 
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German model might be seen as a new form of German hegemony, something which Germans 
avoided given their recent historical baggage (Allen, 2010) (Streeck, 2010). 
(2) Lack of explanation of CME: Institutions are not immobile entities - they are flexible (Stainmo et 
al., 1992) and are continuously transformed by policy-makers’ wills. The lack of an explicit model 
influenced German policy makers since they lacked the tools necessary to respond to advocates of 
a laissez faire model, which was far more explicit. Also, this argument may demonstrate a lack of 
capacity to use the past to solve current issues (Allen, 2010; Streeck, 2010). 
Other authors, such as Jürgen Habermas (A Pact for or against Europe, 2011), point out that 
Germany could be classified as a civilian power up until reunification, however since then the 
German military force has become more confident and willing to behave as a global actor. 
Furthermore, according to Habermas since 2005 the role of Germany within Europe has increased 
notably and vice versa; Germans have witnessed the Europeanization of Germany. Therefore, 
German CME is likely to be influenced by the openness of Germany to Europe and correspondingly 
the European legal framework increasingly crashes into German Rahmenbedingungen. 
Nevertheless, the historical responsibilities of Germany from WWII still constrain its diplomatic role 
in certain critical issues, such as issues related to Israel (Habermas, 2011) 
Another authority on this topic, Wolfgang Streeck is also sceptical about the continuity of the 
German CME economic model. He notes three specific malaties of the German economic Modell: 
(1) The exhaustion of the model based on high-wages and high-skills. Unemployment rates during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s were unsustainable, and this together with high welfare costs 
propitiated a movement towards more flexible labour markets. (2) The aforementioned costs of 
reunification, not only in economic terms but also in terms of the massive task of transferring West 
German institutions to the East. The commitment to establish the high-wage model in the East was 
met with fear that this would have the opposite effect in the West: the erosion of the quality-
competitive West German market in favour of a price-competitive one given the low-cost 
opportunities in the East. (3) Boundaries of national politics have become increasingly 
indeterminate with the advent of globalisation. As it has already been noted, the German economic 
model CME requires a higher degree of control by national governments than more liberal ones. 
Therefore, the phenomenon of globalisation might be expected to affect CMEs to a greater degree 
than Liberal Market Economies, as pointed out by Streeck (2003). 
● Continuity of the German Economic Model? 
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Despite the alarm of laissez faire, the economic model that Germany has never been able to 
assimilate, there are still strong arguments to believe in the German organised capitalism model as 
a better way to face the three above-mentioned strains of reunification:  
(1) Streeck and Yamamura (2003) in their book The End of Diversity? Prospects for German and 
Japanese Capitalism, state that features such as long-term orientated capital investments, the 
relevance of the secondary sector, and highly skilled workers are crucial for any internationally 
oriented economy, all of which were present in the German economic system.  
(2) Close relations between the main social actors has been a key element since Bismarckian times. 
High quality industry requires a high level of education and retraining. This is only possible with the 
coordination of employers’ associations and unions who shape the structure of the educational 
programmes together with the government. Furthermore, strong employers’ associations would 
not have been possible without the involvement of banks in the management of the companies 
through long-term investments (Allen, 2004).  
(3) Adaptive institutional structures have been needed and sought by many countries and they have 
also attempted to obtain them by emulating the German institutional design. However, Germany 
has nurtured its institutional patterns for decades and implementing this strategy in the former GDR 
was going to be a tremendous challenge. One of the key elements of this structure, flexibility, could 
only be preserved with the collaboration of all social stakeholders, employers, employees, banks, 
and the state. This association was only possible under the umbrella of a complex framework 
regulation (Rahmenbedingungen), (Allen, 2004). 
(4) One of the main differences between CME and laissez faire (or LME) economic models was that 
while the former was characterised by relations between the social actors, the latter was defined 
by deals. The consequences of the two different ways of shaping relationships had significant 
implications on their respective models: deals are far more rigid due to the legal regulations they 
are submitted to, whereas relations maximise the use of voice 56 and show further flexibility to 
assimilate environmental changes, which make long term relations easier and more adaptive (Allen, 
2004).  
● Double challenge German Reunification & European integration 
                                                          
56 This term is widely used in Social science. It was created by Albert O. Hirschman in his book: Exit, Voice, 




All these tensions would be enough to be concerned about the success of German reunification but 
the German administration had to deal with the European integration process over and above all its 
internal strains. On the one hand, Europeanization symbolised the consummation of the post-cold 
war spirit and the European common project; but on the other hand, it represented a great 
challenge for the German economic model. European finance standardisation threatened German 
characteristic economic relations, which were based on the Wirtschaftswunder. European 
integration confronted, to some extent, the German economic model, which is based on 
codetermination and consensus-oriented principles (Allen, 1997). 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
After analysing the two development models for Germany and for Brazil through historical 
perspectives, it has emerged that there are some structural characteristics that define each of the 
two models. There are also circumstantial features that depended on different factors such as: the 
international context, different ideologies concerning power relations, changes in political regimes, 
and dynamics in the social conflicts in one or another country.  
Firstly, the historical roots of Germany (and Western Germany) are founded on the pillar of stability 
as one of the main anchors of the German socioeconomic model and the German social contract. In 
the field of economics, the hyperinflationary process that suffered at the beginning of the 20th 
century has marked the political economy until today. However, the Bismarckian welfare state 
model to some extent still represents the paradigm of German welfare state policies currently 
undertaken. All this is said with some reservation, due to the role of circumstantial factors, such as 
the division of Germany after WWI and the reunification. However they can be broadly defined by 
these two-main characteristics: an anti-inflationary monetary approach, and the Bismarckian 
welfare state model. 
Secondly, Brazil in comparison to Germany, lacks continuity concerning its socioeconomic model. 
On the contrary, disruption would be the best term to define the development process in the 
country. Both internal as well as external shocks have hit the Brazilian economy and society. 
Regarding the former, the shifting of political regimes and macroeconomic imbalances have 
interrupted many attempts of development.  As regards the latter, the crisis of oil in the 1970s shed 
light on the excessive dependency on the export of natural resources. 
To sum up, the principal differences between Brazil and Germany regarding policy making process 
are the following: 
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Brazil represents a Presidential model (since the 1988 constitution) and the major changes in social 
policies have to be passed through the executive power, which means social policies and 
redistribution policies are commonly volatile and unstable. It is also characterised by a deep uneven 
development despite the influence of mandates from ECLAC authors and the heterodoxy — 
inequality has always been a structural matter in the country. The policies undertaken to overcome 
this problem have always been focused on the formal sphere of society but there is a dualism 
between the ones inside and outside of the formal economy and there has not been a government 
able to face this phenomenon. This gap between the ones inside the system and the outsiders still 
challenge the political stability and the socioeconomic development of the country. This is despite 
the efforts of the social-oriented political parties in power during the last two decades, whose 
policies have focused on poverty alleviation. However, most of the Brazilian population still lack 
representation in the main institutions, government, corporate world, or unions, as they work under 
informality conditions. The cultural aspects related to privileged sectors of society inherited from 
long-lasting authoritarian governments are still present and they contribute to this unequal power 
relation. Finally, the enormous dimension of the country and the federal state have made all the 
decision-making processes very slow and the institutions have become bureaucratic and inefficient 
instruments when it comes to facing the difficult challenges of the country. 
In Germany on the contrary, the role of institutions is much stronger in comparison to Brazil and 
more relevant in the decision-making processes of laws and regulations. Accordingly, the 
development of the country has followed a far more even path than Brazil with solid pillars of the 
model since Bismarck setting the basis of it, in particular the strong role of the state as a coordinator 
of the national economic strategy, which involves financial institutions, firms, and unions. Also, the 
inherited Bismarckian culture of long-term vision has helped to develop a sustainable model that 
has been able to adapt to internal and external shocks. However, this aversion to sharp short-term 
changes is a double-edge sword as it limits its agility and ability to adapt to rapidly changing 
international contexts. This path dependent model, although it has suffered serious shocks, has 
been able to stick to its principles. Traditionally, the German development model has been 
characterised as even and equal, despite the fact that in the last decades the number of 
underemployed citizens is rising and that put the Bismarckian model under strong pressures. The 
traditionally equal relations of power between different actors, above all unionism, is threatened 
by the new currents of neo-liberalism that do not embrace these principles. This hypothesis of the 
precarisation of the German labour market is to be tested empirically for the period from 1990 to 
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2016 in Chapter 5, when the number of social security contributors is used as explanatory variables 
of percentile ratios of income distribution (P90/P10, P90/P50 and P50/P10)57. 
The different income opportunities, levels of education, and opportunities for social mobility in the 
two countries have also contributed to major difficulties to stable political legitimacy and social and 
political consensus. In Germany this social and political consensus has reinforced the social contract 
whereas in Brazil strong social inequalities and political dissensus have operated against a stable 
configuration of a social contract. However, the stability of Brazilian governments during the first 
decade of 21st century have supposed an era of consolidation of the major socioeconomic 
institutions, establishing the liberal neo-developmentalism model (Cornell, 2013). In Germany, the 
collaboration of major socioeconomic institutions remains strong. However, internal and external 
tensions such as competition in international markets and an ageing population represent 





                                                          
57 See Table 14, Table 15, and Table 16. 
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CHAPTER 4.  METHODOLOGY 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the design of the study. First, I describe the comparative study, which tests 
the causality relation of the chosen concepts: social contract and income inequality, and then I 
explain the redistributive aspects of each of the welfare states. Also, I highlight the limitations of a 
methodology linked to the selection of this kind of comparative study, most importantly the low 
number of cases. Thereafter, the design of the analysis together with the dependency relations 
between the concepts is described through a flow chart. 
Then, I explain the operationalization of the concepts, namely income inequality, social contract, 
and education to identify the variables necessary to carry out the statistical analysis. Although the 
income inequality the variable is measured by the Gini index and composed of different indicators, 
this index is one of the most used by scholars and there are many ways to measure this concept. In 
this chapter my decision as to how to measure this concept is argued. Also, in the case, of Germany 
I use percentile ratios to better understand the direction of redistribution given the lack of statistical 
significance found with the Gini index.  
The concept of social contract is operationalised by two variables, social expenditure and social 
security contributors. The indicator for social expenditure is taken directly from the OECD database 
for Germany, while for Brazil, it is constructed following the same definition of the OECD to make 
them comparable. In the case of social security contributors both are already constructed and taken 
straight from their databases - this will be discussed later.  
Also, a control variable is added to the analysis to demonstrate the inference of the independent 
variables and the explained one. The level of education is chosen as the control variable and it is 
measured by the indicator secondary school enrolment, and data for this is available for both 
countries, Germany and Brazil. Also, the databases of all indicators or indexes are named and 
justified. 
After the design of the empirical analysis is explained, I consider the descriptive study that is 
undertaken in chapter 6. The main goal of this descriptive study is to understand the evolution of 
the welfare models from 1990 to 2016 in Germany and Brazil. I consequently can answer the 
research question regarding the hypothetical results of the replication of the German welfare state 
in a developing country such as Brazil. The descriptive analysis is focused on the direction of social 
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expenditure (how to spend the social budget) and the finance of this social budget (who contributes 
to the welfare state), social security contributors or taxpayers. Social expenditure allocations are 
divided and analysed from the early-1990s to the mid-2000s to understand the modifications in the 
social expenditure function in Brazil and Germany. Afterwards, all the different components of the 
social budget are classified from a sociological perspective following the so-called welfare 
classification of Esping-Andersen (1990).  
 
2. COMPARATIVE STUDY 
Comparative analysis has always been a universal method in social sciences and, in a broad sense, 
all social-empiric analysis is comparative in some way. To quote Guy Swanson, “thinking without 
comparison is unthinkable” (Swanson, 1971:145). However, the term comparative analysis has been 
narrowly used for large macrosocial units. The more specific discipline within the large field of the 
social sciences, comparative social science, encompasses cross-societal differences and similarities 
(Ragin, 1987).  
There are different definitions and limitations regarding the term comparative social science, and 
still today there is little agreement about it. One of the broader definitions could be the use of 
comparable data of at least two countries, however, this excludes studies that compare the situation 
of one aspect of a country and an ideal (hypothetical) scenario58. Other definitions of comparative 
social science emphasise its multilevel character. That is the macrosocial level as well as the within-
system level. A study that only focus on the former could not be defined as a comparative study, 
according to this definition. Ideally, in a comparative study, a macrosocial level should explain a 
within-system phenomenon. In fact, all studies whose explanatory variables are defined only by 
national-level aggregated data are excluded from this definition (Ragin, 1987).  This definition is 
even narrower than the first one.  
The common element among the above-mentioned definitions is the importance of the macrosocial 
level. According to Charles C. Ragin, “What distinguishes comparative social science is its use of 
attributes of macrosocial units in explanatory statements” (Ragin, 1987: 5). This definition 
encompasses the double goal of this methodological framework: to explain and to interpret the 
macrosocial variation. The selection of macrosocial units and the identification with one specific 
society (such a nation-state) differentiate comparative from non-comparative research. This 
                                                          
58 Two examples: Tocqueville´s Democracy in America and Durkheim´s Elementary Forms of the Religious 
Life. Retrieved from (Ragin, 1987:4) 
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empirically implements abstraction, and the identification of the macrosocial units by name is the 
key element of comparative social science. 
This definition has methodological implications in terms of the identification of social patterns 
within a certain society or country. Identifying one country with a concrete social phenomenon is 
remarkably difficult. The demonstration of cross-societal differences in disparate cases (say, 
countries) depends upon histories and identities in most cases and they must be thoroughly 
addressed, as has been done in Chapter 2 of this study with Germany and Brazil. 
 
2.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS: CASE-ORIENTED VS. VARIABLE ORIENTED STUDY 
There is a great degree of duality within comparative studies and it is important to define them to 
frame the current study and its limitations. Most of the comparative analysis moves from a global 
understanding of the case to a more specific understanding of a set of features; from the tendency 
to expand the field of study to the tendency to limit it. In general, the reality is that most 
comparative studies concentrate on either a small number of cases or a notably high number of 
them, avoiding an intermediate number of cases (Caïs, 1997: 39). At this point, the desirability of 
one or another study according to the goal of the analysis is described to answer the proposed 
research questions.  
First; one way to approach the comparative analyses is through variable-oriented studies. The focus 
of this method is to reach a high degree of generalisation with the findings of the study. The main 
goal is to test theoretical hypotheses about the relation among social units within a society and this 
is done through statistical treatment of the data. The effects of this kind of comparative analysis 
take the form of variables. The variables may be controlled (closer to the ideal experimental 
analysis), in which case the empirical analysis is simpler than with case-oriented studies. 
Furthermore, causality is seen as an additive causality, which means the effect of one variable is the 
same in every context – which is in contradiction to case-oriented studies, which are more focused 
on case-specific characteristics than generalisations of the variable effect in different cases. 
Proponents of case-oriented studies state that this historical causality is circumstantial (Caïs, 1997). 
The case-oriented type of comparative analysis is here used to answer the first research question: 
Which variable, social security contributors or social expenditure, is shown to have 
more of an impact on the reduction of income inequality in the analysis of two 
distinct countries, Germany and Brazil? 
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Specifically, to respond to the first research question and test the hypothesis, the methodology used 
to undertake the study is a multiple lineal regression. By doing so the dependent relation between 
income inequality and the independent variables, namely social expenditure and social security 
contributors is tested. Furthermore, the causal relation is controlled by the variable secondary 
school enrolment (which represents the concept of education) chosen giving the general 
assumption of its influence on income inequality59. 
Second, case-oriented studies usually use a small number of cases (N). This fact usually limits the 
generalisation of the conclusions of the study. However, if the amount of evidence cited is 
remarkably rich, the degree of indeterminacy could be limited. Through this approximation of 
experimental studies,60 researchers identify the similarities and differences between the cases to 
set the basis for further generalisations. This considerably small number of cases allows the 
researcher to delve deeper into the relation between variables within the cases. Max Weber is the 
main predecessor of this kind of comparative analysis. He uses qualitative techniques based on logic 
instead of statistics to demonstrate relations of association, but he is not able to explain the 
variation (Caïs, 1997). The case-oriented approach is more suitable to answer the second research 
question: 
To what extent may the lessons from a developed country such as Germany, which 
is a paradigm of the corporatist welfare state, be applied to Brazil to reduce its high 
income inequality levels? 
For this purpose, a descriptive study was undertaken to go deeper into the reasons of the results of 
the empirical study. The elements to consider for this analysis are the direction of social expenditure 
(how to spend the social budget) and the finance of this social budget (who contributes to the 
welfare state). Then, the elements of the social budget are divided and classified from a sociological 
perspective by following the welfare classification of Esping-Andersen (1990), which is explained in 
his book The Three Worlds of Welfare. This in-depth analysis is more appropriate when trying to 
understand the behaviour of specific elements of the welfare states, such as formality, the type of 
social benefit (in-kind versus cash transfers), the state of development as a determinant of the effect 
of social policies, or the redistribution character of different social policies. Whereas the 
quantitative analysis is more focused on the generalisation of the results and the causality effect of 
the independent variables in the dependent one but omitting the reasons of these numbers. 
                                                          
59 See the point made in section 3.4. The influence of education on income inequality levels in chapter 2. 




2.2. HYPOTHESES  
Two very different approaches to welfare state policies in Brazil and Germany are taken to study 
their impact on income inequality from 1990 to 2016.  On the one hand the (a) Corporatist-welfare 
model, represented by Germany, and on the other hand; the (b) hybrid between a Residual and 
Universal model according to the Esping-Andersen (1990) classification, represented by Brazil. Both 
have been proven to possess advantages and drawbacks regarding their impact on income 
inequality: 
The two hypotheses of the thesis are related to the effect of social policies and social security 
configuration on the income inequality levels of a country. These are the three specific hypotheses 
to be tested by this study: 
H1: Generally, an increase in the social budget61 is important in reducing income 
inequality, however, the direction of the social expenditure62  determines the effect 
of this measure. Social policies based on the formal social contract, which are 
focused on the middle-working class who work under formality conditions, are 
predictably more effective in income inequality reduction than the residual ones. 
However, non-contributory social policies with low levels of social security 
contributors may improve inequality in high poverty contexts where a significant 
number of citizens are living under informality conditions.  
H2: Taking the Esping-Andersen´s welfare classifications (1990), the corporatist 
welfare model is effective in reducing income inequality as long as the formal labour 
market remains strong in the country. The combination of both elements has been 
proven very effective for Germany, as it has enjoyed one of the lowest income 
inequality levels by following this Bismarckian approach after WWII until late-1980s 
when the reunification happened. While the hybrid welfare model of Brazil pays 
more attention to the poor, it has been characteristic of the most capitalistic 
societies, which have arguably represented the most unequal societies among 
developed countries. At the same time, this approach maintains a public social 
                                                          
61 According to the OECD (2018) definition of social expenditure. 
62 It refers to the weight of each social budget allocation compared to the whole social budget. 
131 
 
security system whose beneficiaries do not represent all of the working class of the 
country due to the high levels of informality. 
H3: The socioeconomic structures, in terms of development, represent a 
determinant when same welfare model is followed by different countries. In a 
context of high level of informality, such as Brazil, residual policies may reduce 
income inequality levels until a certain level of formality is reached, then a 
corporatist welfare model might be more effective in reducing income inequality 
levels.  
 
2.3. LIMITATIONS OF THIS COMPARATIVE STUDY  
The research questions as well as the hypotheses of the thesis provides a framework under which 
the methodology has to be constructed. The number of cases in the present research is small, with 
there being two, namely Brazil and Germany. This could thus be clearly defined as a case-oriented 
comparative study according to the dichotomy63 between this and the variable-oriented study. 
However, I use quantitative techniques, specifically regression analysis, which is more usual in 
studies with a high number of cases, to analyse the relation between the concepts in the form of 
variables.  
The argument to overcome this limitation is based on different facts, not only statistical but also 
those regarding the design requirements of the study. Statistically, the number of cases bars this 
from being treated as a variable-oriented study. Nevertheless, the main goal of this study is none 
other than to demonstrate the casual relation between the concepts (and the corresponding 
variables) in two different welfare regimes represented by Brazil and Germany. Furthermore, the 
robustness of the distribution of the variables could compensate for the lack of cases64. To a lesser 
extent this is mitigated by the analytical generalisation of the outcomes to different countries, which 
are always intended with an eye to the reservations implicit in the impossibility of a statistical 
generalisation. 
To sum up, on the one hand, this kind of analysis would not fit perfectly within the category of 
conventional case-oriented comparative research because of the statistical analysis. While it follows 
the variable-oriented techniques, the number of cases is much smaller than recommended (Caïs, 
                                                          
63 It has already been mentioned in Section 2.1 that this is a false dichotomy, they are not mutually 
exclusive. 
64 This limitation will be tackled with the other limitations of the empirical study in chapter 5. 
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1997: 20). In conclusion, this study prioritises the research question and the demonstration of the 
inference (or not) over the methodological limits of the research. Although these methodological 
issues are considered, they are tackled in the statistical design of the empirical analysis.  
Another important challenge was figuring out how to demonstrate the inference. On the one hand, 
the statistical control of a small number of cases and the difficulty of statistical control represent 
one of the main methodological constraints, above all regarding the small degree of freedom – it 
limits the quality of the statistical inference. Trajectories analysed by longitudinal studies often 
require complex explanations that are difficult to prove with quantitative methods. However, the 
current availability of data bases with large numbers of samples from secondary sources to some 
extent compensate for this limit and improve the quality of the analysis. 
On the other hand, even though both case-oriented and variable-oriented methods differ from one 
another, they are not incompatible. Both kinds of studies depart from the same level of study: 
concepts. From this point of departure, they use different ways to reach the same goal of finding 
causal relations between these concepts. Although causality may be obtained through both 
techniques, a limited number of cases makes it difficult to universalise this causal relation between 
concepts from a statistical point of view. But, from a design perspective this is “acceptable” (Caïs, 
1997: 60) which is the main point. All in all, the methodology has no other function within this thesis 
than serve to the goal of the study in terms of cases, timeframe, concepts, and its relations. 
Therefore, the methodology is what has to fit to the design of the study, not the other way around. 
However, in any case, the selection of the former must fulfil as far as possible the methodological 
criteria. 
 
3. OPERATIONALISATION OF THE CONCEPTS 
Even though, the concepts that are empirically analysed in Chapter 5 have already been described 
at the beginning of the present thesis, these have to be converted into a variable in order to proceed 
with further statistical treatment. This process of operationalization of the concepts is necessary to 
undertaking the multiple linear regression study. For this purpose, the concept, variables related to 






Throughout the process of operationalization of the variables one should answer the question why 
are these variables chosen to define the respective concept? Given the fact that the same concept 
may be measured or defined through different variables, the selection of one or another has 
implications (methodological as well as theoretical) in the subsequent result of the analysis. 
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Figure 11. Concepts, variables and sources 




Income inequality: The Gini coefficient is chosen to measure this concept for various 
reasons: (a) It is the most used index in the literature on this topic. (b) The simplicity of 
summing up this concept in a number; 0 being perfect equality and 1 being its opposite 
makes it easy for the reader to understand. (c) As regards the statistics, the fact that it is a 
continuous variable and therefore can be used in a linear regression analysis. (d) The 
availability of secondary data for both cases of the study (Germany and Brazil) is also an 
advantage compared to other measures such as the 20:20 ratio or Theil index. 
Regarding the sources, the primary data of citizens ́ income are obtained by national 
institutions (via surveys) and the calculation of the coefficient is undertaken by official 
institutions. The sources for both Brazil and Germany are the IPEA (Institute of Applied 
Economic Research of Brazil) and the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) respectively. The latter represents a reputable institution regarding 
socioeconomic matters of developed countries, although it includes sporadically developing 
countries such as Brazil in its reports. Unfortunately, in this case there is no available data. 
Therefore, for Brazil the data is taken from the IPEA, a national institution. 
Furthermore, the lack of statistical significance of all the regressions for Germany 
encouraged me to test the effect of the same independent variables against other 
dependent variable which measure the same concept of income inequality. I chose the 
percentile ratios to understand some dimensions of income inequality that the Gini index 
neglects, namely the variations at the extremes of the income distribution. The three 
percentile ratios taken for Germany are: P90/P10, P90/P50 and P50/P10. Through these 
ratios I attempt to understand in more depth the direction of the income redistribution 
during the period from 1990 to 2016. Considering that, even though the data available 
through the OECD only measures the income coming from formal salaries, it should be 
representative enough in a country with low rates of unemployment. 
- Social security contributors: The relative number of social security contributors, measured 
by the % of population in each country, is chosen to measure this concept. The main 
arguments that support this choice are the following: (a) The simplicity of the term make 
these data comparable among both countries. (b) The relative character of the variable is 
important due to the big differences among the dimension (in terms of gross population) of 




Regarding the definition of this variable, it is important to note some considerations about 
this term in reference to each country: 
In the case of Germany, the social security contributors variable, on the one hand, covers 
all employees which are liable to pay sickness, pension, and nursing insurance, and/or the 
collectives specified in the employment promotion act: apprentices, student trainees, part-
time retirement workers and persons who have been called to serve compulsory service. 
On the other hand, it does not include civil servants, self-employed persons, assisting family 
members, professional and temporary soldiers, and persons doing military or community 
service nor those who are subject to marginal employment (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 
2013) 
Brazilian social security contributors which are subject to paying for sickness, pension, and 
nursing insurance and other allowances65, comprises the following collectives under article 
11 of the law 8.213/91: workers, domestic servants, independently employed persons,66 
self-employed persons, voluntary contributors and special contributors67.  
- Social expenditure: In order to define this concept, the variable chosen for this study is the 
social expenditure variable as a percentage of the total GDP. The reasons for this election 
are mainly these: (a) The relativity of the variable given the differences in the total budget 
of the countries object of study, gross number are not appropriate for the analysis to be not 
comparable. (b) The continuity of the variable represents methodologically requirement for 
the linear regression.  
However, given the fact that there is no availability of the same variable for both countries, 
Germany and Brazil, the OECD's definition of social expenditure is taken as a reference. In 
fact, this definition has been used in other studies undertaken by reputable organisations 
such as the IMF (Clements, 1997) on social expenditure. However, the corresponding 
amount of private social expenditure is taken out of the variable specifically so that this 
study answers as accurately as possible the research questions of the thesis: 
                                                          
65 For example, the child and family allowance. Retrieved from the National Institute of Social Security: 
http://www.previdencia.gov.br/acesso-a-informacao/institucional/inss/ 
66 Person who works partially for one or more companies through an intermediary such as trade unions.  
Retrieved from the National Institute of Social Security: http://www.previdencia.gov.br/acesso-a-
informacao/institucional/inss/  




“Social expenditure comprises cash benefits, direct in-kind provision of 
goods and services, and tax breaks with social purposes. Benefits may 
be targeted at low-income households, the elderly, disabled, sick, 
unemployed, or young persons. To be considered ‘social,’ programmes 
have to involve either redistribution of resources across households or 
compulsory participation. Social benefits are classified as public when 
general government (that is central, state, and local governments, 
including social security funds) controls the relevant financial flows. All 
social benefits not provided by general government are considered 
private. Private transfers between households are not considered as 
“social’ and not included here. Net total social expenditure includes 
both public and private expenditure. It also accounts for the effect of 
the tax system by direct and indirect taxation and by tax breaks for 
social purposes. This indicator is measured as a percentage of GDP or 
USD per capita” (OECD, 2018). 
- Education: secondary school enrolment as percentage of youths of secondary school age 
attending secondary school is the variable which embodies the concept of education. It is 
used as a control variable in this study and the main reasons for choosing this specific 
variable are that: (a) this indicator has already been chosen as an education variable by 
other studies on the relations of causality among education and inequality in Latin- America 
(UNDESA, 2013).  (b) Like the other variables of this thesis it is a continuous variable, which 
is needed for this kind of statistical analysis. (c) The numbers of this variable are relative and 
given the difference among countries (in terms of population terms) it is necessary to 
express the concept of education in this manner instead of gross numbers.  
 
4. DATABASES 
Here the sources of the databases as well as their most striking points are described. All datasets 
used in this analysis are taken from secondary sources and surveys undertaken form third 
institutions. These datasets served to construct the following variables: income inequality, social 




4.1. INCOME INEQUALITY 
The Gini index which measures income inequality in a country is taken from secondary sources for 
both countries. For Brazil, data from the Research Institute of Applied Economics, in Portuguese: 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) was used68. The IPEA undertakes periodic surveys 
to obtain primary data regarding household income and then constructs the Gini index using the 
results from the surveys. For Germany, the Gini index was obtained from OECD.stat69. However, the 
definition of income inequality underwent some changes in 2012. To quote the description taken 
from the OECD.stat: “Compared to previous terms of reference, these include a more detailed 
breakdown of current transfers received and paid by households as well as a revised definition of 
household income, including the value of goods produced for own consumption as an element of 
self-employed income” (OECD, 2017b). Also, for 2014 and 2015 Eurostat provides the Gini index for 
Germany. 
Also, I use other dependent variables for Germany to test the causal effect between the 
independent variables (social expenditure and social security contributors) against income 
inequality, given the lack of statistical significance for the Gini coefficient. I have chosen the 
percentile ratios, namely the P90/P10, P90/P50 and P50/P10 ratios, given the over-sensitivity for 
middle classes which neglects the variations in the share of incomes at the extremes. These are 
obtained for Germany from earnings, gross earnings and decile ratios (Edition 2017), from the OECD 
Employment and Labour Market Statistics (database) (2018b). It is important to mention that this 
database measures salaries instead of disposable income as the Gini index does. There were other 
measures that take the disposable income for percentile ratios, however, the scarcity of data for 
the selected years (only every 5 years from 1990) pushed me to use the former database based on 
salaries. Also, the low unemployment rate of Germany does allow for the use of this database since 
it represents most of the population, even though other income coming from sources other than 
salaries are missed. 
 
4.2. SOCIAL EXPENDITURE 
The social expenditure data series from 1990 to the latest update for both Germany and Brazil meet 
the OECD´s definition to be comparable, although private social expenditure is taken out of the 
study since it was not deemed relevant for this study. For the former, the dataset (Appendix 4) is 
                                                          
68 See Appendix 2. 
69 See Appendix 3. 
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taken from the same OECD database. For the latter, there was no dataset which encompassed the 
elements of the OECD definition of social expenditure. Therefore, the social expenditure variable 
for Brazil was constructed according to the same criteria of the German dataset (the OECD 
definition). For this purpose, first all the total public spending divided by function was obtained from 
SIAFI (SIAFI, 2016), and subsequently, the following elements which define the variable of social 
expenditure were selected: Social Assistance (Assistência Social), Social Security (Previdência Social), 
Health (Saúde), Labour (Trabalho), Education (Educação), Housing (Habitação), Sanitation 
(Saneamento). Apart from the fact that these elements fulfil the requirements of the OECD social 
expenditure definition, the same ones have been considered to define social expenditure in Brazil 
in other studies undertaken by reputable organisations such as the IMF (Clements, 1997). In 
appendix 5, all the expenditure items can be seen as they appear in the Brazilian Treasury. Once the 
total social spending is obtained from this statement (according to the OECD definition), it is divided 
by the Gross Domestic Product retrieved from the IFS (IFS, 2016) in order to finally come to a final 
indicator comparable to the German one: social expenditure as a percentage of the GDP from 1990 
to 2015 (Appendix 6). 
                       
4.3. SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTORS 
The variable social security contributors is taken from secondary sources as well. In the case of 
Brazil, the institution which provides this information is the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 
in Portuguese: Ministério Do Trabalho E Previdência Social (MTPS) and they obtained, in turn, the 
primary data from the periodic survey: Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (Pnad) 
(Appendix 7). The availability of the data was from 1990 to 2014. For Germany, the Labour Federal 
Agency, in German: Bundesagentur für Arbeit, provides the data on social security contributors from 
1992 to 2016, due to the reunification process (Appendix 8).  
 
4.4. SECONDARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT 
For this variable two different sources have been taken for both Brazil and Germany. For the former, 
the database: Net enrolment rates: secondary school (SEDLAC et. al, 2016) is obtained from the 
Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean in collaboration with the World Bank 
(Appendix 9). For the latter, World Bank Open Data and more specifically the collection of 
development indicators provides: The Gross enrolment ratio, secondary, both sexes (%) (World 
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Bank, 2016) (Appendix 10). Although they embody the same idea of secondary school enrolment, it 
is important to highlight that both definitions of the databases slightly differ in their calculation. 
They have been chosen according to the following criteria: first, they covered almost all of the time 
frame (1990 – 2014) chosen for this study. Here are other databases more appropriate for 
comparison, for example the Enrolment rate database for Germany in the OECD Data would fit 
better with the Brazilian dataset. However, that only covers 2013 and 2014. Secondly, both datasets 
are not going to be compared with one another but rather with the Gini coefficient of the same 
country. Thus, while it is relevant to mention, this difference in conceptualisation becomes less 
important for the precision of the present study.  
 
5. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF WELFARE MODELS 
The empirical study, which has been explained in Sections 3 and 4 of this chapter, delves into the 
statistical inference between the dependent and the independent variables, in this case; social 
security contributors and social expenditure as the explanatory variables and income inequality as 
the explained one. This empirical analysis aims to answer this research question focused on the 
variables: 
 Which variable, social security contributors or social expenditure, is shown to have 
more of an impact on the reduction of income inequality in the analysis of two 
distinct countries, Germany and Brazil? 
However, one is not able to answer to the other research question more related to the cases of 
study: Brazil and Germany: 
To what extent may the lessons from a developed country such as Germany, which 
is a paradigm of the corporatist welfare state, be applied to Brazil to reduce its high 
income inequality levels? 
To shed light on this matter I undertake a descriptive study of the welfare state for both countries, 
Brazil and Germany. The description of the welfare states is explained following the so-called 
welfare classification of Esping-Andersen (1990).70 According to this classification the author defines 
the different welfare state categories as a function of the contributors and the entitlement structure 
                                                          
70 See figure 13. 
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(beneficiaries) of the welfare system of a country.71 This social function encompasses the set of 
institutional welfare providers, the family, the  market, and the state, which are combined with the 
entitlement structure of these social policies, that is, the beneficiaries of the social spending. The 
redistributive outcome of the welfare models may differ depending on who finances these social 
policies and who are entitled to benefit from them. This descriptive analysis relies on reputable 
authors on social policies from science, sociology, and economics. This analysis is done for both 
countries to ultimately understand not only which welfare state model for each country has been 
more successful in reducing income inequality72 but why they have (or have not) achieved those 
results in terms of income inequality. 
Regarding the kind of comparative analysis this is, this descriptive analysis may be defined as a 
comparative case-oriented study as opposed to an empirical analysis, which refers to the variable-
oriented part of the thesis. The causality effect between the independent and the dependent 
variables is tested through the empirical analyses. I analyse the welfare state systems through 
disaggregated elements of social expenditure and its influence in income inequality. To disaggregate 
the social expenditure, I take advantage of the work done in Chapter 6 in constructing the variable 
social expenditure for each country. Then, I combine different social spending allocations following 
the theories of different authors (e.g. Contributory and non-contributory) and test them for the 
cases being studied in this thesis.  
  
                                                          
71 See figure 14 for Brazil and figure 18 for Germany. 
72 This question is answered with the empirical analysis. 
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CHAPTER 5. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the statistical analysis that constitutes the core of the thesis. In Chapter 4, I 
explain the design of both analyses, namely the empirical and the descriptive one. The former, that 
is, the empirical analysis using statistical treatments, is undertaken in the present chapter.  
The structure of the chapter is divided into four main parts: (a) Firstly, I explain and justify the 
statistical analysis that I choose to measure the inference effect between the independent and the 
dependent variables. Here the formula and the different elements of the regression are described 
in order to interpret the results. (b) Secondly, I name and describe the lagged and lead variables 
constructed for the statistical treatment together with the original ones. (c) Thirdly, I present the 
results of all the regressions undertaken to test the different hypotheses of the study. (d) Lastly, I 
present a summary of the results, highlighting the most striking points.  
 
2. STATISTICAL TREATMENT: THE MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION  
The methodology used to answer the first research question: 
Which variable, social security contributors or social expenditure, is shown to have 
more of an impact on the reduction of income inequality in the analysis of two 
distinct countries, Germany and Brazil? 
 and to test the hypothesis previously mentioned, will now be described. A multiple lineal regression 
is used to delve into the dependent relation between income inequality and the independent 
variables, namely social expenditure and social security contributors. The controlled variable 
secondary school enrolment (which represents the concept of education) is chosen given the 
general assumption of its influence on income inequality73. The data treatment is undertaken 
through a multiple linear regression which attempts to model the relationship between two 
explanatory variables, one control variable and one response variable, by fitting a linear equation 
                                                          
73 See the point 2.5. The influence of education on income inequality levels in Chapter 1. 
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to the observed data. Every value of the independent variable x is associated with a value of the 
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Figure 12. Design of the study 




The following formula: Linear regression with panel-corrected standard errors  
*xtpcse depvar [indepvars] [if] [in] [weight] [options] 
According to the STATA manual these are the main characteristics of this function: “xtpcse is an 
alternative to feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) for fitting linear cross-sectional time-series 
models when the disturbances are not assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). 
Instead, the disturbances are assumed to be either heteroskedastic across panels or heteroskedastic 
and contemporaneously correlated across panels. The disturbances may also be assumed to be 
autocorrelated within panel, and the autocorrelation parameter may be constant across panels or 
different for each panel”74. The interpretation of the parameters obtained from the xtpcse formula 
is described as follows. 
 
2.1. DESCRIPTION OF THE REGRESSIONS AND INTERPRETETATION OF THE PARAMETERS 
For every regression that is statistically significant I write a brief description with the results from 
the subsequent parameters explained below.  These descriptions will follow the same structure to 
better understand the relation between the explanatory variables and the explained one, as well as 
the variations in the variables from one regression to another. 
● R-squared 
R2 is interpreted as the proportion of response variation explained by the regressors in the model. 
It can be interpreted in this way: 
 
R2 = 1 indicates that the fitted model explains all variability in the dependent variable. 
R2 = 0 indicates no linear relationship between the response variable and regressors. 
 
According to this rationing, the value such as R2 = 0.6 may be interpreted as follows: sixty percent 
of the variance in the response variable can be explained by the explanatory variables. The 
remaining thirty percent can be attributed to unknown, lurking variables or inherent variability. 
A warning that applies to the R2 and to other statistical descriptions of correlation and association, 
is that correlation does not imply causation. Correlations may sometimes provide important clues 
                                                          
74 Retrieved from: https://www.stata.com/manuals13/xtxtpcse.pdf 
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in discovering causal relationships between variables. Nevertheless, a non-zero estimated 
correlation between two variables is not, on its own, the demonstration that a variation in the value 
of one variable would result in changes in the values of other variables. For example, the practice of 
carrying a lighter is correlated with the incidence of cancer but carrying a lighter does not cause 
cancer. 
In the case of the present analysis, the interpretation of the R2 would be in terms of the correlation 
of the regressors, namely social expenditure, social security contributors, and secondary school 
enrolment on the income inequality rates measured by the Gini coefficient. 
● Semipartial correlations 
In a multiple linear regression, the calculation of decomposition of the variance is conducted 
through the calculation of the semipartial correlations to know the explanatory power of each 
variable independent of the model: 
R2 = rxy1_semipartial2 + rxy2_semipartial2 + join effect 
It tells us the part that explains each variable independent of the model. Apart of the variance that 
cannot individually explain each independent variable is the interaction between them or the joint 
effect. When the joint effect is high there is a high collinearity. 
To address this, I calculate the semipartial correlations of each regressor to understand what 
proportion of the total explanation (R2) is, in turn, explained by every independent variable. 
● P-Value 
The p-value is widely used in statistical hypothesis testing, specifically in null hypothesis significance 
testing as part of an experimental design. Before performing the experiment, one first chooses the 
null hypothesis and a threshold value for p, also called the significance level of the test, in this case 
it is 5% (Nuzzo, 2014) and denoted as α. On the one hand, if the p-value is less than the chosen 
significance level (α), that means the observed data is sufficiently inconsistent with the null 
hypothesis that the null hypothesis may be rejected. On the other hand, this fact does not 
demonstrate the tested hypothesis is true either. This test guarantees that the Type I error rate is 
at most α. For typical analysis, using the standard α = 0.05 threshold, the null hypothesis is rejected 
when p < .05 and not rejected when p > .05. The p-value does indicate probabilities in relation to 
hypotheses but is only a tool for deciding whether to reject the null hypothesis.  
In the case of the present analysis, the interpretation of the α would be related to the rejection (or 
not) of the null hypothesis regarding the regressors, social expenditure, social security contributors, 
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and secondary school enrolment, on the income inequality rates measured by the Gini index. If the 
null hypothesis is rejected (p < .05) the causation effect between this variable and the explanatory 
one is accepted. However, the level of causation is measured by another metric, the regression 
coefficient which is subsequently explained. 
● Regression Coefficient 
The lineal regression formula is defined by this:  
Y = B0 + B1*X1 + B2*X2 + e 
 
Regression coefficients are represented by B1 and B2 in the formula above. This means that if 
X1 differs by one unit (and X2 did not differ) Y will differ by B1 units, on average. The same 
interpretation could be applied for X2, if X2 differs by one unit (and X2 did not differ) Y will differ by 
B2 units, on average.   
In the case of the present analysis three regression coefficients are analysed for the three 
regressors, namely social expenditure, social security contributors, and secondary school 
enrolment. 
 
2.2 ADDITION AND COMBINATION OF NEW VARIABLES 
Variation in the already defined variables is added to the analysis in order to better understand the 
inference between the dependent and explanatory variables. Different hypotheses are tested to 
consider different behaviours of the variables: (a) the effect of a modification in the social 
expenditure budget of a country may be seen in the same year (e.g. conditional cash transfers); but 
some social expenses can have an impact on income inequality the subsequent year (e.g. health). 
(b) Furthermore, the number of social security contributors may also have an impact on the income 
inequality level of the following year. (c) Education, measured by the indicator secondary school 
enrolment, predictably impacts income inequality in a more delayed fashion than other social 
policies, which is why it is also tested against the income inequality ratios 5 years later. (d) Lastly, 
the fact that one country experiences certain level of inequality in the year X may influence the 
inequality level of the year X+1.  
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Thus, considering these four hypotheses, I undertake eleven regressions combining and testing 
different hypotheses regarding the behaviour of the variables.  For this purpose, lagged75 and lead76 
variables, based on the original ones, are constructed and combined for the three distributions: first 
Brazil and Germany together, then Brazil alone, and lastly Germany alone. The eleven regressions 
combining different independent, control, and dependent variables are listed and described as 
follows:  
I. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient (or percentile 
ratios in the case of Germany) 
In the first regression all the variables (independent and dependent ones) are taken from the same 
year. No control variable is introduced to the model. Therefore, this regression represents the base 
of the following ones where other variables are added (such as the control variable secondary school 
enrolment) or there is a variation in the same ones used in this regression. 
II. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors 
Control variable: secondary school enrolment 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient (or percentile 
ratios in the case of Germany) 
This is the same as the first regression however the variable secondary school enrolment is 
introduced to control for the effect of the relation between the independent variables and the 
dependent one.  
III. Independent variables: Social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social security contributors 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient (or percentile 
ratios in the case of Germany) 
The introduction of 1 year lagged variable for social expenditure is based on the hypothesis that 
social expenditure may have an influence on income inequality levels not in the same year that the 
government spends it but the year after. The rest of variables for the same year are kept the same. 
IV. Independent variables: Social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social security contributors  
Control Variable: Secondary School enrolment 
                                                          
75 Past values. 
76 Future values. 
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Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient (or percentile 
ratios in the case of Germany) 
This is the same as the third regression however the variable secondary school enrolment is 
introduced to control for the effect of the relation between the independent variables and the 
dependent one. 
V. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient lead (1 year) (or 
percentile ratios in the case of Germany) 
In this case, all the explanatory variables are hypothesized to influence the dependent variable, 
income inequality, of the year X+1. Thus, the lead (1 year) variable is constructed and the regression 
is undertaken. 
VI. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors 
Control variable: secondary school enrolment 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient lead (1 year) (or 
percentile ratios in the case of Germany) 
This is the same as the fifth regression however the variable secondary school enrolment is 
introduced to control for the effect of the relation between the independent variables and the 
dependent one. 
VII. Independent variables: Social expenditure, Security contributors and the Gini coefficient 
lagged (1 year) (or percentile ratios in the case of Germany) 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient (or percentile 
ratios in the case of Germany) 
In this combination the variable lagged income inequality is created and included in the regression 
as an independent variable. The aim in doing so is to test the influence of the same variable from 
one year to the next and thus check the regression coefficient of the independent variables to 
measure their effect only in the variation of the Gini coefficient (explained variable). This is unlike 
the other regressions where the Gini coefficient of a certain year is fully explained by the 
independent variables without taking into account the value for the former year. 
VIII. Independent variables: Social expenditure, social security contributors and the Gini 
coefficient lagged (1 year) (or percentile ratios in the case of Germany) 
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Control variable: secondary school enrolment 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient (or percentile 
ratios in the case of Germany) 
This is the same as the seventh regression however the variable secondary school enrolment is 
introduced to control for the effect of the relation between the independent variables and the 
dependent one. 
IX. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors  
Control variable: secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year) 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient (or percentile 
ratios in the case of Germany) 
In this case it is hypothesized that the variable secondary school enrolment has more influence on 
income inequality levels five years following a change. Therefore, the variable secondary school 
enrolment of five years before is created to test the influence of it on income inequality levels, 
keeping the rest of variables from the same year.  
X. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social security contributors 
Control variable: secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year) 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient (or percentile 
ratios in the case of Germany) 
Here the combined effect of the third and the ninth regression is measured. That is to say, the 
variable Social expenditure and Secondary school enrolment are lagged, 1 year and 5 years 
respectively. 
XI. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year), social security contributors and 
the Gini coefficient lagged (1 year) 
Control variable: secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year) 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient (or percentile 
ratios in the case of Germany) 
Lastly, the tenth regression is modified with the introduction of the Gini coefficient lagged 1 year to 
measure only the effect on the variation of the Gini coefficient (from one year to the next) of the 
same independent variables. 
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In point 6.1. when the dependent variable is changed by the percentile ratios, the sets of regressions 
follow the same pattern, apart from the fact that Gini is substituted by the ratios P90/P10, P90/P50 
and P50/P10 respectively. 
 
3. FIRST SET OF REGRESSIONS: GERMANY AND BRAZIL TOGETHER 
In general, all the regressions (Appendix 11 – 21) follow the same pattern, though there are some 
differences in the behaviour of the variables. The proportions of the explanation (R-squared) of the 
Gini coefficient are surprisingly high for all regressions (>80%). This is the main reason I decompose 
this R-squared into different semipartial correlations for each independent variable, to understand 
to what extent they contribute to the total explanation of income inequality levels. The semipartial 
correlations of social expenditure show higher values (around 30% in some cases), above all, for 
regressions III and IV; when social expenditure is taken from one year before, for the former, and 
when all regressors are tested against the Gini coefficient of the next year, for the latter. Apart from 
that the regressions coefficients, which indicate the predicted value that inequality levels are 
affected by the independent variables, are shown to be higher for social expenditure than social 
security contributors. These values are about -0,01 and -0,02 in most of the cases, except for 
regressions VII and VIII, when the Gini coefficient of the year before is taken as an independent 
variable. The analysis of the most striking points of the relevant regressions (whose p-values are 
lower than 5%) are presented as follows: 
I. Independent variables: Social expenditure and social security contributors 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient  
This regression (Appendix 11) presents an R-squared of 98%. One of the reasons for this high 
number could be the high correlation of the variables, which does not imply in any case a causal 
relation between the independent and the dependent variables. In order to understand this R-
squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 26% indicates that at least this 
proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 0.4% indicates that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
Regarding the P-values, the two regressors, namely social expenditure and social security 
contributors, are statistically significant. The null hypothesis for secondary school enrolment, the 
control variable, is accepted. This fact does not directly imply an inference between the two 
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independent variables and the dependent one, but a correlation between them (always assuming 
5% as a significance level threshold).  
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, taking into account the Brazilian and 
German datasets together from 1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social expenditure: increasing social expenditure by 1% of the national GDP would decrease 
the income inequality level by 0,02 (measured by the Gini coefficient) 
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would decrease the income inequality level by 0,003 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
According to these results, social expenditure is more important in reducing income inequality than 
social security contributors. This takes into account that all regressors are measured against their 
contemporary dependent variable — income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. 
 
II. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors 
Control variable: secondary school enrolment 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient  
This regression (Appendix 12) presents an R-squared of 98%. This is similar to the former 
distribution. In order to understand this R-squared deeper, it is decomposed into the different 
independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 4.71% indicates that at least this 
total R-squared can be explained by this variable. This number is significantly lower when 
the control variable is added, as compared to the former regression (without the variable 
secondary school enrolment) 
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 0.2% indicates that at 
least this total R-squared can be explained by this variable. This is similar to the former 
regression without the control variable. 
Regarding the P-values, the same two regressors are statistically significant, namely social 
expenditure and social security contributors. The null hypothesis for secondary school enrolment, 
the control variable is accepted. 
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Table 11. Summary of the results Brazil and Germany 
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As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, taking into account the Brazilian and 
German datasets together from 1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social expenditure: increasing social expenditure by 1% of the national GDP would decrease 
the income inequality level by 0,02 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would decrease the income inequality level by 0,003 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
According to these results, social expenditure is still more important in reducing income inequality 
than social security contributors, having rejected the influence of the control variable, secondary 
school enrolment. This takes into account that all regressors are measured against the 
contemporary dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient.  
 
III. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social security contributors 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient  
This regression (Appendix 13) presents an R-squared of 98%. In order to understand this R-squared 
in more depth, it is decomposed into the different independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 25% indicates that at least this 
proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. This is similar to 
regression I with the correspondent social expenditure variable of the contemporary year. 
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 0.6% indicates that at 
least this total R-squared can be explained by this variable. This is a barely representative 
number. 
Regarding the P-values, the same regressors are statistically significant: social expenditure and social 
security contributors.  
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, taking into account the Brazilian and 
German datasets together from 1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social expenditure: increasing social expenditure by 1% of the national GDP would decrease 
the income inequality level by 0,02 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would decrease the income inequality level by 0,003 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
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Similar conclusions are obtained from this analysis: social expenditure is more important in reducing 
income inequality than social security contributors, having rejected the influence of the control 
variable, secondary school enrolment. This takes into account, in this case, that social expenditure 
is measured from the former year against the contemporary dependent variable: income inequality 
measured by the Gini coefficient. Social security contributors for the same year as the Gini 
coefficient are chosen. 
 
IV. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social security 
contributors  
Control Variable: Secondary School enrolment 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient  
This regression (Appendix 14) presents an R-squared of 98%. This is similar to the former 
distribution. In order to understand this R-squared deeper, it is decomposed into the different 
independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 4.14% indicates that at least this 
total R-squared can be explained by this variable. This number is significantly lower when 
the control variable is added, as compared to the former regression (without the variable 
secondary school enrolment) 
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 0.2% indicates that at 
least this total R-squared can be explained by this variable. This is similar to the former 
regression without the control variable. 
Regarding the P-values, the same two regressors are statistically significant, namely social 
expenditure and social security contributors. The null hypothesis for secondary school enrolment, 
the control variable is accepted.  
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, taking into account the Brazilian and 
German datasets together from 1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social expenditure: increasing social expenditure by 1% of the national GDP in would 
decrease the income inequality level by 0,02 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would decrease the income inequality level by 0,003 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
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According to these results, social expenditure (even lagged 1 year) is still more important in reducing 
income inequality than social security contributors, having rejected the influence of the control 
variable, secondary school enrolment. However, the modification of the variable social expenditure 
does not have a meaningful influence on the results.  
 
V. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient lead (1 year) 
This regression (Appendix 15) presents an R-squared of 98%. In the same line with the former ones. 
In order to understand this R-squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different 
independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 21.64% indicates that at least this 
proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 0.55% indicates that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. This is not very 
significant. 
Regarding the P-values, the two regressors are statistically significant, namely social expenditure 
and social security contributors.  
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, taking into account the Brazilian and 
German datasets together from 1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social expenditure: increasing social expenditure by 1% of the national GDP would decrease 
the income inequality level by 0,02 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would decrease the income inequality level by 0,004 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
According to these results, social expenditure is far more important in reducing income inequality 
than social security contributors which barely have an influence in the lead Gini coefficient. 
Therefore, the modification of the dependent variable does not significantly show a meaningful 
variation in the corresponding regression with the dependent variable of the same year. 
 
VI. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors 
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Control variable: secondary school enrolment 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient lead (1 year) 
This regression (Appendix 16) presents again an R-squared of 98%. In order to understand this R-
squared deeper, it is decomposed into the different independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 3,97% indicates that at least this 
proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. Extraordinarily lower 
than the former regression without the control variable. 
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 0.25% indicates that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. This is not very 
significant either. 
Regarding the P-values, the two regressors are statistically significant, namely social expenditure 
and social security contributors.  
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, taking into account the Brazilian and 
German datasets together from 1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social expenditure: increasing social expenditure by 1% of the national GDP would decrease 
the income inequality level by 0,02 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would decrease the income inequality level by 0,003 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
According to these results, social expenditure is far more important in reducing income inequality 
than social security contributors which barely have an influence in the lead Gini coefficient. Thus, 
with the introduction of the secondary school enrolment as a control variable the results do not 
really change. 
 
VIII. Independent variables: social expenditure, social security contributors and Gini lagged (1 
year) 
Control variable: secondary school enrolment 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by Gini coefficient  
This regression (Appendix 18) presents an R-squared of 99%, which makes sense assuming a high 
degree of influence between the Gini of one year to the next one. In order to understand this R-
squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different independent variables namely: 
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- The squared semipartial correlations show exactly the same result — near to 0 in both cases, 
which indicates that the total R-squared cannot be explained by any of these variables, at 
least when taking both of them independently. 
Regarding the P-values, none of the two regressors are statistically not significant. Therefore, the 
regression coefficients may not be taken as a result. 
 
IX. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors  
Control variable: secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year) 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by Gini coefficient  
This regression (Appendix 19) presents an R-squared of 99%. This number is even higher than the 
distribution II when the secondary school enrolment is taken from the same year. In order to 
understand this R-squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different independent variables 
namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 1.11% indicates that at least this 
proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. This number is 
significantly lower when the control variable is added, as compared to the former regression 
(without the variable secondary school enrolment) 
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 0.06% indicates that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. This is similar 
to the former regression without the control variable. 
Regarding the P-values, only one of the two regressors is statistically significant, namely social 
expenditure. In this case, the null hypothesis for secondary school enrolment is accepted when 
taken as 5 years lagged.  
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, taking into account the Brazilian and 
German datasets together from 1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social expenditure: increasing social expenditure by 1% of the national GDP would decrease 
the income inequality level by 0,01 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would increase the income inequality level by 0,001 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
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According to these results, social expenditure is still more important in reducing income inequality 
than social security contributors77, however, the influence of the control variable is far more 
significant than in II regression78. This takes into account that all regressors are measured against 
the contemporary dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. 
 
X. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social security contributors  
Control variable: secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year) 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient  
This regression (Appendix 20) presents an R-squared of 99%. This number is similar to the former 
distribution in which the variable social expenditure is taken from the same year as the explained 
variable. In order to understand this R-squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different 
independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure lagged (1 year): the semipartial correlation squared of 1.10% indicates 
that at least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. This 
number is similar compared to the former regression (where social expenditure is taken 
from the same year as the dependent variable). 
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 0.05% indicates that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. This is almost 
the same as the former regression. 
Regarding the P-values, the same two regressors are statistically significant, namely social 
expenditure and social security contributors. In this case, the null hypothesis for secondary school 
enrolment is accepted when taken as 5 years lagged.  
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, taking into account the Brazilian and 
German datasets together from 1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social expenditure: increasing social expenditure by 1% of the national GDP would decrease 
the income inequality level by 0,01 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
                                                          
77 In fact, income inequality increases with the increment of social security contributors according to this 
regression.  
78 With the variable secondary school enrolment of the same year as the independent ones. 
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According to these results, social expenditure is still more important in reducing income inequality 
than social security contributors. This takes into account that all regressors are measured against 
the contemporary dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. 
 
4. SECOND SET OF REGRESSIONS: BRAZIL 
The general trends in the set of regressions of Brazil (Appendix 22 – 32) show a degree of correlation 
between the regressors and the independent variables, ranging from around 80-90%. However, the 
semipartial correlations of the independent variables are notably higher for social security 
contributors than social expenditure. Also, the variable social security contributors become 
statistically significant in most of the cases (all regressions, but the VII and XI); whereas, social 
expenditure show p-values higher than 5% in only three of them (I, V and VIII). It is true that the 
regression coefficients of the social expenditure (when the p-value is >5%) show higher values 
compared to social expenditure. Here, I present the most striking points of the analysis for the 
relevant regressions (whose p-values are lower than 5%): 
I. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient  
This regression (Appendix 22) presents an R-squared of 81%. One of the reasons for this high 
number could be the high correlation of the variables but it does not imply in any case a causal 
relation between the independent and the dependent variables. In order to understand this R-
squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure lagged (1 year): the semipartial correlation squared of 7,95% indicates 
that at least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 26,25% indicates that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
Regarding the P-values, the two regressors are statistically significant, namely social expenditure 
and social security contributors.  
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, considering the Brazilian dataset from 
1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
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- Social expenditure: increasing social expenditure by 1% of the national GDP would decrease 
the income inequality level by 0,008 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would decrease the income inequality level by 0,005 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
According to these results, social expenditure is more important in reducing income inequality than 
social security contributors. This takes into account that all regressors are measured against the 
contemporary dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. 
 
II. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors 
Control variable: secondary school enrolment 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient  
This regression (Appendix 23) presents an R-squared of 94%. This is similar to the former 
distribution. In order to understand this R-squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the 
different independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure lagged (1 year): the semipartial correlation squared of 0,4% indicates 
that at least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 13,89% indicates that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable.  
Regarding the P-values, only one of the two regressors is statistically significant, namely social 
security contributors. In this case, the null hypothesis for secondary school enrolment is rejected.  
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, taking into account the Brazilian dataset 
from 1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would decrease the income inequality level by 0,003 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
According to these results, increasing social security contributors is more important in reducing 
income inequality than social security contributors. This takes into account that all regressors are 
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III. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social security contributors 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient  
This regression (Appendix 24) presents an R-squared of 86%. This is similar to distribution I when 
social expenditure is taken from the same year as the explained variable. In order to understand this 
R-squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure lagged (1 year): the semipartial correlation squared of 2,3% indicates 
that at least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 33,44% indicates that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable.  
Regarding the P-values, only one of the two regressors is statistically significant, namely social 
security contributors. In this case, the null hypothesis for secondary school enrolment is rejected.  
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, taking into account the Brazilian dataset 
from 1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social expenditure: increasing social expenditure by 1% of the national GDP would decrease 
the income inequality level by 0,005 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would decrease the income inequality level by 0,005 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
According to these results, social expenditure is still more important in reducing income inequality 
than social security contributors. This takes into account that all regressors are measured against 
the contemporary dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. 
 
IV. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social security 
contributors  
Control Variable: Secondary School enrolment 
 Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient  
This regression (Appendix 25) presents an R-squared of 97%. This is similar to distribution II when 
social expenditure is taken from the same year as the explained variable and the control variable is 
used. In order to understand this R-squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different 
independent variables namely: 
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- Social expenditure lagged (1 year): the semipartial correlation squared of 0,75% indicates 
that at least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 17,63% indicates that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable.  
Regarding the P-values, only one of the two regressors is statistically significant, namely social 
security contributors. In this case, the null hypothesis for secondary school enrolment is accepted.  
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, taking into account the Brazilian database 
from 1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social expenditure: increasing social expenditure by 1% of the national GDP would increase 
the income inequality level by 0,005 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would decrease the income inequality level by 0,005 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
According to these results, social expenditure is still more important in reducing income inequality 
than social security contributors. This takes into account that all regressors are measured against 
the contemporary dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. 
 
V. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient lead (1 year) 
This regression (Appendix 26) presents an R-squared of 81%. This is similar to distribution I when 
the explained variable is taken from the same year as the explanatory variables. In order to 
understand this R-squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different independent variables 
namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 11,12% indicates that at least this 
proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 27,94% indicates that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable.  
Regarding the P-values, the two independent variables are statistically significant, namely social 
expenditure and social security contributors.  
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, taking into account the Brazilian database 
from 1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
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- Social expenditure: increasing social expenditure by 1% of the national GDP would decrease 
the income inequality level by 0,009 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would decrease the income inequality level by 0,005 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
According to these results, social expenditure is still more important in reducing income inequality 
than social security contributors. This takes into account that all regressors are measured against 
the lead (1year) dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. 
 
VI. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors 
Control variable: secondary school enrolment 
 Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient lead (1 year) 
This regression (Appendix 27) presents an R-squared of 96%. This is slightly higher than distribution 
II when the explained variable is taken from the same year as the explanatory variables. In order to 
understand this R-squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different independent variables 
namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 0,18% indicates that at least this 
proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 14,5% indicates that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable.  
Regarding the P-values, only one of the two regressors is statistically significant, namely social 
security contributors. In this case, the null hypothesis for secondary school enrolment is rejected.  
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, taking into account the Brazilian database 
from 1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would decrease the income inequality level by 0,004 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
According to these results, increasing social security contributors is more important in reducing 
income inequality than social expenditure. This takes into account that all regressors are measured 




VIII. Independent variables: social expenditure, social security contributors and Gini lagged (1 
year) 
Control variable: secondary school enrolment 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient  
This regression (Appendix 29) presents an R-squared of 98%. This is similar to distribution I when 
the explained variable is taken from the same year as the explanatory variables. In order to 
understand this R-squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different independent variables 
namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 1,4% indicates that at least this 
proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 1% indicates that at least 
this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable.  
Regarding the P-values, the two independent variables are statistically significant, namely social 
expenditure and social security contributors.  
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, taking into account the Brazilian database 
from 1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social expenditure: increasing social expenditure by 1% of the national GDP would increase 
the income inequality level by 0,005 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would decrease the income inequality level by 0,002 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
According to these results, increasing social security contributors is more important in reducing 
income inequality than social expenditure. This takes into account that all regressors are measured 
against the contemporary dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. 
 
IX. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors  
Control variable: secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year) 
 Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient   
This regression (Appendix 30) presents an R-squared of 99%. This number is significantly higher than 
the distribution II (by 5% concretely) when the secondary school enrolment is taken from the same 
year. In order to understand this R-squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different 
independent variables namely: 
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- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 0% indicates that none of the 
total R-squared that can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 1,3% indicates that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
Regarding the P-values, only one of the two regressors is statistically significant, namely social 
security contributors. In this case, the null hypothesis for secondary school enrolment is rejected 
when taken as 5 years lagged.  
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, taking into account the Brazilian datasets 
from 1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would decrease the income inequality level by 0,002 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
According to these results, increasing social security contributors is still more important in reducing 
income inequality than social expenditure, however, the influence of the control variable is more 
significant than regression II. This takes into account that all regressors are measured against the 
contemporary dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. 
 
X. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social security contributors  
Control variable: secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year) 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient  
This regression (Appendix 31) presents an R-squared of 99%. This number is significantly higher than 
in distribution IX when social security contributors is taken from the same year as the other 
regressors. In order to understand this R-squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different 
independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 0,1% indicates that at least this 
proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 1% indicates that at least 
this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
Regarding the P-values, only one of the two regressors is statistically significant, namely social 
security contributors. In this case, the null hypothesis for secondary school enrolment is rejected 
when taken as 5 years lagged.  
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As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, considering the Brazilian datasets from 
1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would decrease the income inequality level by 0,002 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
According to these results, increasing social security contributors is still more important in reducing 
income inequality than social expenditure, the fact that social expenditure is lagged (1 year) in this 
regression does not really change the result of it. This takes into account that all regressors are 
measured against the contemporary dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini 
coefficient. 
 
5. THIRD SET OF REGRESSIONS: GERMANY 
For all the regressions (Appendix 33 – 43) with Germany as a case study, except for the IX and X, 
none of the two explanatory variables is statistically significant. Therefore, the regression 
coefficients may not be taken as a result for them. However, I present the results of the two relevant 
regressions (whose p-values are lower than 5%), regressions IX and X: 
 
IX. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors  
Control variable: secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year) 
 Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient   
This regression (Appendix 41) presents an R-squared of 33%. This number is more notable than any 
former distribution from Brazil and Germany together or Brazil alone. In order to understand this R-
squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 2,37% indicates that barely none 
of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 18,38% indicates that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
Regarding the P-values, only one of the two independent variables is statistically significant, namely 
social security contributors. In this case, the null hypothesis for secondary school enrolment is 
rejected when taken as 5 years lagged.  
167 
 
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, taking into account the German dataset 
from 1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would increase the income inequality level by 0,004 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
According to these results, increasing social security contributors is shown to have a positive effect 
on income inequality. On the contrary, the control variable, school enrolment lagged (5 year), is the 
only regressor (statically significant) that has a negative effect on income inequality in this 
regression.  This takes into account that all regressors are measured against the contemporary 
dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient.  
 
X. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social security contributors  
Control variable: secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year) 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient  
This regression (Appendix 42) presents an R-squared of 31%. This number is more notable than any 
former distribution from Brazil and Germany together or Brazil alone. In order to understand this R-
squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of almost 0% indicates that none of 
the total R-squared can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 20,60% indicates that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
Regarding the P-values, only one of the two regressors is statistically significant, namely social 
security contributors. In this case, the null hypothesis for secondary school enrolment is rejected 
when taken as 5 years lagged.  
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, taking into account German dataset from 
1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would increase the income inequality level by 0,004 (measured by the Gini coefficient). 
According to these results, which are similar to former distribution IX, increasing social security 
contributors is shown to have a positive effect on income inequality. On the contrary, the control 
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negative effect on income inequality in this regression. This takes into account that all regressors 
are measured against the contemporary dependent variable: income inequality measured by the 
Gini coefficient. 
 
5.1. ALTERNATIVE SET OF REGRESSIONS FOR GERMANY: PERCENTILE RATIOS AS A DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
After knowing that the results of the German set of regressions does not prove any statistical 
inference between the explanatory variables and the explained one, I decided to go deeper into the 
distribution of income in Germany to obtain some insights. The Gini index has been chosen as an 
indicator for income inequality for two reasons: (1) the availability of data in the main databases, 
(2) because it is widely used among social scientists79. However, it does not perform perfectly for 
the whole range of populations. In fact, two countries may enjoy the same Gini coefficient with very 
different distributions of income. The Gini index shows an over-sensitivity for middle classes and 
neglects the variations in the share of incomes at the extremes. Assuming this missing information 
from this index, I decided to test the same hypothesis posed before in the eleven regressions for 
Germany and Brazil against different income inequality measures. Instead of an index, I chose three 
ratios that may help to fill the gaps missed by the Gini index, namely the P90/P10, P90/P50 and the 
P50/P10 ratios. By taking the ratios as an independent variable of the analysis, I try to allocate the 
effects of the independent variables on the income distribution within these specific income 
percentiles of the population:  
- P90/P10: in this ratio I focus on the differences in the extremes of the distribution. 
- P90/P50: in this ratio I study the differences in the upper part of the income range.  
- P50/P10: in this ratio the analysis provides an insight about the differences in lower income 
distributions.  
Therefore, after this analysis I will be able to obtain conclusions that are different from those using 
the former set of regressions with the Gini index as the explained variable. These will be more closely 
related to the direction of the redistribution within the whole range of the population. The results 
are presented as follows:  
                                                          
79 These reasons have already been mentioned in Chapter 2, point 3.4.3. 
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● Ratio P90/P10 
From all the eleven regressions undertaken80, four of them show relevant results to be analysed due 
to a p-value lower than 5%, the threshold marked as statistically significant for any of the regressors. 
However, the only regressor that show these low p-values (lower than 5%) is social security 
contributors in different combinations with other regressors which are subsequently explained: 
 
I. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by P90/P10 
This regression (Appendix 44) tests the effect of the contemporary independent variables against 
the dependent variables without the control variable, secondary school enrolment. 
Regression I present an R-squared of 25,44%, this number represents a moderate proportion of the 
explanation of this ratio P90/P10. In order to understand this R-squared in more depth, it is 
decomposed into the different independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure lagged (1 year): the semipartial correlation squared of 1,33% indicates 
that barely none of the total R-squared that can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 15,14% shows that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
Regarding the P-values, only one regressor is statistically significant (>5%): social security 
contributors. 
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, considering the German dataset from 
1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would increase the income inequality level by 0,05 (measured by the P90/P10 ratio). 
According to these results, increasing the number of social security contributors is relevant to 
increasing income inequality. This takes into account that all regressors are measured against the 
contemporary dependent variable: P90/P10 ratio. 
 
                                                          
80 The comprehensive results from all regressions may be seen in the Appendix 44 – 54. 
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III. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social security contributors 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by P90/P10 
This regression (Appendix 46) tests the effect of social security contributors and social expenditure 
on income inequality not the same year but the next one, measured by the ratio P90/P50. The 
results are similar to the basic regression I: 
Regression III presents an R-squared of 24,59%. In order to understand this R-squared in more 
depth, it is decomposed into the different independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure lagged (1 year): the semipartial correlation squared of 0,48% indicates 
that barely none of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 15,82% shows that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
Regarding the P-values, only one regressor is statistically significant (>5%): social security 
contributors. 
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, considering the German dataset from 
1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would increase the income inequality level by 0,06 (measured by the P90/P10 ratio). 
According to these results, increasing the number of social security contributors is relevant to 
increasing income inequality. This takes into account that all regressors are measured against the 
contemporary dependent variable: P90/P10 ratio. 
 
IX. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors  
Control variable: secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year) 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by P90/P10 
This regression (Appendix 52) tests the effect of both independent variables on income inequality, 
measured by ratio P90/P50 and it is controlled by the variable secondary school enrolment from 5 
years ago. I show the most striking points here: 
Regression IX presents an R-squared of 40,92%, a higher proportion of the explanation of this ratio 
P90/P10 than the former two regressions I & III, which is logical given the inclusion of the regressor 
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secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year). In order to understand this R-squared in more depth, 
it is decomposed into the different independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 0,05% indicates that almost none 
of the total R-squared that can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 24,81% shows that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
Regarding the P-values, only one regressor is statistically significant (>5%): social security 
contributors. 
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, considering the German dataset from 
1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would increase the income inequality level by 0,06 (measured by the P90/P10 ratio). 
According to these results, increasing the number of social security contributors is relevant to 
increasing income inequality. This takes into account that all regressors are measured against the 
contemporary dependent variable: P90/P10 ratio. 
 
X. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social security contributors  
Control variable: secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year) 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by P90/P10 
This regression (Appendix 53) tests the effect of social security contributors and social expenditure 
on income inequality not the same year but the next one, measured by the ratio P90/P50 and it is 
controlled by the variable secondary school enrolment from 5 years ago. I show the most striking 
points here: 
Regression X presents an R-squared of 36,06%, a lower proportion of the explanation of this ratio 
P90/P10 than the former regression with the social expenditure from the same year as the 
dependent variable. In order to understand this R-squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the 
different independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure lagged (1 year): the semipartial correlation squared of 0,07% indicates 
that barely none of the total R-squared that can be explained by this variable.  
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- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 31,24% shows that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
Regarding the P-values, only one regressor is statistically significant (>5%): social security 
contributors. 
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, considering the German dataset from 
1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would increase the income inequality level by 0,07 (measured by the P90/P10 ratio). 
According to these results, social security contributors is relevant in increasing income inequality. 
This takes into account that all regressors are measured against the contemporary dependent 
variable: P90/P10 ratio. 
● Ratio P90/P50 
This set of regressions81 whose dependent variable measures the upper part of the income 
distribution, shows robust results concerning the relation between social security contributors and 
the ratio P90/P50. However, they do not show conclusive data regarding the effect of social 
expenditure in the explained variable. Most of the regressions show statistical significance (p-values 
lower than 5%) for all of the independent variables except for those of VII and VIII ones. Also, the R-
squared coefficients ranging from 30% to 60% show higher correlations between the explanatory 
and explained variables than the first set of regressions with P90/P10 as the dependent variable. 
They are subsequently explained with their most relevant points: 
 
I. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by P90/P50 
This regression (Appendix 55) tests the effect of the contemporary independent variables on income 
inequality, measured by ratio P90/P50 without the control variable, secondary school enrolment. I 
show the most relevant points here: 
                                                          
81 Appendix 55 – 65. 
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Regression I present an R-squared of 44,17%, this number represents a notable proportion of the 
explanation of this ratio P90/P50. In order to understand this R-squared in more depth, it is 
decomposed into the different independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 1,02% indicates that almost none 
of the total R-squared that can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 29,59% shows that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
Regarding the P-values, only one regressor is statistically significant (>5%): social security 
contributors. 
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, considering the German dataset from 
1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would increase the income inequality level by 0,016 (measured by the P90/P10 ratio). 
According to these results, social security contributors is relevant in increasing income inequality. 
This takes into account that all regressors are measured against the contemporary dependent 
variable: P90/P50 ratio. 
 
II. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors 
Control variable: secondary school enrolment 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by P90/P50 
This regression (Appendix 56) tests the effect of both independent variables on income inequality, 
measured by ratio P90/P50 and it is controlled by the variable secondary school enrolment. I show 
the most striking points here: 
Regression II presents an R-squared of 32,19%, a lower proportion of the explanation of the ratio 
P90/P10 than regression I. In order to understand this R-squared in more depth, it is decomposed 
into the different independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 2,3% indicates that some of the 
total R-squared that can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 15,39% shows that at 










Table 15. Summary of the results Germany ratio P90/P50 
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Regarding the P-values, only one regressor is statistically significant (>5%): social security 
contributors. 
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, considering the German dataset from 
1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would increase the income inequality level by 0,013 (measured by the P90/P50 ratio). 
According to these results, increasing the number of social security contributors is relevant to 
increasing income inequality. This takes into account that all regressors are measured against the 
contemporary dependent variable: P90/P50 ratio. 
 
III. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social security 
contributors 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by P90/P50 
This regression (Appendix 57) tests the effect of social security contributors and social expenditure 
on income inequality not the same year but the next one, measured by ratio P90/P50. I show the 
most relevant points here: 
Regression III presents an R-squared of 48,95%, a higher proportion of the explanation of this ratio 
P90/P50 than regression I, which indicates that social expenditure lagged (1 year) explains the 
dependent variable better. In order to understand this R-squared in more depth, it is decomposed 
into the different independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure lagged (1 year): the semipartial correlation squared of 5,81% indicates 
that some of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 47,28% shows that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
Regarding the P-values, only one regressor is statistically significant (>5%): social security 
contributors. 
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, considering the German dataset from 
1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would increase the income inequality level by 0,022 (measured by the P90/P10 ratio). 
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According to these results, social security contributors is relevant to increasing income inequality. 
This takes into account that all regressors are measured against the contemporary dependent 
variable: P90/P50 ratio. 
 
IV. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social security 
contributors  
Control Variable: Secondary School enrolment 
 Dependent variable: income inequality measured by P90/P50 
This regression (Appendix 58) tests the effect of social security contributors and social expenditure 
on income inequality not the same year but the next one, measured by ratio P90/P50 and it is 
controlled by the variable secondary school enrolment. I show the most striking points here: 
Regression IV presents an R-squared of 36,59%, a lower proportion of the explanation of this ratio 
P90/P50 than regression III, without the control variable secondary school enrolment. In order to 
understand this R-squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different independent variables 
namely: 
- Social expenditure lagged (1 year): the semipartial correlation squared of 6,71% indicates 
that some of the total R-squared that can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 35,03% shows that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
Regarding the P-values, only one regressor is statistically significant (>5%): social security 
contributors. 
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, considering the German dataset from 
1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would increase the income inequality level by 0,02 (measured by the P90/P10 ratio). 
According to these results, increasing the number of social security contributors is relevant to 
increasing income inequality. This takes into account that all regressors are measured against the 




V. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by P90/P50 lead (1 year) 
This regression (Appendix 59) tests the effect of the contemporary independent variables on income 
inequality, measured by ratio P90/P50 lead (1 year) without the control variable, secondary school 
enrolment. I show the most relevant points here: 
Regression V presents an R-squared of 27,36%, a lower proportion of the explanation of this ratio 
P90/P50 than regressions I-IV, which use the contemporary P90/P50 ratio. In order to understand 
this R-squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 0,27% indicates that almost none 
of the total R-squared that can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 18,30% shows that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
Regarding the P-values, only one regressor is statistically significant (>5%): social security 
contributors. 
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, considering the German dataset from 
1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would increase the income inequality level by 0,014 (measured by the P90/P10 ratio). 
According to these results, increasing the number of social security contributors is relevant to 
increasing income inequality. This takes into account that all regressors are measured against the 
contemporary dependent variable: P90/P50 ratio. 
 
VI. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors 
Control variable: secondary school enrolment  
 Dependent variable: income inequality measured by P90/P50 lead (1 year) 
This regression (Appendix 60) tests the effect of the contemporary independent variables on income 
inequality, measured by ratio P90/P50 lead (1 year) with the control variable, secondary school 
enrolment. I show the most relevant points here: 
Regression VI presents an R-squared of 25,77%, a lower proportion of the explanation of this ratio 
P90/P50 than the former regression V, without the control variable secondary school enrolment. In 
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order to understand this R-squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different independent 
variables namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 0,19% indicates that almost none 
of the total R-squared that can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 17,20% shows that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
Regarding the P-values, only one regressor is statistically significant (>5%): social security 
contributors. 
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, considering the German dataset from 
1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would increase the income inequality level by 0,016 (measured by the P90/P50 ratio). 
According to these results, increasing the number of social security contributors is relevant to 
increasing income inequality. This takes into account that all regressors are measured against the 
contemporary dependent variable: P90/P50 ratio. 
 
IX. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security contributors  
Control variable: secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year) 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by P90/P50 
This regression (Appendix 63) tests the effect of both independent variables on income inequality, 
measured by ratio P90/P50 and it is controlled by the variable secondary school enrolment lagged 
(5 year). I show here the most striking points: 
Regression IX presents an R-squared of 72,18%, a higher proportion of the explanation of this ratio 
P90/P50 than the former regressions I - VIII. In order to understand this R-squared in more depth, it 
is decomposed into the different independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 7,96% indicates that some of the 
total R-squared that can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 33,60% shows that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
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Regarding the P-values, both regressors are statistically significant (>5%): social expenditure & social 
security contributors  
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, considering the German dataset from 
1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows: 
- Social security contributors: increasing the social spending by 1% would decrease the 
income inequality level by 0,021 (measured by the P90/P50 ratio). 
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would increase the income inequality level by 0,013 (measured by the P90/P50 ratio). 
According to these results, increasing the number of social security contributors is relevant to 
increasing income inequality. This takes into account that all regressors are measured against the 
contemporary dependent variable: P90/P50 ratio. 
 
X. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social security 
contributors  
Control variable: secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year) 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by P90/P50 
This regression (Appendix 64) tests the effect of social security contributors and social expenditure 
on income inequality, not the same year but the next one measured by ratio P90/P50 and it is 
controlled by the variable secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year). I show here the most striking 
points: 
Regression X presents an R-squared of 64,42%, a lower proportion of the explanation of this ratio 
P90/P50 than regression IX, with the contemporary social expenditure variable. In order to 
understand this R-squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different independent variables 
namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 0,21% indicates that some of the 
total R-squared that can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 39,57% shows that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
Regarding the P-values, both regressors are statistically significant (>5%): social expenditure & social 
security contributors  
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As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, considering the German dataset from 
1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would increase the income inequality level by 0,02 (measured by the P90/P50 ratio). 
According to these results, social expenditure contributes to a decrease in income inequality, while 
increasing the number of social security contributors is relevant to increasing income inequality. 
This takes into account that all regressors are measured against the contemporary dependent 
variable: P90/P50 ratio. 
 
XI. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year), social security contributors 
and P90/P50 lagged (1 year) 
Control variable: secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year) 
Dependent variable: income inequality measured by P90/P50 
This regression (Appendix 65) tests the effect of social security contributors and social expenditure 
on income inequality not the same year but the next one, measured by ratio P90/P50 and it is 
controlled by the variable secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year). Also this regression includes 
the P90/P50 lagged (1 year) as an independent variable. I show here the most striking points: 
Regression X presents an R-squared of 66,84%, a higher proportion of the explanation of this ratio 
P90/P50 than the former regressions X, without the P90/P50 lagged (1 year) as an independent 
variable. In order to understand this R-squared in more depth, it is decomposed into the different 
independent variables namely: 
- Social expenditure: the semipartial correlation squared of 0,94% indicates that some of the 
total R-squared that can be explained by this variable.  
- Social security contributors: the semipartial correlation squared of 23,20% shows that at 
least this proportion of the total R-squared can be explained by this variable. 
Regarding the P-values, both regressors are statistically significant (>5%): social expenditure & social 
security contributors  
As regards the regression coefficients, the interpretation, considering the German dataset from 
1990 to 2016, may be defined as follows:  
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- Social security contributors: increasing the number of social security contributors by 1% 
would increase the income inequality level by 0,027 (measured by the P90/P50 ratio). 
According to these results, social expenditure contributes to a decrease income inequality, while 
increasing social security contributors is relevant to increasing income inequality. This takes into 
account that all regressors are measured against the contemporary dependent variable: P90/P50 
ratio. 
● Ratio P50/P10 
For the lower part of the distribution of income there are no statistically significant regressors in any 
regression. Therefore, I cannot show any relevant information about the inference relation of the 



























6. SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS 
In order to make all the data resulting from this statistical analysis more understandable to the 
reader, I gather and sum up the values of the main parameters. Specifically, the parameters that 
one has to focus on so as to answer one of the following research questions (variables oriented) of 
this thesis are mainly: semi-partial correlations and regression coefficients.  
Which variable, social security contributors or social expenditure, is shown to have 
more of an impact on the reduction of income inequality in the analysis of two 
distinct countries, Germany and Brazil? 
The values of the former parameter indicate the proportion of the total R-squared82 that may be 
explained by a certain explanatory variable, in other words, up to what point one or another 
independent variable participate in the total explanation of the dependent variable. For the later 
parameter, the interpretation of its value indicates the sign (positive or negative) and the 
quantitative impact of the independent variable on the explained one. This summary of the 
comprehensive analysis is divided into three groups of regressions undertaken during the study: 
first Brazil and Germany together, then Brazil, and then Germany alone. 
 
6.1. BRAZIL AND GERMANY 
In general, the independent variable social expenditure seems to be more important than social 
security contributors, considering that the regression coefficient number for the former hovers 
around 0,00 and -0,0283, whereas, the same value remains barely 0,00 for the latter variable. That 
means that in some regressions increasing the social expenditure of a country by 1% may decrease 
the income inequality to the extent of 0,02 points of the Gini coefficient (the explained variable). 
On the other hand a 1% increase in the number of social security contributors does not imply a 
significant change in income inequality. This takes into account that in this model Brazil and 
Germany are taken together as the case of study. 
However, the proportion of the total explanation that both independent variables, taken separately, 
can have on the dependent variable is not very high in either case. In fact, this percentage varies 
                                                          
82 The total R-squared defines the proportion of the explanation by the model, but it does not give the 
specific information of the separate variables.  




from nearly 1% to 26% of the total explanation of the model (Table 1). Given the unusually high 
values of the R2 of this group of regressions (circa 0,99), the analysis of covariances is especially 
important because collinearity between the explanatory variables is probable and the joint effect 
reflect that. Therefore, in order to solve this possible limitation of the study, the semi-partial 
correlations are calculated so as to delimit the values of the regression coefficients, which express 
the minimum effect that one independent variable has on the explanatory one. For this purpose, I 
have calculated the semipartial correlations of all regressors and therefore deduct the joint effect 
of the regression against the total R2 of the regression model. 
A more specific summary is subsequently presented showing the behaviour of the two explanatory 
variables: social expenditure and social security contributors. This focuses on the modification of 
the regressions, such as lagged and lead variables, the addition of control variables, and the 
introduction of the explained variable as an independent one: 
- Social expenditure: 
The most striking points in trend changes regarding this variable are the following: (a) the addition 
of the control variable substantially modify the value of the semi-partial correlation, while the 
regression coefficients remain about the same84. (b) The effect of the independent variables on the 
Gini coefficient lead (1 year) is not significantly different than the contemporary one.85 (c) When the 
variable Gini lag (1 year) is introduced as an independent variable, the semi-partial correlation as 
well as the regression coefficients plummet to 086. 
- Social security contributors:  
In the case of social security contributors, the most striking points in trend changes are the 
following: (a) the addition of the control variable does not cause substantial changes in either semi-
partial correlations or regression coefficients, which remain almost the same.87 (b) The effect of the 
independent variables on the Gini coefficient lead (1 year) is not significantly different than the 
contemporary one.88 (c) When the variable Gini lag (1 year) is introduced as an independent 
                                                          
84 See regressions I, II, III and IV (Table 11). 
85 See regression I, II, V and VI (Table 11). 
86 See regressions I, II, VII and VIII (Table 11). 
87 See regressions II and IV (Table 11). 




variable, the semi-partial correlation as well as the regression coefficients do not exhibit any major 
variation.89 
Even though the purpose of the introduction of secondary school enrolment as a regressor is none 
other than to control the independent variables, a summary of its results may contribute to the 
study.  For the semi-partial correlations of education, the values are 0% for all regressions apart 
from regression X whose value is 1%, in this case the variable secondary school enrolment is lagged 
5 years. Likewise, the regression coefficients are also nearly 0,00 for all regressions. However, it 
influences the values of other regressors (especially social expenditure) as has been mentioned. 
Lastly, the effect of replacing the contemporary variable with the lag (5 year) secondary school 
enrolment is not relevant, since it presents the same results as the contemporary ones. 
 
6.2. BRAZIL 
For the set of regressions with Brazil as a case study, the values do not show that either of the 
independent variables (social expenditure and social security contributors) have a higher impact 
than the other on the Gini coefficient. The regression coefficient values for both variables hovers 
around 0,00 and -0,0190 alternatively, for one and the other variable. That means, that in some 
regressions increasing either the social expenditure or the number of social security contributors by 
1% in a country may decrease the income inequality to the extent of 0,01 points of the Gini 
coefficient (the explained variable).  
With respect to the proportion of the total explanation that each independent variable can have on 
the dependent variable, the percentage fluctuates from nearly 1% to 26% of the total explanation 
of the model91. Given the unusual high values of the R2 for this group of regressions (circa 0,99), it 
is especially important to analyse of covariances because of the high likelihood of collinearity 
between the explanatory variables. Thus, the results of the parameter which represents the sum of 
the semi-partial correlations of all regressors by the total R2 are relevant for this purpose,92 same as the 
point 5.1. They vary from nearly 0% to 42%. Regressions I, III and V presents the highest values for this 
parameter (higher than 40%), followed by II and IV (close to 30%). This means that the regressors 
                                                          
89 See regressions VII and VIII (Table 11). 
90 See table 12. 
91 See table 12. 




(independent variables and the control one) explain the result in the dependent variable to a greater 
extent than the rest of the regressions. 
In this particular group of regressions where there is no clear “winner” between the two explanatory 
variables, it is especially pertinent to present a more specific summary showing the behaviour of 
the two explanatory variables, social expenditure and social security contributors, focusing on the 
modification of the regressions, such as lagged and lead variables, the addition of control variables, 
and the introduction of the explained variable as an independent one.  
- Social expenditure: 
The most striking points in trend changes regarding this variable are the following: (a) the addition 
of the control variable modify substantially the value of the semi-partial correlation. In fact, social 
expenditure represents almost 0% with the addition of the control variable, reduced from 8% 
without a control variable. Also, the regression coefficients change significantly from -0,01 to 0,00.93 
(b) The effect of the independent variables on the Gini coefficient lead (1 year) is not significantly 
different than the contemporary one. The regression coefficients are similar (-0.01 without the 
control variable and 0,00 with it) and the semi-partial correlations are slightly higher when the Gini 
lead (1 year) is taken (between 1-2%).94 (c) When the variable Gini lag (1 year) is introduced as an 
independent variable, the semi-partial correlation plunge to 0 whereas the regression coefficients 
either remain 0 or rise to a surprising (because of the positive sign) 0.01.95 
- Social security contributors: 
In the case of social security contributors, the most striking points in trend changes are the 
following: (a) the addition of the control variable has an effect in semi-partial correlations and 
regression coefficients, between 12% and 15% for the former and -0,01 for the latter.96 (b) The 
substitution of the dependent variable by the Gini coefficient lead (1 year) represents a difference 
in 1% and 2% with and without the control variable respectively.97 (c) When the variable Gini lag (1 
                                                          
93 See regressions I and II (Table 12). 
94 See regressions I, II, V and VI (Table 12). 
95 See regressions I, II, VII and VIII (Table 12). 
96 See regressions I and II (Table 12). 




year) is introduced as an independent variable, the semi-partial correlation as well as the regression 
coefficients plummet to nearly 0% for the former and 0,00 for the latter.98 
The most noteworthy points about the control variable, secondary school enrolment, are the 
following: the values of the semi-partial correlations range from 3% to 14%, representing 10% when 
the secondary school enrolment is lagged 5 years99. Concerning the regression coefficients all 
regressions show a value of 0,00100. Nevertheless, besides these numbers, it influences the values 
of other regressors as it is intended as a control variable. 
 
6.3. GERMANY 
Unlike the two former two groups of regressions, neither of the two independent variables (social 
expenditure and social security contributors) have a significant impact on the Gini coefficient. Most 
of the regression coefficient numbers for both variables cannot be considered because they are not 
statistically significant. Moreover, the values of the ones that are statistically significant are almost 
0,00. However, there are some interesting points regarding the control variable, secondary school 
enrolment whose results vary when it is lagged 5 years. This takes into account that in this model 
only Brazil is taken as the case study.  
Regarding the proportion of the total explanation that each independent variable can have on the 
dependent variable, the percentage fluctuates from (Table 5) nearly 0% to 21% of the total 
explanation of the model. In this case, the R2 of this group of regressions, between 0,1 and 33%, do 
not follow a clear pattern. For this reason, the behaviour, not only of the regression coefficient 
numbers but also the covariance matrix, is relevant. Even so, in this group of regressions with far 
lower values for the R2, the risk of collinearity between the explanatory variables is not as high as 
the two former regressions. The most striking point concerning this covariance matrix is the 
variation in the variable social security contributors representing 18 and 21% out of a total R2 of 33 
and 31%, respectively; as well as secondary school enrolment (lagged 5 years) which accounted for 
18 and 17% for the same R2 percentages. The sum of the semi-partial correlations of all regressors 
as a percentage of the total R2 shows a higher participation of the regressors in the total R2 than in 
the others (Table 3). They vary from nearly 63% to nearly 100%. However, this fact is not relevant 
                                                          
98 See regressions I, II, VII and VIII (Table 12). 
99 See regressions II, IV, VI, IX and X (Table 12). 




in the majority of the regressions where the regression coefficients are not statistically significant 
and therefore cannot be taken into account for the analysis.  
The analysis of the regression coefficient is subsequently undertaken, nevertheless, it does not 
reveal very striking findings regarding the two independent variables due to the fact that most of 
them are not statistically significant. Again, as it has already been mentioned, the noticeable 
changes are related to the control variable secondary school enrolment and more precisely the one 
lagged 5 years.  
- Social expenditure:  
There are no statistically significant values101 that can be taken into account for the variable social 
expenditure.  
- Social security contributors: 
In the case of social security contributors, the only two statistically significant regression coefficients 
result from the regressions when secondary school enrolment (lagged 5 years) is used as a control 
variable. However, the value of the regression coefficients is close to 0,00. 
As regards the control variable, while the values of the semi-partial correlations range from an 
insignificant 0% to 2%, there is an outstanding changing of behaviour when the variable is lagged 5 
years, showing 18% and 17% for the same parameter. Notwithstanding those results, the regression 
coefficients for regressions IX and X, the only statistically significant ones, present numbers close to 
0,00. 
 
6.3.1 GERMANY: PERCENTILE RATIOS AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Given the difficulties to extract any relevant conclusion for Germany taking the Gini coefficient as 
the explained variable, I decided to go use other variables to better understand the income 
distribution of Germany. It is known that the Gini coefficient misses the variations in the extremes 
of the income distribution. For this reason I take the percentile ratios, which can provide information 
that the Gini index is not able to provide, namely: P90/P10, P90/P50 and P50/P10. The set of 
regressions are the same eleven that have formerly been chosen with the Gini coefficient, but the 
results differ notably.  





Regarding the results of the three different sets of regressions, two of them present relevant values 
to be explained: the one with the ratio P90/P10 and the one with the ratio P90/P50 as the 
dependent variable. Both show p-values lower than 0,05 for the variable social security contributors, 
not for social expenditure. While the former show higher values for the regression coefficients for 
the four statistically significant regressions, the later ratio presents lower values for nine of the 
eleven regressions. The set of regressions with the ratio P50/P10 does not present any statistically 
significant values for the two independent variables, thus, it does not provide relevant information 
to be considered for the conclusions.  
- P90/P10 
The semipartial correlations of this set of regressions (Table 6) are relatively high compared to the 
original regression with the Gini (Table 6), especially for the only statistically significant variable, 
social security contributors, which range from 17% and 47%. Thus, this regressor explains to a great 
extent the value of the ratio P90/P10. The semipartial correlations are particularly high when the 
control variable, secondary school enrolment is not used and when the control variable used is 
lagged 5 years.  
Also, the more statistically significant variables and the regression coefficients show higher values 
than the former regressions (Table 6). However, the only variable with some p-values lower than 
0,05 is the social security contributors, which reaches values of 0,0 to 0,07 with a positive sign, given 
that the only the statically significant regression coefficients are from regressions I, III, IX and X. 
Which means that the fact that social security contributors have increased during the period of study 
contributes to an increase in the P90/P10 ratio.  
- P90/P50 
The second relevant set of regressions with the ratio P90/P50 (Table 7) as the dependent variable 
show semipartial correlations of the consistently statistically significant variable: social security 
contributors, which fluctuates from 15% to 40%. The highest values are when the control variable, 
secondary school enrolment, is not used and when the control variable used is lagged 5 years, similar 
to the former set of regressions with the explained variable: ratio P90/P10 (Table 7). 
However, the regression coefficients present far lower values than the former regression (Table 7), 
while the consistency of statistical significance is higher than the former one for social security 
contributors with p-values under 0,05 in nine of the eleven regression (I, II, III, IV,V, VI, IX, X, XI) 




- P50/P10: No relevant statistical information, p-values for all regressors show higher than 
5%. 
It is surprising that social expenditure, for the first time in all the sets of regressions with Germany 
as a case study, is statistically significant in regression IX, when social security contributors is lagged 
5 years. In this case, the semipartial correlation is 8% and the regression coefficient shows a value 
of 0,02 with a negative sign.  
In general, considering all the results from this percentile ratios some conclusions have been 
obtained: (a) Social security has been relevant in increasing income inequality levels during the 
period from 1990 to 2016. The increase in the number of people contributing to the social security 
system has led to divergences in income distribution, particularly in gross salaries. (b) This increase 
in income inequality levels is especially high between the extremes P90 and P10, but it is best proven 
(and has the most statistically significant regressions of all the scenarios tested) between the higher 
percentiles of the income distribution, that is between the P90 and P50. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
The regressions, in general, reveal interesting results. There is no clear winner between the two 
independent variables. Both show relevant results though they depend on the country taken and 
the variable variations tested. To sum up, increasing social security contributors is more important 
than social expenditure in reducing income inequality when both countries are taken together as 
one case, and also when Brazil is taken alone as the only case study. However, none of the 
independent variables are statistically significant in reducing inequality for Germany when tested 
against the Gini coefficient. But the variable social security contributors notably affects income 
inequality when percentile ratios are considered as the explained variables. But it is a positive 
relation; the higher the number of social security contributors, the higher the income inequality 
levels. Analysing each explanatory variable separately, this is the summary: 
(a) Social expenditure seems to be more relevant in reducing inequality when both countries are 
taken together as well as when Brazil is taken alone. However, in the case of Germany it may not be 
considered as a significant variable (only one statistically significant value when the ratio P90/P50 is 
used as a dependent variable) in reducing income inequality rates measured by the Gini coefficient. 
However, in almost all relevant cases (p-value <0.05) the sign is negative, which shows that by 




In the case of the lag variable (1 year) social expenditure, the results do not show relevant 
differences between that and the way the social expenditure for the same year affect income 
inequality levels.  
(b) The variable social security contributors explain income inequality rates to a similar extent as 
social expenditure in the case of Brazil, and also when both countries are taken together. The 
variable social security contributors does not account for the explanation of the dependent variable 
for Germany when I take the Gini coefficient as the explained variable (given the lack of statistical 
significance: p-value < 0,05). However, it shows a positive relation for percentile ratios P90/P10 and 
P90/P50, while noting that the dependent variables measure gross salaries instead of disposable 
income. Therefore, interpretations of this result are more related to the evolution of the German 
labour market than social policies, although gross salaries account for a notable proportion of the 
disposable income in a country with low unemployment rates and most of the active population are 
working under formality conditions. Therefore, one can conclude that salaries have been more 
unequal as the number of social security contributors has increased in Germany from 1990 to 2016, 
showing the dualization of the labour market between the high-skilled and low-paid jobs.  
Regarding Brazil and Germany, the former shows a steady decrease in income inequality during the 
past two and a half decades and social security contributors plays a notable role in this together 
with social expenditure, though it is not clear which one of the variables plays a stronger role. On 
the other hand the latter, Germany, has been experiencing an increase in income inequality since 
the early 1990s by 0,04 – 0.05 measured by the Gini coefficient and social security contributors 
appears to be related to this increase.  
In the following chapter the more theoretical explanations of the results of this quantitative analysis 
are explained, and also framed within the current debates around the impact of welfare state 






CHAPTER 6. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN GERMAN AND BRAZILIAN: KEY ELEMENTS 
OF THEIR WELFARE  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter I presented the results of the quantitative analysis. In the present chapter 
the aim is the comprehension (in a more qualitative manner) of the causal effect between the 
explanatory variables and the explained one: social expenditure, social security contributors, and 
income inequality, respectively.  
To recall the main argument of this thesis, Brazil and Germany represent two distinct ways of 
confronting economic inequality, especially since the early 1990s when both countries faced 
important political and economic shocks whose impact remains even today: In Germany, 
reunification has been challenged by the existing economic inequality between regions. In Brazil, 
hyperinflation and the chronic illness of income inequality since the end of WWII was only addressed 
by the first elected presidency of Fernando Collor in 1964. In this chapter I attempt to explain the 
lessons learned from one or another way of dealing with these critical shocks during the last two 
and a half decades in terms of welfare state policies.  
The findings of the study undertaken in Chapter 5 are framed within the debates on welfare models: 
the concept of the welfare state combines the two sides of redistribution: social expenditure 
direction (entitlements) and the funding of public social policies (taxpayers). Thus, welfare state 
systems combine the institutions that embody  of the social contract, by which a citizen submits his 
will to that of a parliamentary representative; the idea of Volonté Générale expressed by Rousseau, 
represent the function of governments to maximise the welfare of society as a whole, not as a mere 
sum-zero welfare function (Barker, 1947).  I analyse, in the following pages, the influence of the 
two-different configurations of social contracts (the Brazilian and German ones) in terms of income 
inequality through their redistribution capacity. 
Firstly, I analyse both sides of income redistribution, namely the direction of social expenditure (how 
to spend the social budget) and the financing of this social budget (who contributes to the welfare 
state), either via social security contributions or via taxes. Secondly, the redistributional aspects of 
welfare state policies are summarised from a sociological perspective following the so-called 
welfare classification of Esping-Andersen, explained in his book The Three Worlds of Welfare. This 




the main welfare providers: the family, the market and the state. Thereafter, the Brazilian and 
German evolution of welfare models are analysed according to the Esping-Andersen welfare state 
classification. Social expenditure allocations are divided and analysed in longitudinal study from 
1990 to mid-00s so as to understand the modifications in the social expenditure function in both 
countries. Throughout this analysis, the evolution of welfare policies, which play a major role in 
framing the social contract in each country, is contrasted with the findings of the quantitative study. 
Secondly, one of the main determinants, given the cases taken for the study (Brazil as a developing 
country and Germany as a developed one) is, arguably, the difference in the degree of development 
of both countries. Current discussions about the effect of welfare state policies within a country, 
associated with the economic development (one of the main arguments of this thesis) are examined 
in the axis: Less Developed versus OECD countries. This section aims to shed some light on the 
different outcomes of a welfare model in each of the socioeconomic contexts, which respond to the 
research question:  
To what extent may the lessons from a developed country such as Germany, which 
is a paradigm of the corporatist welfare state, be applied to Brazil to reduce its high 
income inequality levels? 
Lastly, even though for education, the variable secondary school enrolment is taken in this thesis 
for the sole purpose of controlling the independent variables of the empirical study undertaken in 
Chapter 5, namely social spending and social security contributors, it is revisited here within the 
debate of pre-distribution as opposed to redistribution policies. The pre-distribution social 
investment debates have a high currency at present as “all authors critically engage with the social 
investment state approach that sees in education and training investment the lynchpin of a pre-
distribution agenda protecting individuals from the new social risks of a competitive, knowledge-
driven economy” (Di Stasio and Solga, 2017: 1). 
 
2. DIRECTION OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURE: WHERE SHOULD GOVERNMENTS SPEND THE 
SOCIAL BUDGET TO REDUCE INCOME INEQUALITY? 
It is relevant to remember that social expenditure represents a broad term which embody a variety 
of items of the total budget of a country. According to the OECD definition102 these are the budget 
                                                          




allocations which it comprises: social assistance, social security, health, labour, education, housing, 
and sanitation. 
Overall, there is a consensus about the negative relation between a social expenditure budget and 
income inequality (Niehues, 2010) (Anderson, D'Orey, Duvendack, & Esposito, 2017).  Even though 
social expenditure is closely related with income inequality according to most of the authors, there 
is a debate regarding which direction the social spending must go in order to reduce income 
inequality. Recently, Niehues (2010), from the University of Cologne as well as Esping-Andersen 
(1990) point out the structure of benefits to define the success (or not) of social expenditure in 
reducing income inequality. All in all, different structures of social expenditure may lead to different 
distributional outcomes, depending on the goals of the benefits. 
Thus, the degree of causality among the two concepts might be affected by two different elements, 
namely the size and the direction of this spending. This causality, which is measured in the empirical 
analysis in Chapter 5 is critical in this study given one the research questions it aims to answer: 
Which variable, social security contributors or social expenditure, is shown to have 
more of an impact on the reduction of income inequality in the analysis of two 
distinct countries, Germany and Brazil? 
I answer this question using the results of the regressions, which show that an increase of 1% in 
social expenditure may promote an up to 0,02 decrease in the inequality rate, if both countries Brazil 
and Germany are taken as one case study (measured by the Gini Index)103. However, if one takes 
Brazil and Germany separately, the results differ from this picture: (a) In the case of Brazil an 
additional 1% in social expenditure may reduce income inequality rates by no more than 0,01 
measured by the Gini index. (b) However, in the case of Germany no conclusions could be obtained 
regarding the causality between social expenditure and income inequality since none of the 
regressions were statically significant (p < 0,05). With these results, the following interpretation of 
them focus on the social expenditure functions of each country for the same period as the regression 
study (1990 – 2015). 
The complexity of the concept of social expenditure gives rise to rich debates regarding the influence 
of social expenditure on income inequality levels. These debates revolve around these two different 
topics such as: (a) the size of social spending, in terms of percentage of the GDP; (b) the direction of 
the expenditure. The way a certain government spends this social budget among the variety of social 
                                                          




expenditure items may determine its degree of success in income inequality terms. For the former, 
the size of social expenditure, there is a consensus about it negative effect (reduction) on income 
inequality, always for the same social expenditure function (Niehues, 2010) (Anderson et al., 2017). 
However it is true that an increase in social expenditure, especially in low income strata, may lead 
to a second order positive effect on pre-government income inequality. In other words, even though 
benefits to the poorest may have a negative effect (decreasing income inequality) on 
postgovernment104 income inequality, the incentive to work is reduced and leads to a second order 
pregovernment105 positive effect, increasing income inequality. However, the negative effect of the 
social expenditure on post-government income inequality outweighs this positive effect (Niehues, 
2010), therefore the net effect of social policies focused on the poorest may lead (in the short term) 
to income inequality reduction. Nevertheless, for the same size of social budget allocations, the 
outcomes may vary widely according to which social allocation national governments spend this 
money, namely Social Assistance, Social Security, Health, Labour, Education, Housing and Sanitation. 
 
3. SOCIAL SECURITY AND SOCIAL ASSISTANCE: WHO FINANCEs THE WELFARE STATE? 
Above, I have considered the expenditure side of the social budget. Here, I take into consideration 
the other side, namely the financing of the social budget. In redistribution terms, not only is the 
social expenditure budget important (how much and how is spent) but who pays for it is also 
important. There are different formulas to finance this social budget, from social security systems 
to taxes or through both. This combination of contributors and receivers of social policies determine 
the degree of redistribution of a welfare system.  
The results of the regressions shown in the previous chapter show different outcomes when 
different cases are analysed. For Germany it has been shown that there is no significant effect in the 
Gini index for the variable social contributors106. Nevertheless, if the dependent variable is changed 
by percentile ratios, the variable social security contributors becomes significant for the ratios 
P90/P10 and P90/P50, but with a positive sign, that is, the increase of social security contributors is 
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related to and increase in income inequality in gross salary terms.107 In the case of Brazil there are 
some regressions in which an increase of 1% in social security contributors suppose a diminution in 
0,01 of the Gini index.108 When both countries are taken together as one case of study, an increase 
of social security contributors seems to reduce income inequality.109 In general, the role of the 
variable social security contributors is not clear in this analysis. Subsequently, these causal effects 
are contrasted with the entitlement structure of both welfare models (German and Brazilian) in 
order to interpret the results and shed some light on the behaviour of this variable. 
 
3.1. ORIGINS AND RECENT TRENDS OF SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEMES 
Much has been discussed about social security systems and social policies regarding entitlements, 
contributions, benefits, and management (private or public). The origin of these debates come from 
Bismarck and Beveridge. The former, introduced the first Social Security scheme with the intention 
of easing more socialist alternatives into Germany. The latter published the Beveridge Plan for the 
UK during WWII in 1942, which he named after himself, and which resulted in the establishment of 
the first unified social security system in the UK. The different elements (mainly funding and 
entitlements of the social security system) for social insurance reveals notable differences between 
the Bismarckian and Beveridgian systems. While the Bismarckian system is based primarily on social 
insurance contributions, the financing of the Beveridgian systems is through taxes. In general, a pure 
Bismarck system leads to barely no redistribution among various strata given the identification of a 
recipient and contributor. But the Beveridge system does promote redistribution from the richest 
to the poorest (Cremer, & Pestieau, 2003). Given the spirit of this Social Security policy undertaken 
by Bismarck, countering the social unrest of the working classes due to poor working conditions, 
one of the main characteristics of the Bismarckian model is the entitlement of workers (only this 
social group could enjoy security services such as healthcare or pensions). Compared to the 
universalism which characterised the Beveridge Plan in UK, in this case the central figure is not 
represented by the workers but the citizens. To sum up, the beneficiaries of the Social Security 
system in a Bismarckian system are the same as the contributors and it is funded through wages 
(payroll). However, this relation between employee and contributor changes for Beveridgian 
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systems where the beneficiaries are not identified by the figure of worker but a taxpayer (citizen) 
and the beneficiaries represent the entire population (Kolmar, 2007).  
In recent times there has been a trend in Europe (and generally speaking, OECD countries) for the 
two financing systems to converge. This convergence indicates that there are grey zones between 
the black and white systems (Bismarkian and Beveridgian systems); there is neither a complete 
Bismarckian nor pure Beverdgian country, there are variations of the two models. For example, just 
within Europe the diversity regarding one or another social security system is rather remarkable. In 
a country such as the UK the portion from government taxes accounts for more than 50% of the 
total Social Security funding in 2005 (more Beverdgian), whereas in the same year Germany´s social 
security tax funding represents no more than 36%. However, there are even more Bismarckian 
countries in that sense. The Netherlands finance the social security system through around 20% of 
taxes, far less than Germany. On the other extreme, Denmark, the most Beveridgian one, has 
covered around 63% of social security spending with government taxes (CESifo Dice Report, 2008). 
Social Security schemes rely only on the wages of the employees of a country, paid by both the 
employee and employer. Therefore, not only do social security schemes influence income 
inequality, but the converse is also true;  the more workers (less unemployment rates) and higher 
wages of a country (pre-government equality of income), the more money there is to use for the 
Social Security system, which predictably will lead to better post-government equality (Vallas, West, 
& Odum, 2015). Nevertheless, a high proportion of the income earned by the richest come from 
capital gains (Piketty, 2014), and they thereby avoid contributing to the social security system. This 
reciprocal correlation, according to Vallas et al. (2015), is especially relevant when talking about very 
different countries in these two socioeconomic indicators: rates of unemployment and mean wage, 
which are the cases of Brazil and Germany. 
It is important to recall the differences in social security contributors between Germany and 
Brazil110, given that they do not embody the same collectives: (a) In the case of Brazil, this variable 
embodies the following groups: workers, domestic servants, the independently employed111, self-
employed persons, voluntary contributors, and special contributors.112 (b) However, in Germany it 
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111 Person who works partially for one or more companies through an intermediary such as trade 
unions.  Retrieved from the National Institute of Social Security: http://www.previdencia.gov.br/acesso-
a-informacao/institucional/inss/  




covers all employees which are liable to pay sickness, pension, and nursing insurance and/or the 
collectives specified in the employment promotion act.: apprentices, student trainees, part-time 
retirement workers and persons who have been called to serve compulsory service. The German 
system does not include civil servants, self-employed persons, assisting family members, 
professional and temporary soldiers, and persons doing military or community service, nor does it 
include those who are subject to marginal employment (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2013). taking 
this into account, there may be a double effect that may be deducted from the fact that increasing 
the number of social security contributors may reduce income inequality: (a) On the one hand, it is 
obvious that the more people employed and therefore contributing to a social security system, the 
more people there are under the umbrella of that social security scheme. This would be the 
Bismarkian lesson, more implicit than the following one. (b) On the other hand, if the percentage of 
the population contributing to the system is higher, the redistribution budget would increase as 
well, thus, greater funds will be redistributed by the government amongst the citizens. The 
combination of both the increase in (formal) workers and the redistribution of higher gains from 
contributions through payroll may help to reduce income inequality in a corporatist welfare model 
(such as Germany), which rely to a greater extent on social security schemes. However, in a country 
with a high level of labour informality and unemployment rates, social security contributors would 
represent a low portion of the total population and therefore, leave behind a lot of citizens. This 
scenario could be close to the Brazilian socioeconomic context during the last decades. 
Having said this, the discussions about the influence of social expenditure on income inequality rates 
revolve around how the social budget must be financed and who is entitled to benefit from social 
expenditure: Bismarckian schemes benefit more  the middle income (not poor) strata, including the 
working classes, while Beveridgian systems benefit the low and high income strata. Regarding 
Beveridgian schemes, the richest ones seek to minimise their contribution and the poorest win 
compared to the Bismarkian one, where the middle strata suffer the most, paying more taxes and 
receiving less services than the others. (Conde Ruiz, & Profeta, 2007). To sum up, the debate about 
the redistribution character of different social security systems revolves around the relation 
between the contributors and the individuals entitled to benefit from the services provided by the 





4. SOCIAL EXPENDITURE AS A POLITICAL MATTER 
The variety of outcomes, in income inequality terms, for the whole spectre of society (poor, middle 
income and upper-classes) lead to a political debate about the winners and losers of the 
redistribution policies via social expenditure. This debates about social expenditure, brings to the 
table the controversy about redistribution and the interests of different influential groups of 
electors in the election of one and another political party. Recalling the theoretical arguments of 
the thesis, the entitlement structure of the social policies defines what it means to be a citizen of a 
country, which may vary from one country to another. 
For example, the Meta-regression analysis undertaken by Anderson et al., (2017) shows some 
conclusions concerning the direction of the social spending of the government. Although, the 
authors mention the differences among the lower, middle and upper strata, the middle and upper 
classes represent the major recipients of the redistributive impact of social expenditure in most of 
the countries analysed (Anderson et al., 2017). The reason why these middle-upper strata become 
the main winners of this social policies may be explained by different allocations within the whole 
social budget. The two more influential elements of the social budget are, especially, unemployment 
benefits and public old-age pensions according to (Niehues, 2010). However, the ones entitled to 
these contributory benefits are mostly the same ones that finance them. Therefore, the income 
inequality rates are presumably not reduced through allocating money to these social programmes. 
However, politically, income inequality reduction policies are not popular for a large number of the 
electors. 
Considering these findings of the meta-regression analysis from Anderson et al. (2017), a developed 
country such as Germany with a higher proportion of middle-upper strata population than Brazil 
would be more sensitive to changes in social expenditure regarding certain social policies such as 
old age pensions or unemployment. 
 
4.1. PARADIGMATIC EXAMPLE: INTER-INTRA GENERATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION (A POLITICAL 
MATTER) 
Pension benefits represent one of the main costs of all social security systems while many of the 
contributors are out of the retirement age. This inter-intra generational dilemma in social security 
schemes is an example of the political limits of social expenditure when facing income inequality. It 




inequality distributions. Authors such as Tabellini (2000), Sala-i-Martí (1996) and Conde Ruiz (2007) 
have debated about the intra-inter generational redistribution effects of pensions in income 
inequality.  
Taking the pension benefits as an example, the fact that the number of contributors (contributors 
to the social security systems) outweigh the number of recipients  (old-age pensioners) in most of 
the developed countries is curious, especially taking into account that old-age pensions supposed a 
high portion of social expenditure (Tabellini, 2000). If the number of recipients is smaller than 
contributors, why are pensions systems supported by a majority while it only benefits a minority? 
The answer may be explained through both political and redistributive reasons. Equilibrium 
between intra-generational and inter-generational redistribution policies is discussed: 
(a) Young low-income workers support the social security system because of the income 
distribution of the total household within the families through the parent’s pensions (main 
beneficiaries of social security). The gains from the pensions are greater than the costs of 
the young workers from their payroll. Another reason in favour of this equilibrium between 
inter and intra-generational redistribution is bidirectional altruism as a driver of 
redistribution: on the one hand, the young workers contribute to the pensions of the older 
generations, while, on the other hand, the parents have provided for them before (Tabellini, 
2000). 
(b) Politically, the pensioner’s generation constitute a homogeneous coalition which do not 
support other forms of redistribution (intra-generation). Attempts to change this status 
quo, for example through a tax on wealth instead of income, would break this homogeneity 
among pensioners, but this has not been implemented since the construction of the social 
security system as we know it today (Tabellini, 2000) 
Old age pensions represent an important public expenditure for Brazil and Germany. Both pension 
systems follow a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) scheme by which the younger today generation pays for 
the old age pensions of today. This system has been put under a lot of pressure in both countries 
during the last years due to the increase of the ageing population in the case of Germany and the 
declining labour force participation at lower and older ages in Brazil. The numbers show that the 
governments spend remarkably more on old age pensions nowadays than years ago: Germany has 
increased their budget on public old age pensions by almost 4% of the total social expenditure from 
1991 to 2013 (OECD, 2016a). Meanwhile, the same indicator for Brazil rose from 4.6% of the GDP in 




tensions of the old age pension scheme is the fact that, overall, the formal labour force has been 
growing during the past decade in Brazil and the contributions are higher through regulations such 
as a minimum salary (Queiroz, Figoli, & Gonçalves, 2010). But still the Brazilian economy in terms of 
GDP has grown to a greater extent than the social security contributors113 from 1990 to mid-10s, 
and in the meantime the number of old age pensioners has grown, which shows there are margins 
for more contributions within the social security system in Brazil. For Germany, the gap between 
the social security contributors and social security expenditure was increased from 1990 to 2006114 
making the systems less and less sustainable, even though the situation has been reversed from 
2006 to 2013. To conclude, ageing populations remain a common problem present in Germany, as 
in most of the developed countries, and simulations for Brazil show that urgent reforms are needed 
to make the old age pension system sustainable (Queiroz et. al, 2010). 
 
5. BRAZILIAN AND GERMAN WELFARE MODELS 
Having already described the three welfare models of Esping-Andersen in chapter 2, it is the current 
aim to compare the characteristics and evolution of Brazilian and German Welfare Models from 
1990 until the present through the lens of this so-called classification. In this section I will try to 
explain the 
outcome from the quantitative analysis and framing them in an institutional perspective following 
Rousseau’s definition of the social contract. To do so, some concepts from Chapter 2 are recalled 
here and summed up. The sociological concept of the welfare state combines the two sides of 
redistribution: the social expenditure direction (entitlements) and the funding of public social 
policies (taxpayers). Thus, the welfare state systems combine the institutions that embody the 
Rousseau's definition of the social contract, by which a citizen submits his will to a parliamentary 
representative: the idea of Volonté Générale expressed by Rousseau, represents the function of 
governments to maximise the welfare of society as a whole, not a mere sum-zero welfare function 
(Barker, 1947). This Rousseau's definition of the social contract serves as a simple way to classify 
different welfare states according to the Esping-Andersen classification, considering only the 
redistribution dimension which is relevant for this thesis.  
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This section does not aim to strictly identify these countries with any one model, but to understand 
the evolution of the welfare state model of both countries to see how the German and Brazilian 
welfare systems have responded to the internal and external factors which have threatened their 
welfare states. As Esping-Andersen, the author of The Three Worlds of Welfare, points out, not every 
country falls precisely into one category of the welfare classification, but a country may have some 
characteristics from different ones. Furthermore, the same country can evolve from one model to 
another, above all in response to certain internal and external socioeconomic shocks such as a 
financial crisis or an exogenous factor. The main goal of this analysis through the Esping-Andersen 
work is to understand how the changes in welfare state policies have affected income inequality 
rates during the last two and a half decades. I summed up in Figure 13 the structure of analysis 
which is used to compare the evolution of the Brazilian and German welfare models following the 
key elements of the social contract according to definition, who benefits and who finances the 
different kinds of welfare models: 
Figure 13. Welfare States models according to entitlements, finance and extension 
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5.1. BRAZILIAN WELFARE MODEL 
The constitution of 1988 sought to change the former social contract that was based on contributory 
systems in which mostly benefited workers in the formal labour market through the social security 
system. However, people in rural areas working under conditions of informality, unemployed, and 
domestic workers did not benefit from any social policy. Therefore, the new constitution contained 
terms such as citizenship as a body of rights and obligations. These rights explicitly include housing, 
work, education, and healthcare among others. Furthermore, it embraces solidarity as the principle 
to achieve this main goal of assuring the rights to a citizen of Brazil. However, the reality, at the 
beginning of the new democratic era in Brazilian history, did not truly reflect the spirit of the new 
constitution regarding social rights. The inherited social institutions were founded on a contribution 
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Figure 14. Summary of the evolution of the Brazilian welfare model (1990-2015) 




the economic crisis during the 1980s and early 1990s did not help in the attainment of the welfare 
goals of the new constitution. These weak foundations supposed a limit to be faced by 
administration at the beginning of its mandate. Considering these circumstances, the main focus of 
the welfare systems during the 1990’s and 2000’s was poverty alleviation, a summary of the 
evolution from 1990 until 2016 is presented in Figure 14. 
Ultimately, to what extent was the main goal of universalism (the right to be a Brazilian citizen) 
achieved? This ambitious goal of the constitution of 1988 has led to more of a “dual system,” in 
which, for example: “Still today, in Brazil, approximately 1.000.000 pension beneficiaries from the 
state take up a similar amount of money as 14.000.000 pension beneficiaries from the private 
sector” (Filgueira, 2005: 25). This is a new-developmentalism welfare system, and it has been thusly 
defined given its out of the box approach compared to traditional welfare state classifications.115 
The state has addressed two main sectors of society: (a) On the one hand, the poorest strata have 
benefited from an extensive programme of cash-transfer social policies such as the Benefício de 
Prestação Coninuada (BPC) or the Bolsa Familia. (b) On the other hand, the workers in the formal 
labour market participated in social insurance, which was financed by the same workers in turn. 
Taking as a reference the classification of welfare states for developed countries, such as Esping 
Andersen ́s, the latter policy would be more characteristic of the corporatist welfare states while 
the former would be closer to the residual one. Filgueira (2002) stressed the relevance of the 
direction of social expenditure and criticized the singular focus on quantity, which is consistent with 
Niehues (2010) and Anderson et al. (2017). The way this money is distributed appears to be more 
relevant to reducing not only income inequality but increasing the well-being of citizens. However, 
it is interesting how public services such as healthcare and education are not explicitly at the core 
of the Brazilian welfare system. In the case of healthcare, people with private insurance still go to 
the public sector for high-level treatments, but preventive healthcare is far better and more agile in 
the private sector, with long waiting lists in the public sector for low-level treatments. Likewise, in 
public tertiary education it is difficult to be admitted and so most of the students are educated in 
private secondary schools (Fleury, 2017). In Figure 15 the main budget allocations related to social 
expenditure are shown between 2000 and 2016. It can be seen how important the social security 
(contributory) benefits are as compared to healthcare and education, considering that these kinds 
of benefits only cover people under the formal social contract. It is paradoxical this approach in 
which public services are scarcely provided by the public system, while it is known that when 
                                                          




services such as healthcare and education are partially provided for by the private sector, the lower 
and low-middle strata are out of the welfare system. It is also true that commodification of public 
services creates more jobs and therefore allows more people into the formal social contract, with 
greater rights than a mere citizen (Esping-Andersen, 1999).  
Figure 15. Evolution of the main social expenditure budget allocations in Brazil 
  
 
In words of Fleury, some citizens are: “entitled to benefits without rights and others have rights 
without benefit” (Fleury, 2017: 8), which means that some citizens are entitled to cash benefits in 
the form of conditional cash transfers, but they are not covered by public services such as 
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healthcare, while the opposite is true for others. The conditionality of cash transfers, which are 
based on bringing children to the hospital or school, have supposed an innovation in social policies 
in Brazil and globally. However, this conditionality has not been able to guarantee an exit door for 
the poorest strata. In fact, it is known that these focused social policies (even though conditional) 
tend to perpetuate poverty and it assumes the mistakes of the socioeconomic system of a country. 
Furthermore, healthcare expenditure has steadily decreased by around 4% from 2000 to 2015, while 
social assistance expenditure has increased in the same proportion of the total social assistance 
budget (figure 16).  To recall Amartya Sen’s (1992) approach to functionings and capabilities, 
equality of opportunity can be achieved by a set of basic public services. 
Figure 16. Evolution of health expenditure (% total social expenditure), social assistance (% total 
social expenditure) vs. social expenditure (%GDP) in Brazil 
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Welfare structures have been constructed during the last three decades through which extreme 
poverty has been tackled and 25.4 million Brazilians have overcome the poverty threshold of $1.90 
per day between 1990 and 2015 (World Bank, 2018a). However, high-skill workers and business 
leaders still do not support non-contributory benefits. There is still a kind of clientelism and the low 
and high strata of society are content with the dual system focused on poverty and social insurance 
in the formal sector but it is far from an integrative welfare state in which the middle class is the 
core of society.  
To conclude, the negative effect of social expenditure on income inequality rates, shown in the 
regression analysis, may be explained by this opposed trend: the increase in social assistance 
spending to a greater extent than other social budget allocations such as health, education or old-
age pensions. In Section 7, this argument represents a critical point in explaining income inequality 
reduction in a developing country, as opposed to a developed one. 
 
5.1.1. CALLS FOR THE RENEGOTIATION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IN BRAZIL 
The current constraints, which are mainly economic but also those that are caused by political 
instability in the country, in some respects signify the exhaustion of the new developmentalism 
welfare state model. Sonia Fluery and Lenaura de Vasconcellos, Brazilian scholars, have agreed on 
the renegotiation of the current social contract in Brazil in order to keep the current coverage at 
least, before it is dismantled (Lobato, 2016) (Fleury, 2017). More pressure on reducing current 
benefits, even those focused on the poor, have led to recent demonstrations in major cities (Duffy, 
2013). The high expenses of the World Cup and the Olympics, when the financial situation of the 
country did not allow for more pressure, has re-entrenched other budget allocations such as social 
expenditure. The renegotiation of a new social contract based on the universal and citizenship 
approach, constitutionally guaranteed, is now on the negotiation table. Brazil is not the only 
country, either developed or otherwise, facing similar constraints to keeping their welfare 
standards. Cristopher Allen defined it in the term “Siren Song of Deregulation” (Allen, 1997) and the 
current wave of liberalism in Germany also threatens to break the so called Bismarckian 
socioeconomic model. Against this global and current trend of liberalisation, recommendations 
from specialists on both developed and new developmentalism welfare states, Esping-Andersen 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999) and Fleury respectively, advocate for a more universal welfare state 




“The inclusion of social rights as part of the status of citizenship represented the 
most paradoxical solution for the distributive conflict in a class economy, since it 
had generated a public sphere not primarily subordinated to the process of 
accumulation […] Nonetheless, it contributed to the creation of a more cohesive 
society, based on social principles of solidarity, in which social inclusion was 
widespread” (Fleury, 2011: 5).  
Figure 17. Social Assistance and Social Security Expenditure vs. Health and Education 
Expenditure in Brazil 
 
 
The new Brazilian government elected in October 2018 will have to face this unrest and the 
challenge of renegotiating a new social contract in difficult circumstances as tensions in the 
population are rising. Figure 17 shows the increasing dualism in the welfare policies undertaken 
during the past decade. The next Brazilian administration must deal with the exhaustion of this 
model which has been relatively successful in terms of income inequality reduction and steadily 
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5.1.2. UNIVERSALISM ELEMENTS IN BRAZILIAN WELFARE MODEL VS. LIBERAL ECONOMIC ELEMENTS 
A new economic paradigm called liberal neo-developmentalism has been outlined to interpret the 
singular characteristics of Brazilian socioeconomic configuration. According to them (Cornel, 2013) 
Brazil has stood for a strong governmental role in welfare state provision, despite the Washington 
Consensus measures undertaken to keep macroeconomic stability. Redistribution policies, such as 
cash transfers have played a tremendous role in poverty reduction in Brazil which was the result of 
an incredible finance effort made by the state. Nevertheless, and according to the welfare states 
classification, these kinds of cash transfer social policies are defined as targeted social protection, 
which are more characteristic of liberal welfare states. Interestingly enough, the same governments 
have established the universal social policy of having a minimum wage, which is more characteristic 
of Nordic countries (Cornel, 2013). This fact exemplifies the hybrid welfare state model of Brazil. It 
has characteristics of different welfare models and is difficult to frame clearly within just one, at 
least not the ones defined by Esping-Andersen in The three worlds of Welfare, which was 
constructed based on the developed countries of the time.  
This strong governmental role in Brazilian welfare state policies presents some similarities to Esping-
Andersen’s proposals during the late 1990s116 for developed countries, which proposed a model in 
which the state guarantees full employment and family aid (Esping-Andersen, 1999). This solution 
is proposed to address the main challenges that welfare state systems (in developed countries) have 
faced in the last decades such as globalisation, ageing populations, and new forms of family117. In 
fact, this is very close to the universal welfare model followed by Scandinavian countries. 
 
5.2. GERMAN WELFARE MODEL 
Germany has been pointed out as the archetypal Corporatist welfare model in the so called Esping-
Andersen’s classification system presented in The Three Worlds of Welfare (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
The foundations of one of the oldest welfare systems were established by Bismarck (seen as the 
father of the German social insurance schemes). During the late 19th century, in view of the 
                                                          
116 Presentation in the conference: Globalización, Mercados de Trabajo y Políticas de Bienestar Social, 
organised by IPEA in Brasilia (19th to 22nd of January 1999). 





pressure from socialist movements, Bismarck decided to create a system focused on old age 
pensions and the security of workers against sickness. The Bismarckian inheritance is still present 
today in the social welfare policies of the country, and even other countries have emulated elements 
of it, a summary of the evolution from 1990 until 2016 is presented in Figure 18. The strong link of 
work and social security has been an anchor during the construction of current socioeconomic 
German institutions. The German welfare state model, also called conservative by the Esping-
Andersen classification(1990), has been based on the breadwinner model in which there is one 
provider for each family, and this fact comes with critical implications: leaving women out of the 
formal social contract and reliant upon a male individual, thus does not provide sufficient protection 
against sickness, widowhood, and old age expenses. This is important not only for the worker’s well-
being but also for their families, children, and women. Furthermore, in this scenario the guarantee 
of a job position becomes an enormous responsibility for public institutions. 



















Within the scope of this thesis, the evolution of the German welfare state from 1990 until today is 
analysed. This time period is marked by internal and external shocks that challenge the pillars of the 
model mentioned above, namely: (a) firstly, reunification necessitates a huge effort to keep the 
same social security model in the east where contributions are much lower due to low productivity 
rates; (b) also, the increasing cost of old age pensions result in a lack of competitiveness in the 
context of globalisation and the inclusion of low-pay countries; (c) thirdly, the health costs have 
increased because of the ageing population and the pay-per-use system; (d) lastly, the strong legal 
basis of entitlements enforced by the constitutional court in 1980 (Leisering, 2000) (Allen, 2010).  
The 1990s crisis resulted in substantial changes in the welfare state model, however, the 
cornerstone is still a social security system in which a job guarantees entitlement to be covered 
against temporary unemployment, old age, and sickness. Globalisation and re-unification forces 
have favoured the emergence of a low-paid labour market parallel to the high-skill one. This new 
dual labour market system had consequences on the welfare state configuration, especially in 
relation to the incorporation of women to the labour market and to old age expenses: On the one 
hand, in the early 1990s there was explicit encouragement of the male breadwinner model, 
hindering the incorporation of women to the job-market (through the lack of nursery services and 
a tax structure that favoured families). Nevertheless, during the mid 1990s the global competition 
that put pressure on salaries, the decrease in high-skill jobs, and the increase in unemployment 
rates, favoured the rapid integration of women into the labour market during the late 1990s and 
2000s to maintain household incomes. This pressure on the labour market came with more universal 
family benefits such as child-aid and extra pension entitlements for mothers (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2016). 
On the other hand, the ageing population together with the creation of a low-paid labour market 
threaten the maintenance of the old age pension as it was in the early 90s. Measures such as 
mandatory private contributions as well as increasing the retirement age for women were 
undertaken by the Schröder administration’s 1999/2000 reforms to maintain the quality of life of 
workers after retirement (Leisering, 2000). In Figure 19, the evolution of social security budget 
allocation and social security contributors show the consequences of globalisation and the lack of 
competition in Germany on the labour market. The decrease in social security contributors from 
1992 to 2005, with the exemption of 1998-2001, together with the steady increase in social security 




While it is true that Germany has not been able to improve the Gini Index118 during the last two and 
a half decades, it is relevant to recall the economic shocks the country has faced: reunification, 
globalisation, public deficits, and an ageing population. Even considering this, the results of the 
regression analysis in Chapter 5 do not show a causal relationship between the explanatory and the 
explained variables, and the effort of the federal and regional governments to prevent the 
dismantling of the Bismarckian welfare model is remarkable. Also, Figure 19 shows that the number 
of contributors has steadily grown since 2005 while the social security expenditure has not- it has 
even decreased a bit. This means that the number of people covered under the social security 
system has returned to the levels of the early 1990s, however, the amount per contributor is lower. 
The creation 
Figure 19. Social security budget allocation (unemployment, old age, health expenditure) vs. 
social security contributors in Germany 
 
 
of a dual labour market with low-paid and high-skill jobs has supposed a diminution in contributions 
to social security systems. Furthermore, these tensions have led, for example, to an increase in the 
retirement age, lower old-age pensions, and voluntary private systems. At the same time, the 
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budget for the people outside of the social security system, beneficiaries of social assistance 
programmes, has not improved in gross terms. However, it is compensated (from 2005) for by the 
increase in citizens covered under the social security system. To sum up, Germany has struggled to 
maintain the welfare model constructed from the end of WWII to re-unification, and the challenge 
was not to improve income inequality rates but keep a high level of well-being of German citizens 
in difficult circumstances during the past two and a half decades. 
 
5.2.1. DOES STILL GERMANY REPRESENT A CORPORATIST MODEL? 
In Figure 20 the expenditure in social assistance policies119 is compared to social security 
expenditures from 1990 to 2013. The upward trend of social security expenditure contrasts with the 
decrease by around 4% of the GDP in social assistance expenditure during the same period. This 
figure supports the thesis in favour of a corporatist welfare model in which the figure of worker (as 
a contributor) under the social security scheme gains prominence against the universal model of 
citizenship or the liberal one based on means-tested benefits and poverty. 
Although, the social benefits were linked to the formal labour market and it has been referred to as 
the paradigm of the corporatist welfare model by Esping-Andersen (Esping-Andersen, 1990), the 
German welfare state shows quasi-universal characteristics according to others (Leisering, 2000) 
(Seeleib-Kaiser, 2016). If one takes a deeper look into some of the welfare policies undertaken in 
the last decades, even though the broad picture shows this contrasting trend with social assistance, 
some welfare policies such as child benefits have increased during the early 2000s. Furthermore, 
welfare services such as healthcare, financed by the social security contributors in a progressive way 
(the higher the income, the more one contributes), cover almost the entire population. Primary, 
secondary, and tertiary education, in turn, is provided equally to everyone at almost no cost within 
with the dual system, which is one of the cornerstones of German training (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2016). 
Lastly, residual policies, such as a minimum income, together with some basic services (housing and 
health) is guaranteed in case of long-term unemployment to target the poor. It is not the core of 
the German welfare system however and supported only 0,7% of the total social expenditure in 
2013 (OECD, 2016a). 
 
                                                          





Figure 20. Social security vs social assistance expenditure in Germany 
 
 
5.2.2. NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT IN GERMANY OR JUST AN EVOLUTION OF THE BISMARCKIAN MODEL? 
The solid institutional configuration based on the Bismarckian welfare model, which is based on 
quasi-independent agencies which act as intermediates between the government and citizens, have 
provided stability to the welfare model of the country and remains a fundamental pillar of the 
welfare state scheme. However, the social contract has experienced tensions during the last 
decades. The social security system whose two main goals were: (a) securing a minimum income as 
well as (b) safeguarding the (economic) status acquired during working life (Leisering, 2000); has 
been undermined. During the early 2000s the value of old age pensions deteriorated through the 
introduction of voluntary private systems and the increase in working age. However, not all the 
welfare policies have moved towards a liberal model: (a) Governments, during the last decades, 
have extended family policies related to care insurance such as child benefits, maternity leave, and 
public nurseries. (b) Regarding education, the so-called dual system has proved an effective way to 
provide employment to young professionals, reducing unemployment rates, a pillar of a corporatist 
welfare model as Germany. (c) Healthcare remains universal, even though there has been an 
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As a counterpoint, there have also been voices in favour of the changes in the welfare policies 
modified towards a liberal welfare model such as old age pensions or unemployment. The fact that 
Germany (together with the northern European countries, defined as generous welfare states) have 
done fairly well during and after the financial crisis compared to America and the southern European 
countries may be attributed to the welfare state reform during the 2000s. Hallerberg points out that 
the welfare state reforms, called Hartz ́s reforms120, undertaken during the Schröder ́s mandate 
were implemented as a reaction to the increase of the public deficit in 2003 to almost 3% of the 
GDP, which was marked as the limit by the EU. The Schröder administration undertook notable 
reforms (the major ones from reunification until nowadays) in the welfare state policies such as the 
reduction of unemployment benefits (from a flat rate to a percentage of the last salary; the creation 
the “1 euro jobs”121  (Hallerberg, 2013: 265), cuts in pensions and a steady increment of working 
age, and lastly the kurzarbeit, the program whose goal was to keep jobs during economic downturns 
by subsidising part of the salaries with public money  (Hallerberg, 2013). 
 
6. WELFARE STATES IN DEVELOPED VS. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Even though this is not a normative analysis one may deduce a lesson to be considered from social 
politics. First of all, it has to be taken into account that a country such as Germany, with a starting 
point of income inequality of 0,26 (Gini index) in 1990,122 may not have the same “urgency” to 
reduce income inequality rates as a country like Brazil that scored 0,61 the same year. Therefore, 
the focus of both governments on income inequality may differ. With this study about the evolution 
of welfare models and income inequality rates in a developed and developing country I try to shed 
some light on the behaviour of welfare models in terms of redistribution in different socioeconomic 
contexts. Scholars, such as Sala-i-Martin, have already mentioned the degree of development of a 
country as determinant in implementing a social policy or a different one. For example, in the case 
of social security programmes, they are fully introduced when a certain point of economic 
development is reached in a country (Sala-i-Martin, 1996). Considering the statistics of the present 
study, they are consistent with Sala-i-Martin conclusions. If one has a look at Figure 21, one may 
                                                          
120 Named after Peter Hartz the chairman of the commission. 
121 The state may require people on benefits for 1€ per hour. 




realise that the number of social security contributors steadily increased together with the GDP of 
Brazil, especially from the early 2000s to the mid-2010s.  
Figure 21. Social Security Contributors vs. GDP in Brazil 
 
 
The level of economic and institutional development of a country is also mentioned as an element 
that might alter the performance of social spending. In other words, if one developed country 
spends the same amount of money on the same budget allocations, they would perform differently 
than another less developed country (Foster, 2012).  
This comparison shows that, in fact, a function of social expenditure that includes a high proportion 
of social assistance policies (cash transfers), in a developing country such as Brazil have a negative 
causal effect on income inequality. Here, this causal effect is demonstrated, in some regressions in 
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contributors of a country may decrease the income inequality to the extent of 0,01 points of the 
Gini coefficient123.  
The institutional framework of the welfare state may be taken as one of the variables that define 
the degree of development of a country. Korpi and Palmer (1998) have studied this relation between 
welfare institutions and income inequality. The findings of their study show a causal effect between 
the two concepts: welfare institutions and income inequality. Specifically, it shows an interesting 
relation between the direction of a redistribution budget and income inequality, what they call the 
paradox of redistribution; The more focused on the poor through public transfers a policy is, the less 
likely it is to reduce poverty and inequality (Korpi & Palme, 1998). However, in their study they do 
not include any developing countries, only OECD countries.  




The focus on developed countries from Korpi & Palme (1998) may be the reason why in the case of 
Brazil this relation is not true, since Brazil, a country that has focused on the poor, has been able to 
tackle income inequality during the last two decades thanks (in part) to a basic goods approach 
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welfare policy. Both variables, social expenditure and social security contributors, have been able 
to affect income inequality levels in Brazil, however, the former shows greater regression 
coefficients124. Also, when social expenditure is deconstructed into social assistance and social 
security policies for Brazil, the growth of the former has outweighed the latter during the analysed 
period125, in financial terms. Particularly, this analysis mentions the conditional cash transfers and 
its stronger effect on developed countries than developing ones. This finding also supports the 
results of this thesis, that the social assistance expenditure (related to cash transfer policies to the 
poorest) in Brazil and Germany during the last decade and a half follow a dramatically different 
trend. In Figure 22, the evolution of social assistance spending in Germany and Brazil is put in 
contrast. For the former, social assistance soars from almost 3% of the total social expenditure in 
2000 to nearly 9% in 2013; whereas for the latter social assistance spent hoovers around 0,5% and 
0,7% of the total social expenditure. Also, if Brazil is compared with other emerging countries such 
as India and China, high economic growth rates have been followed by a sharp increase in income 
inequality during the past decades (UN, 2013: 36). 
Figure 23. Social security expenditure vs. social security contributors Brazil 
 
 
                                                          
124 See table 12. 
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The increase in social security contributors at the same time that social security expenditure 
decreases could be the reason why in the quantitative analysis the increase in social security 
contributors is predicted to reduce income inequality. The regressive character of the social security 
system in Brazil may have partially been reversed and currently covers a higher spectrum of the 
income distribution, including lower classes. This is a deduction from the data in Figure 23 but has 
not been completely demonstrated by the present study. However the same comparison between 
the number of social security contributors and the social security expenditure for Germany follows 
a different trend. The number of social security contributors is similar in 1991 than 2013. However, 
the proportion of the social expenditure expended on them is nearly 8% higher, which indicates that 
the people under formality conditions (most of the population in Germany) should be better 
covered. However, the percentile ratios analysis shows that the differences in gross salaries 
distribution between the 90th and 10th percentiles have steadily grown from 1994 to 2016126. 
Therefore, the deterioration of the labour market in Germany may explain the increase in income 
inequality from 1990 to 2016. Even considering this, the formality of the German social contract has 
not been threatened, and the distribution of income within the formal contract is arguably more 
unequal. 
Brazil, as a developing country, could face the gap between the richest and the poor by focusing on 
extreme poverty, reducing the 25,4 million people under the poverty line127, from 32,3 to 6,9 million 
(World Bank, 2018a). The conditional cash transfer programmes such as Bolsa Familia has proven to 
be effective in reducing income inequality during this period. However, Germany, as a developed 
country, has faced different challenges, above all, related to demographics: ageing population and 
low fertility rates have created an increase in social security expenditure (including healthcare 
costs), while the number of social security contributors was reducing dramatically128 until the 
incorporation of women into the labour market during the late 1990s and early 2000s; but also, the 
high cost of social security systems for companies (the core of the welfare system in Germany) has 
constrained their comparative advantage during the globalisation process.  
Looking at Figure 24, it is clearly recognisable that there is an opposite trend in Brazilian social 
assistance and social security expenditure (as a % of the total social expenditure). The same 
                                                          
126 See figure 25. 
127 According to the Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP). 




elements are contrasted above for Germany,129 and the chart shows an exact inverse trend for both 
elements. In Brazil social assistance expenditure steadily increased and social security expenditure 
shows a decrease between 2000 and 2013, with a change in both trends between 2013 and 2016.  
Germany follows the opposite trend; social assistance expenditure slowly declines while social 
security expenditure soars between 1990 and 2013.  
 
Both charts exemplify how both countries, one being a developed country and the other a 
developing country, has changed the configuration of the welfare state systems, and the impact of 
these changes in income inequality terms. However, the different outcomes, in income inequality 
terms, of social expenditure functions regarding the stage of development of a country may be 
interpreted in different ways. 
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7. PRE-DISTRIBUTION DEBATE 
The previous debates need to be complemented by the more recent debates on pre-distribution, 
income inequality, and social justice. Lastly, Joseph Hacker, has proposed to act on causes instead 
of on the consequences of income inequality, which he identifies with pre-distributive policies 
instead of post-distributive policies (Hacker, 2011). This debate on pre and post-distribution is 
relevant to this thesis, not merely because of the pragmatic implications of the variables studied on 
income inequality, but due to the political implications of pre-distribution policies on welfare states 
and on income inequality levels. It is relevant, for instance, to remember that income inequality is 
considered a major social issue, but also a macroeconomic problem because it can constrain 
economic growth, and reputable institutions, even conservative ones such as OECD or IMF (OECD, 
2011) (IMF, OECD), hold these concerns to be important. Therefore, policy makers, the ones in 
charge of taking decisions and implementing them to improve conditions of income inequality, have 
to face this dilemma between pre and post-distribution. These kinds of structural reforms aim to 
tackle income distribution within economic structures instead of acting after the markets distribute 
the income. 
It is important not to confuse this pre and post-distribution perspective with redistribution — both 
pre and post-distribution policies may be redistributive. The difference lies in the preventive 
character of pre-distribution and the palliative perspective taken by post-distributive policies. 
Therefore, post-distribution represents the opposite term of pre-distribution instead of 
redistribution. 
Even though Jacob Hacker has recently raised this debate, other reputable authors such as Tony 
Atkinson, who advocates for policy changes and for workers to have stronger negotiating power, 
also includes pre-distribution mandates as part of a list of recommendations. In his last book: 
Inequality. What can be Done? He mentions fifteen proposals to reduce the extent of inequality, 
many of them in line with the pre-distributive agenda: (a) a balance of power among stakeholders; 
(b) technological changes that would be accompanied by a strategy that increases employability; (c) 
the creation of a public investment authority in the form of a sovereign fund, so as to increase state 
net worth; (d) a set an explicit aims to increase employment and support it by extending public 
employment at a minimum wage (Atkinson, 2015: 237). Also, James Heckman, winner of the Nobel 
Prize in Economics in 2000, advocates for pre-distribution as way to tackle economic inefficiency, 
that is, not only is pre-distribution defended for social justice reasons but also to better the 




It is true that this classification has its drawbacks, given that it may become confusing when dealing 
with interactions between post and pre-distributive policies that may affect each other. In the words 
of Hacker: “it does not seem easy to determine a strict border between pre-distribution and post-
distribution when economic interactions, taxes and transfers act simultaneously (high taxes on high 
incomes generate incentives to negotiate higher wages).” 130  
To sum up, the two redistribution models proposed here follow a preventive and palliative focus, 
defined as pre-distribution and post-distribution respectively. It is not by chance that since the 
global financial crisis in 2008 this debate about the ways of facing inequality has been raised. This is 
when populations witness a change in productive economies under flexible specialization with 
greater job insecurity, wage contraction, and loss of union power. Also, since the 2000s, when the 
capital has provided higher rates of economic returns than economic growth of a country, capital 
gains have become far more concentrated than incomes from work (Piketty, 2014). These findings, 
obtained from Piketty ́s work Capital in the Twenty-First Century, show also that governments may 
only comprehensively face economic inequality from within market institutions. That is, following 
Piketty ́s reasoning, governments and public institutions cannot only address wages as a pre-
distribution policy, through education for example, if they want to face income inequality. Rather, 
they have to regulate the core of the market institution through measures such as taxes from capital 
gains or legacies, environmental taxation, or corporate governance if they really want to address 
income inequality. 
● Precarisation in Pre-distribution 
The division of work in the labour market represents a key element for social stratification that is in 
line with the thesis of the Weberian tradition.131 At present, division of labour is not only 
characterised by the division between the proletariat and managers, but different divisions have 
also emerged. I present this argument due to its relevance in considering the results of the German 
regressions with the percentile ratios as the dependent variable, whose data measures gross salaries 
instead of disposable income (Gini index). In this set of regressions, I have tested the pre-distributive 
character of the independent variables through the percentile ratios whose data measures gross 
salaries. This can be compared to the Gini coefficient, which measures the post-distributive 
character through disposable income or consumption. The conclusions are interesting, taking into 
                                                          
130 Quote taken from the session: Pre-distribution Policies to Fight Against Inequality, organised by 
Fundació Catalunya Europa.  




account the new divisions of labour in developed countries, such as Germany. The results are in line 
with the thesis of the author Guy Standing (2011) who brings up the new idea of precariat as the 
emergence of a new labour division created by new global market characteristics and the pursuit of 
economic growth at any price. Quoting the author:  
“The precariat has class characteristics. It consists of people who have 
minimal trust relationships with capital or the state, making it quite unlike 
the salariat. And it has none of the social contract relationships of the 
proletariat, whereby labour securities were provided in exchange for 
subordination and contingent loyalty, the unwritten deal underpinning 
welfare states. Without a bargain of trust or security in exchange for 
subordination, the precariat is distinctive in class terms. It also has a 
peculiar status position, in not mapping neatly onto high-status 
professional or middle-status craft occupations. One way of putting it is 
that the precariat has ‘truncated status’. And, as we shall see, its structure 
of ‘social income’ does not map neatly onto old notions of class or 
occupation” (Standing, 2011: 8) 
Following the argumentation of Standing and illustrating the precarisation of the job market in 
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Figure 25. Evolution of the percentile ratios in gross salaries in Germany 




for the three ratios: P90/P10, P90/P50 and P50/P10. There is a clear growth trend in income 
inequality for the ratio between the extremes of the distribution since 1994: P90/P10. The income 
distribution of both the upper and lower strata also follow the same pattern (even though it is less 
pronounced) and show an increase during the same period. Thus, this definition of the proletariat 
according to Standing (2011) may fit into the new underemployment relations in Germany, whose 
impact on income inequality is notable according to the positive relation (the increase in income 
inequality) between social security contributors and income inequality, measured by the percentile 
ratios.  
 
7.1. ROLE OF EDUCATION AS A PRE-DISTRIBUTIVE POLICY 
To recall the main reasons why education is taken as a control variable in this thesis, I introduce 
some studies such as Rudra’s (Rudra, 2004), which shows that only education has an unanimously 
negative impact (by decreasing) on income inequality rates. In contradistinction, the findings do not 
show the same effect with social security, healthcare, and welfare spending. The same conclusion 
is reached by Foster (2012), who defends the argument that better education is a driver to making 
a country more competitive in a global market. Although for education only the variable secondary 
school enrolment is taken in this thesis for the purpose of controlling the independent variables of 
the empirical study, namely social spending and social security contributors, it is revisited here as a 
pre-distributive policy. As Di Stasio and Solga mention: “all authors critically engage with the social 
investment state approach that sees in education and training investment the lynchpin of a pre-
distribution agenda protecting individuals from the new social risks of a competitive, knowledge-
driven economy” (Di Stasio and Solga, 2017: 1). 
Pre-distribution has been a priority in tackling income inequality in the Latin American region, and 
a structural view of income inequality for Latin American authors, above all in the form of 
structuralism, focused on the deeper reasons of this phenomenon instead of the consequences. 
According to these scholars, primary export countries (such as the Latin American ones) have proven 
not to be very successful in providing growth and welfare to its citizens because of unfair exchange 
terms between primary exports and imports from industrial countries (Prebish, 1962). For this 
purpose, the ISI model (developed by the structuralists) was undertaken by several countries in Latin 
America from the 1950s to the 1970s. However, none of them were able to fully implement the ISI 




added value would be higher than the primary one, thereby providing more economic growth and 
higher wages.  
In the case of Brazil, governments still follow some practises inherited through the ISI strategy, such 
as protectionism policies132 on high value manufactured goods in automobile or aviation industries. 
Hence, education became a key area of focus so that they could produce high skill workers to 
develop an industrialisation strategy coordinated by the state. On the contrary, as can be seen in 
the evolution of education expenditure in Figure 26, it was not a priority in public spending terms 
for Brazilian governments. The focus of the federal governments has followed a more basic needs 
approach rather than pursuing structural change in favour of pre-distribution.  
 
This argument is in line with the liberal neo-developmentalism approach to defining the Brazilian 
economic model, which on the one hand follows a basic goods needs strategy to alleviate extreme 
poverty that leaves behind the middle-class and is opposite to corporatist welfare models. On the 
other hand, it protects and focuses on key national industries in order to be competitive in the global 
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Figure 26. Brazil: % of Education Expenditure vs. Total Social Expenditure 





market and thereby create an industrial sector able to sustain a high wage model, which, in turn, 
could redistribute the gains before the government redistribution policies, such as social 
expenditure or social security structure. The same argument for international competition in the 
context of globalisation may apply also to Germany, whose social security model (an anchor of 
German corporatist welfare state) relies on high skill and educated workers to be competitive in 
high added value markets, which requires an education programme that meets the requirements of 
those industries. In the case of Germany, the dual educational system has become an essential part 
of the industrial model, in addition to the universal education system with its almost free tertiary 
education. This new focus in Germany on what can be seen as pre-distribution may be seen through 
the low rates of social assistance programmes compared to the other social expenditure budget 
allocations.133  
Another argument in favour of education as a pre-distributive policy, in LDCs such as Brazil, is the 
institutional limitations of governmental clientelist practices to allocate resources to middle and 
upper-middle classes, which leaves education as one of the only escape routes towards a better 
income opportunity for the poorer strata. When talking about social mobility, education is one of 
the main drivers to improving the position of a son/daughter in respect to his/her parents, according 
to different institutions and scholars (IMF, 2017) (Di Stasio, & Solga, 2017). Nevertheless, the degree 
of development of a country (in institutional terms) would determine the extent to which the human 
capital of a country is capitalised on by the state and rewarded by the private sector. In other words, 
the same skilled worker may enjoy a higher or lower wage depending on the country he/she works 
in. But, not only might income be affected by pre-distribution policies, welfare levels may as well.  
The countries that have a strong welfare state are the ones that invest in pre-distribution policies 
as well, argues Jacob Hacker.134 In a corporatist country such as Germany, where the welfare system 
relies mainly on worker contributions, it is reasonable to expect that pre-distribution policies are 
strongly related to income inequality since almost all of the population’s income comes from the 
formal labour market. This is in comparison to Brazil where the informal sector and unemployed 
people comprise a substantial share of the total population. Hence, pre-distribution policies such as 
education may prevent the necessity of post-distribution policies (and so public expenditure) to 
                                                          
133 See figure 20. 
134 Quote taken from the session: Predistribution Policies to Fight Against Inequality, organised by 




tackle inequalities resulting from within the economic system, which does not distribute the wealth 
of a country in a fair manner. 
 
7.2. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND CRITICS ABOUT PRE-DISTRIBUTION 
In conclusion, though pre-distribution policies such as education may lead to better income 
distributions, the institutional framework and industrialisation levels of a country need to be 
developed so as to reward high education levels. The higher the degree of development of a country 
the more effective education policies become in reducing income inequality. While, it is true that 
pre-distribution perspectives may not solve all the inequality problems of a country, it raises 
questions regarding the possibility of interactions between pre and post-distribution policies to face 
inequality. In fact, pre-distribution policies may be useful in order to distribute the wealth of a 
country before the government does it through redistribution policies, though no country has been 
able to get rid of income inequality only using these measures, and certainly not a developing 
country. Through the comparative study undertaken in this Chapter, it can be seen that social 
assistance policies (characteristic of a post-distribution model) may be useful to some extent to 
reduce income inequality in the early stages of development and even for those left behind in a 
developed country.  In liberal countries such as the USA (the main subject of study of Hacker), the 
focus on pre-distribution may be the site of a much-needed struggle against inequality, more so 
than countries such as Germany where the capitalist practices are muffled by a strong institutional 
framework. This fact that does not undermine the idea of a mixed redistributive agenda between 
pre and post-distribution and should be contextualised for every single country. 
Another critical point for a pre-distribution agenda comes from the central role attributed to the 
government in shaping an economic framework that is dominated by post-distribution policies. 
According to the critics, it neglects bottom-up relations that can influence the political agenda in the 
same direction as these prevention policies of income inequality. To quote Hacker, “the state cannot 
do everything” (Hacker, 2013), and social movements may trigger political initiatives that can then 
be discussed at national and international levels. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
In comparing the debates about welfare states with the results from the analysis undertaken and 




are not decisive. In the case of Brazil, the results show a negative effect between the independent 
variables (social expenditure and social security contributors) and the explained one (income 
inequality), although to a lesser degree than both countries together. In a country such as Brazil, 
where there are still high rates of poverty (even though they have improved it the last two decades), 
the last governments have not relied decisively on a pure welfare system according the typical OECD 
welfare classifications such as Esping-Andersen´s.  Rather, they have created a welfare structure 
that exists between the three models: corporatist, residual, and universal. This hybrid approach is 
being undertaken, for example, by increasing the number social security contributors, setting a 
universal minimum salary, and focusing on the poorest strata, respectively. This liberal neo-
developmentalism model followed by Brazilian governments since the 1990s have shown positive 
results in terms of income inequality reduction, although it has been giving some signals of 
exhaustion since 2012, and the decrease in social assistance expenditure135 together with the steady 
rise of social security contributors136 are indicative of a change of paradigm. Although the direction 
of these changes is not clear, some policies such as privatisation of healthcare and the education 
system indicates a liberal switch to a residual welfare model, while other policies such as minimum 
salary suggest a swift towards universalism.  
In the case of Germany, the low statistical significance obtained in the analysis does not allow for 
relevant conclusions regarding the relation between social security contributors and social 
expenditure in income inequality. However, by having a look at the longitudinal data-series 
(Appendix 8) one may extract some conclusions: the number of social security contributors has 
dropped from almost 37% of the population in the early 1990s to less than 32% in 2005 and then 
has rocketed to 38% in 2016, while in the meantime the Gini coefficient has soared steadily by 
almost 0,04 between the early 2000s and 2016137. Therefore, though the findings from the 
regression are not clear, one may conclude that the redistribution character of the social security 
system, at least in the past years, is not evident. This result is consistent with the “Siren song of 
deregulation” (Allen, 2003: 20) — the idea that Christopher Allen describes as the departure from 
an institutionalised market economy that characterise the Deutschland Model to the Anglo-
American model, which is more residual and less institutionalised. This new phenomenon may be 
seen, for example, through the decrease in bargaining power of workers, and the share of German 
                                                          
135 See Figure 18. 
136 See Figure 17. 




workers in trade unions dropping by almost half in the last 20 years, now representing less than 20 
percent of the German workforce (Allen, 2010). However, the point of departure in Germany in the 
beginning of the 1990s is radically different than in Brazil, since Germany is one of the most 
egalitarian countries in Europe and worldwide and Brazil is almost the opposite regionally and 
worldwide with Gini Index values of 60,1 in 1993 and 29,2 in 1994 respectively (World Bank, 2018c). 
Therefore, after the socioeconomic shock of reunification and globalisation, keeping the income 
inequality at the same level represented quite a challenge for the country. I launch a question 
regarding the formality of the social contract: has more people working under conditions of 
formality had a negative effect on income inequality? According to the results of this thesis the 
answer is: not always. In the case of Brazil, it can be determined that a greater number of social 
security contributors leads to income inequality. Interestingly though, for Germany it rather clearly 
has positively affected income inequality. That is, the higher number of people under formality 
conditions has resulted in higher income inequality levels. This conclusion may be deducted from 














CHAPTER 7.- CONCLUSIONS OF THE THESIS  
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I sum up the conclusions of this thesis, contributions, limitations, and considerations 
for further studies. The main goal of this chapter is to stress the main relevant points of this work. I 
understand a doctoral dissertation as an ongoing work, which aims to provide, through empirical 
findings, a contribution to the state of the art. Following this reasoning, in this chapter I aim to show 
not only the gap that this study fills, but also the limitations that remain unsolved and the possible 
future studies that may follow this thesis, partly based on these limitations.  
I will try to provide a convincing answer to the research questions following the results of the 
analyses undertaken. These conclusions revolve around these elements: (a) the effect of the 
independent variables on income inequality, (b) the formality of the social contract, (c) the extent 
to which the development of a country influences the effect of social policies on income inequality 
and (d) the relevance of social assistance versus social security policies. First, I introduce an overview 
of the results from the empirical study. Second, I introduce some theoretical conclusions to respond 
to the research questions and test the hypothesis posed at the beginning of the thesis, putting into 
dialogue the results of this analysis with other studies that either are in line with this work or refute 
it. Third, I mention the most striking contribution of this thesis, in other words, which gap in the 
academia this dissertation aims to fill. I advance that the main contribution concerns: (a) the new 
trend in welfare states in emerging countries and the new approach of focusing on the dimension 
of formality in the social contract; (b) the division of the social budget into different allocations in 
Germany and Brazil from 1990 to 2016 (according to Esping-Andersen ́s classification). Lastly, a 
methodological point concerning the comparison between Brazil and Germany will be made 
following an apple and oranges comparison model, which is not common in welfare studies. 
 
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Let us start by remembering the research questions as well as the hypotheses that I have tested 
during the present thesis: 
Which variable, social security contributors or social expenditure, is shown to 
have more of an impact on the reduction of income inequality in the analysis of 




H1: Generally, an increase in the social budget138 is important in reducing income inequality. 
However, the direction of the social expenditure determines the effect of this measure. The social 
policies based on the formal social contract, which are focused on the middle-working class working 
under conditions of formality, are predictably more effective in income inequality reduction than 
the residual ones. However, non-contributory social policies with low levels of social security 
contributors may improve inequality in high poverty contexts with a significant number of citizens 
living under conditions of informality.  
To what extent may the lessons from a developed country such as Germany, 
which is a paradigm of the corporatist welfare state, be applied to Brazil to 
reduce its high income inequality levels? 
H2: Taking Esping-Andersen’s welfare classifications (1990), the corporatist welfare model is 
effective in reducing income inequality as long as the formal labour market remains strong in the 
country. The combination of both elements has been proven very effective in Germany, as it has 
enjoyed one of the lowest income inequality levels following this Bismarckian approach after WWII 
until the late 1980s when the German reunification happened. In contrast, the hybrid welfare model 
of Brazil that pays more attention to the poor has been characteristic of most capitalist societies, 
which arguably represent the most unequal among the developed countries. At the same time, it 
maintains a public social security system whose beneficiaries does not represent the whole working 
class of the country due to the high levels of informality 
H3: The socioeconomic structures, in terms of development, play an important role when the same 
welfare model is followed by different countries. In a context of high level of informality, such as in 
Brazil, residual policies may reduce income inequality levels until a certain level of formality is 
reached, then a corporatist welfare model might be more effective in reducing income inequality 
levels.  
 
3. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to conclude with answers to the research questions a general observation concerning social 
inequality, the social contract, and welfare policies in the two countries studied will be made. In the 
case of Brazil, the historical socioeconomic dynamics of high levels of duality and inequality between 
                                                          




social groups have held for the past few decades. However, an era of left-wing parties having 
executive power have precipitated a turning point in terms of the reconstruction of the social 
contract. Both formal and informal social contracts have been affected, as can be seen in the impact 
of both social security and social assistance policies on income inequality. The numbers are clear — 
there are more people working under formal conditions139 and the budget for assistance has 
increased through conditional cash transfers in the same period. Even considering this, other 
elements of the social policies, such as those concerning education and healthcare, have followed a 
liberal approach, which makes the welfare state system a hybrid between the universal and the 
corporatist one, following the Esping-Andersen (1990) classification. In the case of Germany, the 
historical Bismarckian roots still hold for Germany despite the challenges the country has faced since 
1990. However, income inequality has slightly increased during this period. The high-skill and high-
wages model is not the norm anymore, and the system has accommodated a new labour market for 
those underqualified within the high added value industries, combined with a set of non-
contributory benefits, the Hartz IV. While it is true that there is no informal-formal division like the 
one in Brazil, a new division within the formal social contract has arisen during the past decades. 
The results of this thesis show with the empirical and descriptive analyses that this trend is moving 
towards a more liberal socioeconomic model, above all, in terms of welfare state policies. 
In order to answer the research questions with more specificity and to test the hypotheses of the 
thesis, I continue with the summary of the results. Social expenditure seems to be effective in 
reducing income inequality when both welfare models are taken as one case study. The hypothesis 
that increasing the social expenditure budget has a negative relation with income inequality is 
accepted according to this study. This result is in line with the evidence regarding the causal effect 
reported by different authors (Anderson et al., 2017). The variable social security contributors does 
not show a clear pattern according to the quantitative analysis. However, when percentile ratios of 
gross salary distribution are taken as a dependent variable, it shows a positive relation between the 
variables. In other words, increasing the social security contributors leads to higher income 
inequality levels. This behaviour of the variables makes sense for Germany during the analysed 
period for the reason highlighted in the following central point of the conclusions: the formality of 
the social contract.  This conclusion is complementary to the main outcomes of the contextual and 
the empirical study: 
                                                          




• Both variables, social expenditure and social security contributors may influence income 
inequality levels.  
• In general, social expenditure has a negative effect on income inequality levels taking two 
different cases of study, Germany and Brazil. 
• In Brazil, social assistance policies (non-contributory) in the form of cash-transfers have 
worked as a bridge from poverty to formality in Brazil. 
• However, the social policies in Brazil have not guaranteed continuity (within the formal 
social contract) from low & middle classes to higher strata yet.  
• In Germany, the variable social security contributions positively influence income inequality 
(in gross income terms, pre-tax distribution). Thus, an increase in social security 
contributors might be a predictor of more income inequality within the formal labour 
market. 
• The degree of development was a key determinant in the success of social policies in 
reducing income inequality. Social assistance policies may positively affect income 
inequality until a certain point of development is reached by a country. 
• The inclusion of citizens in the formal social contract of a developing country, such as Brazil, 
could be an indicator of an improvement in income inequality levels. However, this depends 
on the strength of the labour market the social security configuration.  
 
3.1. EMERGING CONSIDERATIONS: LDCS VS. OECD COUNTRIES, CLOSING THE GAP? 
The stimulating selection of Brazil and Germany as the cases of study for this thesis presented a 
challenge given the important differences between them, above all the degree of development of 
each country. However, during the period of time chosen for the study (from 1990 to 2016) the 
degree of development of Germany has not changed as much as it has in Brazil;  If one measures 
the degree of development through the GDP, Germany’s roughly doubled from approximately 1,8 
to 3,5 trillion (2018 US$) between 1990 and 2016 whereas the Brazilian GDP shows a fourfold 
increase from 0,5 to 1,8 trillion dollars (2018 US$) in the same period (World Bank, 2018b). However, 
one of the goals of this comparative study was to test the different effects of welfare policies on 
income inequality for different stages of development through an empirical study. The differences 




particular socioeconomic contexts. I have been arguing that social assistance and social security 
policies may help to decrease income inequality depending on the context of a country, especially 
in terms of wealth distribution and the degree of institutionalisation, among other factors. 
Therefore, there is not a general recipe for income inequality reduction, but rather a mix of policies 
that may address different interest groups. The direction of these policies depends upon the 
politician. 
One of the main challenges for Brazil in the early 1990s with the new era of democracy was none 
other than structural socioeconomic inequality. However, macroeconomic indicators such as 
inflation and external deficits did not allow for high amounts of spending on social issues. Theirs was 
a hybrid model and on the social side it focused on the poor. In the economic arena, maintaining 
high levels of interest rates to control the inflation rates was proven to be effective in income 
inequality reduction during this period. Germany, as a contrasting case, was enjoying one of its 
lowest levels of inequality in 1990 before the Berlin Wall fell. However, during the 1990s the country 
struggled to maintain its status quo due to internal and external factors, such reunification and 
globalisation. The policies Germany has followed to maintain their levels of well-being of its 
population seems to differ from the Bismarckian pillars upon which the German socioeconomic 
model was founded, based on codetermination and solidarity principles.  
To sum up, opposite trends for Germany and Brazilian social contracts and their impacts on income 
distribution may suggest a confluence between developing and developed countries. Brazil has been 
able to reduce income inequality by both focusing on the poor and decreasing the budget for social 
security, which has not traditionally been very progressive in redistribution terms. At the same time, 
Germany has steadily increased social security expenditure (in part due to the ageing population) 
but decreased social assistance, worsening the living conditions of the people outside of the formal 
social contract (residual part of the population). This has, above all, increased the precarity of the 
labour market and allocated more influence to the pre-distribution of income.  
 
4. LIMITATIONS & CONSIDERATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH DIRECTIONS  
Throughout the thesis I have been mentioning various limitations of this work. The limitations may 
be grouped in different categories regarding their nature:  conceptual, operational and 
methodological. In terms of the first category, some limitations are related to the difficulty of 




the degree of formality of the social contract, but there are many more dimensions that could be 
considered as defining the social contract, such as democracy, freedom, or political representation. 
I am aware of the complexity of the social contract concept, which is the reason why I delimit the 
extent of the thesis to the formality aspect of social contract.  Also, once I had chosen the variables 
there were some difficulties in operationalising them. In the case of social expenditure, I have taken 
the definition from the OECD and adapted it for Brazil due to the lack of availability in the same 
database of the OECD.stat, which provides the data from Germany. In the case of social security 
contributors, it was harder to make the data comparable given the different social security systems 
which do not include the same working groups. The main limitation was that Germany does not 
include public servants within the public social security system, whereas in Brazil they are included. 
While it is true that this thesis only focused on public policies and not private ones, it makes sense 
that citizens outside of the public social security systems are not included, even though they may 
represent a notable proportion of the total population.  
Methodological limitations have also presented challenges throughout this thesis. The main one is 
related to the low number of cases taken for the study. Only two cases were selected, namely Brazil 
and Germany, which could represent a limitation for the quantitative analysis. However, I have 
chosen a specific formula from Stata, the xtpcse, that could compensate for this and it is specifically 
for “linear cross-sectional time-series models when the disturbances are not assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed.”140 Moreover, the low number of variables has also been a 
limitation for the thesis, not in the conceptual sense whose argumentation I believe is correct,141 
but from the statistical point of view. I have tried to overcome this limitation by adding a control 
variable, education, in order to provide more robustness to the regression analysis. Also, I have 
created more variables from the original ones, lag and lead, to finally obtain eleven different 
regressions that test different variations of the original hypothesis. 
Concerning income inequality, the phenomenon that I have been attempting to explain through the 
concept of the social contract, the Gini index brings some advantages but also some limitations to 
this thesis. The universal use of this index to measure income inequality, not only by economists but 
also by social scientists in general, provides a high degree of comparability with other studies and 
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141 As has already been mentioned in the conceptual limitations, I only focus on the formality aspect of 




easy availability of the secondary data in the main databases. However, the over-sensitivity of Gini 
for middle classes neglects the variations in the share of incomes at the extremes. 
Concerning the above-mentioned limitations, there are various lines of research that could be 
furthered and that could enrich the conclusions of this thesis. Starting with the first methodological 
limitation of this study, namely the low number of cases, a quantitative analysis could be undertaken 
for a higher number of cases. This can be done for different purposes: on the one hand, the 
comparison study may include more countries from both Latin America and Europe. This aligns with 
the growing interest in comparison studies and collaborations between these regions, reflected by 
the creation of the EU – LAC Foundation as a result of the VI Summit of Heads of State and 
Government. Also, with more countries incorporated in the analysis the researcher could use other 
statistical treatments such as a multilevel treatment, which requires a higher number of clusters 
than the multilinear regression analysis used in the present thesis. 
Moreover, there is space to do research with a regional focus on Latin American and Caribbean 
countries following the same methodologies and this could contribute to the new current of studies 
on welfare states in emerging countries.  
Regarding the variables, further studies may include different variables that more accurately 
measure the formality of social contracts, regardless of the number of cases. For example, instead 
of using secondary variables such as social security contributors, the researcher could use surveys 
to better understand the formal situation of workers, that is, the people contributing to private 
security systems or mutual insurances or other anomalies missed by this thesis. Also, a 
disaggregation of the total social expenditure by contributory and non-contributory benefits may 
be included in future quantitative analysis.  
Another line of study that could be a fruitful departure from this thesis may be related to pre-tax 
and post-tax distribution. As we have seen, authors such as Jacob Hacker (2011) has brought the 
debate about pre-distribution to political agendas. While it is true that education has been chosen 
as a control variable and represents a pre-distributive variable as opposed to a social expenditure, 
a thorough analysis with the money invested in policies and their effect on both types of 
distributions could enrich pre and post distribution debates. Furthermore, a study that includes 
developed and developing countries could produce knowledge on the behaviour of social policies 




Lastly, the reader has to consider the fact that the present thesis did not consider the changes which 
occurred in the last three years in the socioeconomic contexts of both countries, Brazil and 
Germany, mainly due to the lack of data availability. This is of special importance if one considers 
recent elections in Brazil, which influences both political aspects, as well as social issues such as 
income inequality and poverty. One could even go as far as stating that certain aspects, and 
especially income inequality do not play any role under the current president Bolzonaro. If one 
considers Germany, it may be stated that the political scenery has not changed as radical as the 
Brazilian one, yet certain aspects need to be considered. Some voices for instance consider the 
arrival of another economic depression, which would affect any attempt to broaden the welfare 
state in Germany. When at the time these words are being written, the most important elements 
of the social agenda may state to be the basic pension (Grundrente). Thus, it might be very 
interesting to update this thesis, following the same methodology I have undertaken (with the 
pertinent changes), in order to understand which direction the social contracts of Brazil and 
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2. Income inequality 1990 - 2014 (BRAZIL) Gini coefficient  
 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
0,61 0,60* 0,58 0,60 0,60* 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,60 0,59 0,59* 0,60 
      
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
0,59 0,58 0,57 0,57 0,56  0,56  0,55  0,54   0,54* 0,53 0,53  0,53 
    
2014 2015 2016 
0,52    
*Parameter estimated by mean imputation 









1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
0,26  0,26* 0,26 0,26 0,27 0,27 0,26 0,26 0,26 0,26 0,26 0,27 
      
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
0,28  0,28 0,29 0,30 0,29 0,30 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29 0,29** 0,29** 
    
2014 2015 2016 
0,31** 0,30**  
*Parameter estimated by mean imputation 
**New income definition OECD 








       
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013  
26,1  26,6  26,0  26,3  25,0  24,1  24,2  26,7  25,9  24,7  24,6  24,8   
     
2014 2015 2016  
24,9  25,0 25,3   












   
   
   
DESPESA DA UNIÃO POR FUNÇÃO 
ORÇAMENTOS FISCAL E DA SEGURIDADE SOCIAL 
JANEIRO A DEZEMBRO DE 2015 
 




 INSCRITAS EM RP NÃO 
PROCESSADOS  
Valor Nominal  Valor Nominal  
Legislativa 
          
5.914.445.039,23  
                                                
337.799.360,60  
Judiciária 
        
25.500.561.021,94  
                                             
1.837.304.900,62  
Essencial à Justiça 
          
4.944.738.638,56  
                                                
497.000.496,90  
Administração 
        
18.264.588.405,24  
                                             
1.056.104.872,98  
Defesa Nacional 
        
32.888.538.143,99  
                                             
5.271.346.071,02  
Segurança Pública 
          
6.865.839.396,32  
                                             
1.134.980.108,79  
Relações Exteriores 
          
2.958.007.169,19  
                                                  
54.585.367,01  
Assistência Social 
        
69.176.728.067,03  
                                             
2.510.089.028,72  
Previdência Social 
      
513.582.768.598,3
4  






        
92.154.111.989,26  
                                             
7.446.839.176,58  
Trabalho 
        
65.089.574.582,72  
                                             
1.975.353.191,67  
Educação 
        
78.288.377.029,24  
                                           
10.771.018.698,09  
Cultura 
             
783.592.370,10  
                                                
965.054.347,53  
Direitos da Cidadania 
             
635.295.114,26  
                                                
564.598.529,07  
Urbanismo 
          
1.083.901.568,70  
                                             
3.186.515.990,65  
Habitação 
                 
2.391.943,72  
                                                  
66.216.485,77  
Saneamento 
             
259.588.717,48  
                                                
833.198.740,80  
Gestão Ambiental 
          
2.813.691.102,50  
                                             
1.721.300.075,35  
Ciência e Tecnologia 
          
5.807.384.531,11  
                                             
1.958.001.828,61  
Agricultura 
        
17.132.890.604,06  
                                             
3.059.808.404,56  
Organização Agrária 
          
1.558.020.857,25  
                                             
1.359.752.597,23  
Indústria 
          
1.790.798.543,65  
                                                
215.796.921,20  
Comércio e Serviços 
          
1.102.064.557,31  
                                             
3.062.147.858,53  
Comunicações 
          
1.074.339.704,96  
                                                
161.090.519,72  
Energia 
          
1.467.103.038,49  
                                                
280.453.444,35  
Transporte 
          
9.521.702.809,63  
                                             
5.260.937.151,84  
Desporto e Lazer 
             
651.420.843,63  
                                             
1.375.709.540,93  
Encargos Especiais² 
      
685.207.793.790,4
1  
                                           
17.165.051.515,36  
SUBTOTAL 
   
1.646.520.258.178
,31  





Encargos Especiais - Refinanciamento 
      
571.628.348.415,3
7  
                                                                     
-    
Refinanciamento da Dívida Mobiliária 
      
463.280.404.726,4
5  
                                                                     
-    
Correção Monetária e Cambial da Dívida Mobiliária 
      
105.827.951.604,5
6  
                                                                     
-    
Refinanciamento da Dívida Contratual 
          
2.519.992.084,36  
                                                                     
-    
Correção Monetária e Cambial da Dívida 
Contratada 
                                  
-    
                                                                     
-    
TOTAL 
   
2.218.148.606.593
,68  
                                           
74.724.509.889,14  
 
Source: SIAFI - STN/CCONT/GEINC 
Notes: Excluding intra-budgetary operations, which may be obtained from the Summary Budget Execution Report 
for the same period. 
¹ Value updated based on IGP-DI de 2015/2016 de 1   


















1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
11,0 9,2 9,4 12,3 12,0 11,7 11,3 11,3 12,3 12,4 11,6 12,0 
      
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 













1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
27,7 26,1* 24,4 22,5 22,8* 23,0 22,9 22,8 22,3 22,2 22,6* 23,1 
      
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 





*Parameter estimated by mean imputation 








1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
  36,4 35,2 34,7 34,4 33,9 33,3 33,2 33,5 33,8 33,8 
      
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
33,4 32,7 32,1 31,7 32 32,6 33,4 33,4 33,9 35,4 36 36,7* 
  
2014 2015 2016 
37,3 37,7* 38 
 
*Parameter estimated by mean imputation 




9. Net enrolment rates secondary school (1990 – 2014): Share of youths in secondary school age 




1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
17,0 18,4* 19,8 20,5 22,3* 24,1 26,7 29,0 33,0 36,3 39,0* 41,6 
      
2002 2003 2004** 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 




*Parameter estimated by mean imputation. **From 2004 rural north is included 




10. Gross enrolment ratio (1991 – 2014): expressed as a percentage of the population of official 




1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
 99,5 101,0 105,7 105,7 104,9 104,4 104,2 99,0 99,1 99,8 100,6 
      
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 




* The number can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because 
of early or late school entrance and grade repetition. 




11. Table of results of Brazil and Germany together. Independent variables: social expenditure and 














12. Table of results of Brazil and Germany together. Independent variables: social expenditure and 
social security contributors, control variable: secondary school enrolment, dependent variable: 














13. Table of results of Brazil and Germany together. Independent variables: social expenditure 













14. Table of results of Brazil and Germany together. Independent variables: social expenditure 
lagged (1 year) and social security contributors, control variable: secondary school enrolment, 













15. Table of results of Brazil and Germany together. Independent variables: social expenditure and 
social security contributors, dependent variable: income inequality measured by Gini coefficient 














16. Table of results of Brazil and Germany together.  Independent variables: social expenditure and 
social security contributors control variable: secondary school enrolment dependent variable: 













17. Table of results of Brazil and Germany together. Independent variables: social expenditure, 
security contributors and Gini lagged (1 year); dependent variable: income inequality measured 












18. Table of results of Brazil and Germany together. Independent variables: social expenditure, 
social security contributors and Gini lagged (1 year); control variable: secondary school 












19. Table of results of Brazil and Germany together. Independent variables: social expenditure and 
social security contributors, control variable: secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year), 













20. Table of results of Brazil and Germany together. Independent variables: social expenditure 
lagged (1 year) and social security contributors, control variable: secondary school enrolment 












21. Table of results of Brazil and Germany together. Independent variables: social expenditure 
lagged (1 year), social security contributors and Gini lagged (1 year), control variable: secondary 












22. Table of results of Brazil. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 














23. Table of results of Brazil. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 
contributors, control variable: secondary school enrolment, dependent variable: income 













24. Table of results of Brazil. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social 














25. Table of results of Brazil and Germany together. Independent variables: social expenditure 
lagged (1 year) and social security contributors, control variable: secondary school enrolment, 













26. Table of results of Brazil. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 













27. Table of results of Brazil.  Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 
contributors control variable: secondary school enrolment dependent variable: income 













28. Table of results of Brazil. Independent variables: social expenditure, security contributors and 













29. Table of results of Brazil. Independent variables: social expenditure, social security contributors 
and Gini lagged (1 year); control variable: secondary school enrolment dependent variable: 












30. Table of results of Brazil. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 
contributors, control variable: secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year), dependent variable: 












31. Table of results of Brazil. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social 
security contributors, control variable: secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year), dependent 













32. Table of results of Brazil. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year), social 
security contributors and Gini lagged (1 year), control variable: secondary school enrolment 












33. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 













34. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 
contributors, control variable: secondary school enrolment, dependent variable: income 














35. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social 














36. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social 
security contributors, control variable: secondary school enrolment, dependent variable: 













37. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 














38. Table of results of Germany.  Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 
contributors control variable: secondary school enrolment dependent variable: income 













39. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure, security contributors 













40. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure, social security 
contributors and Gini lagged (1 year); control variable: secondary school enrolment dependent 












41. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 
contributors, control variable: secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year), dependent variable: 












42. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social 
security contributors, control variable: secondary school enrolment lagged (5 year), dependent 













43. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year), social 
security contributors and Gini lagged (1 year), control variable: secondary school enrolment 












44. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 















45. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 













46. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social 














47. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social 













48. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 












49. Table of results of Germany.  Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 













50. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure, security contributors 













51. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure, social security 













52. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 












53. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social 














54. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year), social 
security contributors and Gini lagged (1 year), control variable: secondary school enrolment 













55. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 














56. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 















57. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social 














58. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social 














59. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 













60. Table of results of Germany.  Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 













61. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure, security contributors 













62. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure, social security 













63. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 













64. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social 













65. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year), social 
security contributors and Gini lagged (1 year), control variable: secondary school enrolment 












66. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 














67. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 














68. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social 













69. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social 











70. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 












71. Table of results of Germany.  Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 













72. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure, security contributors 













73. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure, social security 













74. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure and social security 












75. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year) and social 














76. Table of results of Germany. Independent variables: social expenditure lagged (1 year), social 
security contributors and Gini lagged (1 year), control variable: secondary school enrolment 
lagged (5 year), dependent variable: P50/P10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
